Humphrey v. Sisk
| Decision Date | 20 December 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 19210,19210 |
| Citation | 890 S.W.2d 18 |
| Parties | Joseph HUMPHREY and Donna Humphrey, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Rocky SISK and Gay Sisk, his wife, and Gary Lee Melton and Debra Kay Melton, his wife, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Daniel T. Moore, L. Joe Scott & Daniel T. Moore, Poplar Bluff, for appellants.
Mark A. Kennedy, Kennedy & Kennedy, Poplar Bluff, for respondents.
Plaintiffs brought this action against defendants, seeking to quiet title to certain real estate and a declaration that they are the owners. Plaintiffs' petition alleged that they were the record owners of the property. Defendants' answer denied that allegation and alleged that defendants were the owners by reason of adverse possession. 1 Defendants filed a counterclaim, seeking a declaration that they are the owners. Each side requested monetary relief.
The trial court, sitting without a jury, entered a judgment in favor of defendants. The court found that defendants are vested with fee simple title in the property, that defendants Sisk have an undivided one-half interest and defendants Melton have an undivided one-half interest, and that plaintiffs have no interest. Claims of both sides for money damages were denied. Plaintiffs appeal.
The land in dispute is the following described property located in Butler County:
All that part of the northeast quarter of the northwest quarter lying west of County Road 462, except for ten acres lying along the west side and all that part of the southeast quarter of the northwest quarter lying west of County Road 462, all in Section 13, Township 24 North, Range 4 East, located in Butler County, Missouri.
This opinion will refer to that tract as "the property."
Plaintiffs present four points on appeal. Their first three points allege that the trial court erred, for various reasons, in adjudicating title to the property to be in defendants. Their fourth point is that the trial court erred in failing to adjudicate title to the property in plaintiffs because plaintiffs "had a better claim to [the property] than defendants based on plaintiffs' quit claim deeds from the last record owners of [the property]."
Plaintiffs made no effort to base their claim of ownership on adverse possession. In the trial court, and in this court, plaintiffs' claim is based on the sole ground that they hold the record title.
Plaintiffs must succeed upon the strength of their own title and if they failed to prove prima facie that they hold record title, they have no interest in the land. Baugh v. Grigsby, 286 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Mo.1956). If plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie showing of record title in them, and they claim no other title, the trial court correctly adjudged that they had no title or interest in the property. Id., at 803. If plaintiffs have no title to the property, they are not aggrieved by a judgment adjudging title in defendants and may not complain thereof. Id., at 803; Harrington v. Muzzy, 258 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Mo.1953).
For the reasons which follow, this court holds that plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie showing of record title in them and that plaintiffs' fourth point has no merit. It is unnecessary to consider plaintiffs' first three points.
Appellate review of this nonjury action is governed by Rule 73.01(c), 2 as construed in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). The judgment of the trial court will be sustained unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, or unless it declares or applies the law erroneously. On appeal, the trial court's judgment is presumed valid and the burden is on plaintiffs, as appellants, to demonstrate incorrectness of the judgment. Delaney v. Gibson, 639 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Mo. banc 1982).
At the trial, plaintiffs introduced into evidence various deeds and other documents describing the property or a portion of it. Defendants introduced Exhibit A, an abstract of title to all of the Northwest Quarter of Section 13, Township 24 North, Range 4 East, in Butler County, which included the property and other land adjacent to it. Plaintiffs' brief makes no mention of Exhibit A, which is 141 pages long. No witness gave an opinion, based on Exhibit A, as to the identity of the holder of record title to the property.
Plaintiffs' exhibits bearing upon the record title to the property are set forth in the following table. Under the column headed "Land Described," "P" refers to the property, "P/O" refers to the property and other land, and "Portion" refers to a portion of the property.
Exh. Date of Type Grantor(s) Grantee(s) Land
No. Transfer of Deed Descr-
ibed
1 10/09/39 Warranty E.O. Scott & Bertha Scott Dee Sloan & P/O
Opal Sloan
6 12/05/68 Warranty Raymond A. Bove & Mary Bove, Katheryn P/O
his wife Winking, a
single
person
9 12/05/68 Warranty Katheryn Winking, a single Marvin Q. P/O
person Silver
Milton
Suffian, &
Joseph S
Rosenthal
12DD 03/15/89 Quit-claim Michelle Suffian Chilton & Defendants Porti-
David Chilton, her husband on
12R 03/17/89 Quit-claim Daniel Suffian, a single Defendants Porti-
person on
12V 03/24/89 Quit-claim Joseph S. Rosenthal & Beverly Defendants Porti-
E. Rosenthal, his wife, & on
Marvin Q. Silver, a single
person
12Z 03/31/89 Quit-claim Harriet Suffian, a single Defendants Porti-
person, Karen Suffian Frost on
& Harlie Frost, her
husband, & Lauren Suffian
Usher, a single person
3 07/03/89 Quit-claim Virginia B. Sloan, single Plaintiffs P
4 02/06/90 Quit-claim Rodger D. Sloan, single Plaintiffs P
----------
Plaintiffs' fourth point is that the trial court erred "when it failed to quiet title to [the property] in plaintiffs because plaintiff (sic) had a better claim to the land than defendants, based upon plaintiffs' quitclaim deeds from the last record owners of [the property], regardless of the manner in which plaintiff (sic) acquired his deeds." (Emphasis added).
On this appeal this court must, and does, confine its review to the "points relied on." Rule 84.04(d); Kurtz v. Fischer, 600 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Mo.App.1980). "The questions for decision on appeal are those stated in the points relied on, and a question not there presented will be considered abandoned on appeal and no longer an issue in the case." Pruellage v. De Seaton Corp., 380 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Mo.1964). See also Conway v. Judd, 723 S.W.2d 905, 906 (Mo.App.1987).
Plaintiffs had the burden to establish their title to the property by competent evidence. Lock v. Bennartz, 470 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Mo.1971). The brief of defendants concedes that record title to the property passed to Dee Sloan and Opal Sloan by reason of Exhibit 1.
Plaintiffs base their claim to title on two quitclaim deeds, Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 4. It is true, as plaintiffs argue, that a quitclaim deed is as effective as any other deed for the purpose of transferring title. Grimes v. Rush, 355 Mo. 573, 197 S.W.2d 310, 312 (1946); Teson v. Vasquez, 561 S.W.2d 119, 130 (Mo.App.1977). See also Swisher v. Pemberton, 249 Mo. 200, 155 S.W. 22, 24 (1913).
The flaw in plaintiffs' position is that the grantors in Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 4 were not "the last record owners" of the property. "If any links are missing in such chain of title," Noble v. Cates, 230 Mo. 189, 130 S.W. 302, 304 (1910), plaintiffs' case must fail. See Hunter v. Pemiscot Land & Cooperage Co., 246 Mo. 135, 151 S.W. 714, 715 (1912).
Although, under Exhibit 1, title to the property passed to Dee Sloan and Opal Sloan, plaintiffs introduced no deeds or other documents of title showing that the grantor in Exhibit 3, "Virginia B. Sloan, single," or the grantor in Exhibit 4, "Rodger D. Sloan, single," had any title to convey. Plaintiffs introduced no record showing the relationship, if any, of Virginia B. Sloan or Rodger D. Sloan,...
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