Humphrey v. Hall

• Decision Date: 28 March 2022
• Docket Number: CIVIL 1:19cv362-HSO-RHWR
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi
• Parties: OMAR KHAYYAM HUMPHREY PLAINTIFF v. PELICIA HALL, et al. DEFENDANTS

OMAR KHAYYAM HUMPHREY PLAINTIFF
v.
PELICIA HALL, et al. DEFENDANTS

CIVIL No. 1:19cv362-HSO-RHWR

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Southern Division

March 28, 2022

ORDER OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION [72]; ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [71]; DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION [55] FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION [62] FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S REMAINING CLAIMS

HALIL SULEYMAN OZERDEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

BEFORE THE COURT are (1) Plaintiff Omar Khayyam Humphrey's Objection [72] to the Report and Recommendation [71] of United States Magistrate Judge Robert H. Walker; (2) Plaintiff's Motion [55] for Summary Judgment; and (3) Defendants' Motion [62] for Summary Judgment. Based upon a review of the parties' submissions, the record, and relevant legal authority, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Plaintiff's Motion [55] for Summary Judgment be denied, that Defendants' Motion [62] for Summary Judgment be granted, and that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed. See R. & R. [71] at 16.

After thoroughly reviewing Plaintiff's Objection [72], the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [71], the record, and relevant legal authority, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Objection [72] should be overruled and that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [71] should be adopted as modified herein. Defendants' Motion [62] for Summary Judgment should be granted, and

1

Plaintiff's Motion [55] for Summary Judgment should be denied. Plaintiff's remaining claims in this case will be dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Humphrey's claims

Plaintiff Omar Khayyam Humphrey (“Plaintiff” or “Humphrey”) is a postconviction inmate in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (“MDOC”), incarcerated at the South Mississippi Correctional Institution (“SMCI”) in Leakesville, Mississippi. See, e.g., Tr. [62-1] at 8; Ex. [62-2] at 1. He is serving a life sentence without eligibility for parole for homicide. See Mem. [63] at 1.

On June 26, 2019, ^[1] Plaintiff filed the Complaint [1] in this case advancing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of his incarceration at the SMCI. Humphrey named as Defendants 12 individuals who either work at SMCI or for MDOC-Pelicia Hall, Joe Errington, Joshua Csaszar, Regina Reed, Penny Bufkin, James Cooksey, Joseph Cooley, Sheneice Hartfield-Evans, Roylandia McBride, Andrew Mills, Andrian Keys, and Richard Pennington. See Compl. [1] at 1-3, 14-15.^[2]

The Complaint [1] alleges that

2

Defendants are violating the 8^th and 14^th Amendments to the U.S. Constitutions [sic] by failing to provide conditions of confinement that offer prisoners reasonable safety and protection from harm/violence. The policies and practices at SMCI subject members of the SMCI class to a substantial risk of serious harm and injury. And unsafe living conditions. [sic] And the (PLRA). [sic]

Id. at 3.^[3] As a postconviction inmate, Plaintiff essentially raises a conditions-of-confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment, but he asserts no physical injuries as a result of Defendants' alleged constitutional violations. See id.; Tr. [62-1] at 13-14. Plaintiff's alleged injuries consist of psychological injuries, specifically anxiety and “having a hard time sleeping.” Tr. [62-1] at 13-14.

B. The parties' Motions [55], [62] for Summary Judgment

Humphrey has filed an “offensive” Motion [55] for Summary Judgment, seeking summary judgment in his favor. See Mot. [55]. Humphrey asserts that Defendants are deliberately indifferent to their own policies and practices, specifically with respect to understaffing and inadequate supervision, resulting in a substantial risk of harm to him as a “non-gang inmate.” Mem. [56] at 2. He contends that there is “overwhelming proof” that SMCI is “1) grossly understaffed and as a result (2) the gangs are running the prison in which 3) defendants are being ‘deliberate[ly] indifferent' to the aforementioned.” Id. at 3. According to Humphrey, “SMCI['s] severe understaffing exposes [him] as a non-gang inmate and inmates similarly situated to serious harm, ” id. at 5, and “SMCI does not

3

reasonably protect prisoners from rampant violence, ” id. at 6. Defendants have filed a Response [65] to Humphrey's Motion [55], see Resp. [65], contending that Humphrey has offered “only conclusory allegations, unsupported by any fact, ” id. at 2, and that Humphrey's Motion [55] for Summary Judgment should be denied, see id.

Defendants have filed their own Motion [62] for Summary Judgment, seeking dismissal of all claims asserted against them. See Mot. [62] at 1-2. To the extent Defendants are sued in their official capacities, they take the position that such claims “are due to be dismissed because the Eleventh Amendment prohibits actions for damages against a state actor without the state's consent, ” and that the State of Mississippi's sovereign immunity extends to a state agency or entity such as MDOC, which is deemed to be an arm of the State. Mem. [63] at 5-6 (citing Brooks v. George County, Mississippi, 84 F.3d 157, 168 (5th Cir. 1996); Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 2002)). Defendants further assert that the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply here. See Id. at 7 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)).

With respect to claims against Defendants in their individual capacities, they maintain that they are each entitled to qualified immunity, as there is no evidence of deliberate indifference. See Id. at 7-12. As for Defendant former Commissioner Pelicia Hall, Defendants argue that Humphrey has not shown the existence of a policy of understaffing and that, according to Humphrey's own testimony, there is no such policy adopted by Hall. See Id. at 12-13. With respect to Humphrey's claims against Defendants Andrew Mills, Roylandia McBride, and Sheneice Evans

4

for allegedly participating in gang activity, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff's broad and conclusory allegations are insufficient to withstand summary judgment. See Id. at 13.

To the extent Humphrey is asserting Defendants did not adequately respond to his letters and complaints about prison violence, Defendants argue that “this simply does not rise to the level of a constitutional claim.” Id. at 13. As for Humphrey's claims concerning Defendants Richard Pennington and Joseph Cooley that they handled the facility's Administrative Review Program (“ARP”) in a deliberately indifferent manner, Defendants posit that this claim is frivolous because Humphrey “has no constitutional right to a grievance procedure and has no due process liberty interest in having his grievance resolved to his satisfaction.” Id. at 14. Likewise, Defendants maintain that to the extent Humphrey charges that any Defendant failed to follow an MDOC or standard operating procedure, this alone is not a violation of Humphrey's constitutional rights. See Id. at 14-15.

Defendants also assert that Plaintiff has not shown any physical injury and cannot bring a civil action for only mental or emotional injuries. See Id. at 16-18 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)). Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit, requiring dismissal of his claims. See Id. at 18-24.

Humphrey responds that he did not fail to exhaust his administrative remedies because staffing is a personnel matter not subject to the ARP, meaning that exhaustion was not required. See Resp. [67] at 2-3 (citing Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 675-76 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Casanova v. Dubois, 304 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 2002)).

5

Humphrey further claims that Defendants have generally obstructed the ARP process at the prison by improperly preventing him from completing the grievance procedure. See Id. at 3-4. Humphrey relies upon one ARP, number SMCI-19-0604 concerning “deficient staffing, ” that was “rejected due to no available process, ” id. at 3; therefore, he argues that dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies would be improper, see Id. at 3-4 (citing Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1249-50 (10th Cir. 2010)); see also Ex. [1-2] at 1-4 (ARP number SMCI-19-0604); Compl. [1] at 4, 7-8 (relying upon only rejected ARP number SMCI-19-0604 to assert exhaustion of administrative remedies).

Humphrey insists that he has demonstrated deliberate indifference on Defendants' part and that he has presented evidence that prison officials were aware of a substantial risk of harm to him. See Id. at 5-9. According to Humphrey, gang members in SMCI have “unchecked authority” over non-gang members such as him, and “SMCI is understaffed and to make up for this deficiency allow [sic] the gangs to run/control the housing units etc.” Id. at 10. Finally, Humphrey contends that Defendants were on notice of constitutional deficiencies and did not act responsibly in addressing them. See Id. at 10-11.

C. The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [71]

The Magistrate Judge entered a Report and Recommendation [71] determining that Plaintiff did not properly exhaust his claims, such that they should be dismissed. See R. & R. [71] at 4-8. As for the claims against Defendants in their official capacities, the Magistrate Judge found that they were subject to dismissal on grounds of sovereign immunity. See Id. at 8-10. The Magistrate

6

Judge further concluded that dismissal of these claims was appropriate because Defendants in their official capacities are not persons who can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Id. at 10-11. With respect to claims against Defendants in their individual capacities, the Magistrate Judge found that each Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. See Id. at 11-16. The Magistrate Judge therefore recommended that Defendants' Motion [62] for Summary Judgment be granted, that Humphrey's Motion [55] for Summary...