Humphreys v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 13 December 1993
• Docket Number: No. 91-50256.,91-50256.
• Parties: Jackie S. HUMPHREYS and David Humphreys, her husband, Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

839 F. Supp. 822

Jackie S. HUMPHREYS and David Humphreys, her husband, Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. 91-50256.

United States District Court, N.D. Florida.

December 13, 1993.

Clark Fletcher, Panama City, FL, for plaintiffs.

Ernest H. Eubanks, Orlando, FL, for defendant.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COLLIER, District Judge.

Defendant, General Motors Corporation, moves for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (doc. 108). Plaintiffs, Jackie and David Humphreys, have opposed this motion. After reviewing the pleadings, evidence of record and the legal briefs of the parties, the Court concludes Defendant's motion for summary judgment must be GRANTED.

Background

This suit arose out of a four-car accident occurring on November 9, 1987 on State Road 390 at or near its intersection with Main Avenue in Panama City, Florida. During the accident, the Plaintiffs' vehicle, a 1985 Chevrolet Cavalier station wagon, was struck in the rear and allegedly pushed into the back of the vehicle in front of it.

At the time, Jackie Humphreys was driving the Chevrolet and she suffered injuries as a result of the collision. Plaintiffs allege the injuries to Mrs. Humphreys were due, in part, to a failure of the Chevrolet's driver seat back locking device during the accident. Allegedly, the seat back device failed upon impact and in some fashion injured Mrs. Humphreys.

Plaintiffs originally filed this case in Florida Circuit Court for Bay County, Florida. Defendant promptly removed the action to this court on December 19, 1991. In their complaint, Plaintiffs included claims under strict liability, negligence and implied warranty based on alleged defects in the seat back and seat belt assemblies of their 1985 Cavalier. By Order dated June 23, 1992, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs claim under implied warranty, but allowed their claims under strict liability and negligence to stand (doc. 7).

At this point, the Court entered a scheduling order setting a discovery cut-off date of November 2, 1992. As part of its discovery, Defendant propounded interrogatories and requests to produce upon Plaintiffs. Defendant requested inspection of the car and the allegedly defective components. The car and the allegedly defective components, however, were destroyed after Plaintiffs released it to the custody of their insurance carrier. Consequently, Defendant contends it has not had an opportunity to inspect the car or its seat back and seat belt. Furthermore, when Defendant requested Plaintiffs produce any photographs of or reports on the damaged vehicle, Plaintiffs responded by saying they had no such information in their possession. Indeed, the record at this point contains not a single photograph, report or affidavit attesting to the condition of the car after the accident and the alleged failure of the seat back and seat belt.

On September 14, 1992, Defendant presented its first set of 15 interrogatories to Plaintiffs. The first interrogatory asked Plaintiffs to specify the alleged defect and the facts upon which Plaintiffs relied in claiming the defect. The fifth interrogatory asked Plaintiffs to disclose any non-medical experts Plaintiffs would rely upon at trial. Although the responses to these interrogatories were due on October 14, 1992, Plaintiffs did not present Defendant with any answers until October 29. Even then, Plaintiffs submitted only draft answers to selected interrogatories. At this point, Defendant complained Plaintiffs' response to the defect interrogatory was insufficient. Furthermore, Plaintiffs for the first time disclosed their intent to call Mr. Bryant Buchner as an expert to testify about reconstructing the accident, occupant kinematics and the performance of the vehicle's seats and seat belts.

On November 13, 1992, the Court held a hearing regarding, among other things, Plaintiffs' responses to Defendant's interrogatories. The Court concluded Plaintiffs' response to the defect interrogatory was "totally and completely unsatisfactory" and ordered Plaintiffs to respond more precisely to Defendant's request. Furthermore, the Court concluded Mr. Buchner could not be called as an expert witness given Plaintiffs' tardy disclosure and the lack of any factual basis for his opinion. The Court also declined Plaintiffs' request to extend the discovery deadline because Plaintiffs had not showed any due diligence in pursuing discovery.

A week later, Plaintiffs provided their supplemental answer to Defendant's defect interrogatory. Plaintiffs described the alleged defect as follows:

A design defect of the front driver's seat back locking device. The defect is that the seat back was not designed strongly enough to maintain its integrity during moderate excellerations sic which in and of themselves would not cause permanent injuries as sustained by the Plaintiff in this accident. The facts relied upon regarding the defects are the accident report, speed, weight, types of vehicles involved, review of exempler sic vehicles, and statements of individuals that inspected the seat in Plaintiffs' vehicle.

Plaintiffs, however, have not submitted any evidence in the form of reports or affidavits to support this claim of a defect. Furthermore, as the case now stands, Plaintiff does not have any expert to testify about the presence of a defect and the causation of Mrs. Humphreys' injuries. It is on this basis that Defendant has moved for summary judgment.

Analysis

A. Summary Judgment Standard

A motion for summary judgment should be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1510 (11th Cir.1987). An issue of fact is "genuine" if the record as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. Id. On this motion for summary judgment, the Court must take the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Griesel v. Hamlin, 963 F.2d 338, 341 (11th Cir.1992).

Initially, Plaintiffs argue Defendant has not properly supported its motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs contend that in order to "show" there are no genuine issues of material fact, Defendants must present positive evidence in the form of affidavits, segments of depositions, and documents. Plaintiffs claim that since Defendant has not presented such evidence in conjunction with its motion, the motion is insufficient.

The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs' assessment of Defendant's burden under Rule 56. To begin with, though the record is admittedly thin on evidence, it contains portions of depositions, transcripts of the November 1992 hearing and Plaintiffs' answers to Defendant's interrogatories and requests for production. On a motion for summary judgment, the Court reviews the entire record — not just the memoranda and materials submitted by the parties in conjunction with the motion. Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 952 (11th Cir.1986). Here, the Court finds there is record evidence supporting Defendant's arguments on summary judgment.

Furthermore, Defendant's burden under Rule 56 of "showing" there are no genuine issues of material fact does not mandate citing record evidence at every turn. Rule 56(c) requires summary judgment to be entered when:

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Although the rule cites various forms of evidence, a movant satisfies its burden if it "shows" the record reveals no genuine issues of material fact. Here, Defendant is attempting to show the record contains no evidence supporting several essential elements of Plaintiffs' claims. This is a legitimate method of demonstrating there are no genuine issues regarding Plaintiffs' claims under strict liability and negligence. See Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323-25, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54. To hold, as Plaintiffs apparently argue, that Defendant can only make this showing by presenting positive evidence demonstrating the nonexistence of evidence would be nonsensical. In essence, Plaintiffs seek improperly to place the burden on Defendant to affirmatively disprove the elements of Plaintiffs' cause of action.

In this regard, the Court adopts the reasoning of Judge Rubin in Fontenot v. Upjohn Company, 780 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir.1986). As Judge Rubin aptly noted:

The crucial question for the court is whether there is a "genuine issue" of fact concerning any essential element of the claim on which judgment is being sought. If the moving party can show that there is no evidence whatever to establish one or more essential elements of a claim on which the opposing party has the burden of proof, trial would be a bootless exercise, fated for an inevitable result but at continued expense for the parties, the preemption of a trial date that might have been used for other litigants waiting impatiently in the judicial queue, and a burden on the court and taxpayers.

Fontenot, 780 F.2d at 1195.

Judge Rubin has captured the essence of the situation before the Court today. Consequently, because Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving the essential elements of strict liability and negligence at trial, Defendant is permitted to rely upon the complete absence of proof of an essential element of Plaintiffs' case to support its motion for summary judgment. Id.; see Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d...