Humphries v. Allstate Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 16 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 18-cv-11006 |
| Parties | DAMON P. HUMPHRIES, Plaintiff, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
On May 25, 2017, Plaintiff Angela Humphries1 ("Plaintiff") filed the instant action against Defendants Allstate Insurance Company and CorVel Corporation ("CorVel"), alleging breach of contract, insurance bad faith, and aiding and abetting. See ECF No. 1. On August 21, 2017, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). See ECF No. 2. On March 27, 2018, Plaintiff's action was transferred to this Court after the United States District Court for the District of Arizona ("Arizona District Court") determined that it did not have personal jurisdiction over DefendantAllstate Insurance Company (hereinafter, "Defendant"). See ECF No. 3. In its order, the Arizona District Court severed Plaintiff's claims against CorVel; those claims remain pending before that court. Id.
Presently before this Court is Defendant's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings as to Count II of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, filed on January 28, 2020. ECF No. 32. Plaintiff filed a Response on April 10, 2020. ECF No. 40. Defendant filed its Reply on May 4, 2020. ECF No. 41. A hearing on Defendant's Motion was held on June 9, 2020. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT Defendant's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings as to Count II of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint [#32].
On May 14, 1979, Plaintiff suffered permanent injuries from an automobile accident in Michigan. ECF No. 1, PageID.2. Plaintiff was a Michigan resident at the time of the accident. Id. She suffered a severe brain injury, causing her to be hospitalized for roughly six months immediately after the accident. Id. Plaintiff's family now provides her with 24-hour care. ECF No.1, PageID.3. She continues to receive No-Fault benefits under the terms of her father's Michigan No-Fault insurance policy with Defendant. ECF No. 21, PageID.593.
In 2004, Plaintiff sued Defendant in Oakland County Circuit Court, Case No. 05-067578, alleging breach of contract, fraud, and violations of the ConsumerProtection Act. Id.; ECF No. 1, PageID.5. Plaintiff and Defendant (together, the "Parties") settled the Michigan state court lawsuit in May 2006 and entered into an agreement regarding Plaintiff's attendant care from 2006 through 2016. ECF No. 21, PageID.594. The Parties' agreement included a provision where the hourly rate for Plaintiff's attendant would be adjusted yearly based on the consumer price index. ECF No. 1, PageID.5. Subsequent to the Parties' settlement, in 2010, Plaintiff and her family moved from Michigan to the Phoenix area in Arizona, where they continue to reside today. ECF No. 20, PageID.421. According to Defendant, its employees in Michigan continue to handle Plaintiff's claim. ECF No. 21, PageID.594.
In early 2016, Defendant hired CorVel to assist it in adjusting the amount of daily attendant care paid under the Michigan No-Fault policy and Michigan No-Fault Act. ECF No. 2, PageID.25. CorVel scheduled Plaintiff for an insurance medical exam with Dr. Barry Hendin in March 2016. Id. CorVel asked Dr. Hendin to evaluate Plaintiff's "need for attendant care" and "the hours per day required and the type of provider required." Id. On April 4, 2016, Dr. Hendin examined Plaintiff. Id. at PageID.26. On June 15, 2016, Plaintiff purports that Dr. Hendin wrote to Defendant, stating that "the level of care is 'home health aide and would require no more than 8 hours per day of service.'" Id.
An adjuster in Defendant's Farmington Hills, Michigan office allegedly sent a letter to Plaintiff on June 28, 2016, notifying her that Defendant was changing the amount it would pay for attendant care under the Michigan Policy. ECF No. 32, PageID.678. Dr. Marzulo, who purportedly has known Plaintiff for over five years "with several evaluations," subsequently wrote to Defendant, expressing his opposition to Dr. Hendin's conclusions. ECF No. 2, PageID.27. Dr. Hendin disagreed with Dr. Marzulo's determination. Id. On August 29, 2016, Defendant purportedly wrote a letter to Plaintiff reiterating that it was changing the amount it would pay for her care. Id. at PageID.28.
Plaintiff instituted this action on May 25, 2017 in the Arizona District Court following Defendant's adjustment of her claim. See ECF No. 1. In Count II of Plaintiff's FAC, Plaintiff alleges a claim of "bad faith."2 ECF No. 2. She purports that Defendant owed her "an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in the handling of her insurance claim." Id. at PageID.30. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant "committed bad faith and breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" by not paying all of her requested personal protection insurance ("PIP") benefits. Id. at PageID.31. In her Complaint, Plaintiff lists nine examples of Defendant's alleged "intentional and unreasonable conduct" and disregard of herrights. Id. at PageID.31-32. Based on her allegations, Plaintiff claims entitlement to compensatory damages for "personal injuries, mental and emotional distress and anxiety, loss of security, and other incidental damages" and also seeks "[p]unitive and exemplary damages." Id. at PageID.32.
Defendant then moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. See ECF No. 32-4. Plaintiff opposed the motion. See ECF No. 32-5. In her Response, Plaintiff requested that, if the Arizona District Court found no jurisdiction, the court transfer those claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1631.3 Id. at PageID.756 (). In its Reply, Defendant asked the Court to transfer Plaintiff's claims to this District because "nearly all" the relevant factors "weigh in favor of Michigan." ECF No. 32-6, PageID.777. On March 27, 2018, the Arizona District Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss; severed Plaintiff's claims against Defendant from her claims against CorVel; and ordered the transfer of Plaintiff's claims against Defendant to this Court. See ECF No. 32-7. In its Order, the Arizona District Court determined that "it is beyond dispute that the Eastern District of Michigan is the most appropriate venue to hear Plaintiff's claims against Defendant." Id. at PageID.792 (citing Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495 (9th Cir. 2000)).
After Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Ninth Circuit, ECF No. 14-1, she filed an emergency motion in this Court for a stay of proceedings pending the outcome of her petition. ECF No. 14. This Court granted Plaintiff's emergency motion on May 30, 2019. ECF No. 16. This case was administratively closed on that same day.
On March 12, 2019, the Ninth Circuit denied Plaintiff's petition.4 See ECF No. 20-2, PageID.590. Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Partial Lifting of Stay Proceedings and to Re-Transfer This Case to the District of Arizona in this Court. ECF No. 20. On December 16, 2019, this Court issued an Opinion and Order granting Plaintiff's Motion to partially lift the stay of proceedings and denying Plaintiff's Motion to re-transfer this case to the District of Arizona. ECF No. 25.
In its present Motion, Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings as to Count II of Plaintiff's FAC under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). ECF No. 32, PageID.680. Defendant argues that Michigan law governs this case. Id. at PageID.676. Under Michigan law, Defendant contends that Plaintiff is limited to "pursuing her breach of contract claim, and [that] her potential damages are limited to those available under contract jurisprudence and Michigan's No-Fault Act." Id. at PageID.673-74. Plaintiff opposed Defendant's Motion on April 10, 2020,asserting that the Court should find Arizona tort law applicable and accordingly deny the instant motion. ECF No. 40, PageID.859. Defendant filed its Reply to Plaintiff's opposition on May 4, 2020. ECF No. 41.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment on the pleadings "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Motions for judgment on the pleadings are analyzed under the same standard as motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 623 F.3d 281, 284 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). "For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment." Id. (quoting JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
To withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must comply with the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). Rule 8(a)(2) requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in orderto give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). To meet this standard, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-80 ().
When deciding a 12(c) motion for...
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