Hund v. Geier

• Decision Date: 30 June 1874
• Parties: BERNHARD HUNDv.ANTON GEIER.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

72 Ill. 393

1874 WL 8834 (Ill.)

BERNHARD HUND

v.ANTON GEIER.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June Term, 1874.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. WILLIAM H. SNYDER, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. HAY & KNISPEL, for the appellant.

Mr. WILLIAM WINKELMAN, for the appellee.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:

It appears, from the record in this case, that appellant had obtained permission to haul earth over appellee's ground and alleyway; that he sent his son with a team of horses for the purpose, and that, whilst in the alley, appellee's little son, in passing the horses, was kicked and severely injured; that he employed a physician to treat his wounds. The next day appellant went to the house of appellee and expressed sorrow for the accident, and asked appellee what doctor he had, and, on being informed, told appellee to get another, and promised to pay all expenses of the cure. After the boy was cured, and the physician had visited the boy thirty-six times, he presented a bill for $100, which appellee called on appellant to pay, but he refused, and said he would not pay the bill of that doctor. He himself testified that the reason he wished appellee to procure the services of another physician was, because Doctor Myer always charged twice as much as other doctors.

On appellant refusing to pay the bill, this suit was brought, before a justice of the peace, and appealed to the circuit court, where a trial was had by the court and a jury, resulting in a verdict and judgment for the amount of the bill, and the record is brought to this court, and we are asked to reverse it on the grounds that appellant is not bound by the promise, and that the court gave improper instructions.

We think it is but a fair inference, from the evidence, that appellant only intended to become liable on the condition that another physician was employed, or rather, that he was willing to pay a reasonable bill, such as other physicians charged; not that he would pay the bill, let it be what it might. Whilst willing to pay, he was only willing to pay what was fair and reasonable. This, we think, is the scope and extent of the promise, and he can in no event be held beyond that extent of liability. There is no evidence in the record tending to show that the charges for services rendered by the physician were reasonable and customary in the profession. He simply made out his bill, and appellee presented it to appellant for payment. For aught that appears, the charges may, as appellant feared, be double the amount other physicians would have charged. They may be exorbitant and unreasonable, and if so, there can be no pretense that appellant agreed to pay such charges. Had he said nothing in reference to this physician, the law would only imply that he was willing to pay reasonable compensation for the services. It is urged that the promise by appellant was purely voluntary, and there was no consideration to support it. If the evidence shows that the son of appellant was guilty of negligence, and that such negligence was the...