Hunnicutt v. Armstrong
| Decision Date | 25 February 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:03 CV 627(PCD).,3:03 CV 627(PCD). |
| Citation | 305 F.Supp.2d 175 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Carnell HUNNICUTT v. John ARMSTRONG, et al.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> |
Carnell Hunnicutt, Cumberland, MD, Pro se.
Ann E. Lynch, Attorney General's Office, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Carnell Hunnicutt ("Hunnicutt") is a Connecticut sentenced inmate currently confined within the Maryland Department of Correction. In May 2002, he commenced this action with then-inmate Anthony Oliphant.2 On April 2, 2003, the court ordered the claims of the two plaintiffs severed and instructed the Clerk to open this case to consider only Hunnicutt's claims.
In his amended complaint, Hunnicutt asserts seventeen claims and twenty-one causes of action addressing the conditions and circumstances of his confinement in Administrative Segregation at Northern Correctional Institution in Somers, Connecticut. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss this action. For the reasons that follow, defendants' motion is granted.
When considering a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draws inferences from these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Thomas v. City of N.Y., 143 F.3d 31, 37 (2d Cir.1998). Dismissal is warranted only if, under any set of facts that the plaintiff can prove consistent with the allegations, it is clear that no relief can be granted. See Tarshis v. Riese Org., 211 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir.2000); Cooper v. Parsky, 140 F.3d 433, 440 (2d Cir.1998). "The issue on a motion to dismiss is not whether the plaintiff will prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support his or her claims." Branham v. Meachum, 77 F.3d 626, 628 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 69 F.3d 669, 673 (2d Cir.1995) (internal quotations omitted)). In its review of a motion to dismiss, the court may consider "only the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the pleadings and matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Samuels v. Air Transport Local 504, 992 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.1993). The Second Circuit "ordinarily require[s] the district courts to give substantial leeway to pro se litigants." Gomes v. Avco Corp., 964 F.2d 1330, 1335 (2d Cir.1992).
The court accepts as true the following allegations taken from the amended complaint.
Hunnicutt was placed on administrative segregation status at Northern Correctional Institution when he failed to complete the chronic discipline program within six months. He refused to participate in the mandatory mental health-based phase program and, therefore, could not complete the program and be released from administrative segregation status. Hunnicutt was not provided any indication of how long he would continue to be confined in administrative segregation.
Hunnicutt refused to participate in the psychological group therapy sessions required in the phase program. He objected to revealing personal beliefs and disclosing such things as an abusive childhood or family relationships in front of other inmates. Hunnicutt alleges that the mental health staff failed to conduct a rigorous individual psychological evaluation of his condition and were not available for private meetings. Any meeting with mental health staff was conducted on the tier within hearing of other inmates. Mental health staff falsified reports and fabricated incidents to cover up the use of excessive force against inmates.
In addition, medical staff denied treatment and falsified medical incident reports to hide abuse of inmates by staff and the injuries inflicted on inmates. They denied access to physicians or outside medical treatment.
Prisoners at Northern Correctional Institution, all of whom are considered dangerous or threatening to the safety and security of other correctional facilities, were double-celled in a cell that was designed for one inmate. In addition, they were forced to go to recreation in handcuffs and shackles.
All inmates were handcuffed behind their backs whenever they left the cell. Because the inmates were double-celled when the first inmate was being handcuffed, the other inmate had his hands free and could assault the handcuffed inmate. No compatibility assessment was done before inmates were assigned to cells and correctional staff did not adequately supervise the inmates.
If an inmate refused to accept a cellmate, he would be maced, slammed into the wall or placed in in-cell restraints in a dirty isolation cell for up to seventy-two hours. In the isolation cell, he would be denied personal hygiene items, a change of clothing, reading or writing materials and showers. Restraints would not be removed to facilitate toilet use or eating.
At one time, Hunnicutt had progressed beyond Phase I of the three-phase program. He was returned to Phase I for drawing a cartoon that was considered offensive and threatening by staff even though this action would not have been sufficient to warrant administrative segregation placement if he were in general population.
Staff issued false disciplinary reports for minor reasons just to prolong an inmate's stay in administrative segregation. Inmates were not provided the advocate of their choice at the disciplinary hearing and were denied witnesses. The assigned advocates did not conduct independent investigations of the charge. In addition, inmates were not permitted to use institutional surveillance tapes in their defense.
Hunnicutt was transferred to Virginia pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact. During the six months he was confined in Virginia, Hunnicutt received various sanctions for minor infractions. When he returned to Connecticut, these infractions were used to generate further sanctions. In addition, the time Hunnicutt was confined in segregation in Virginia did not contribute to the time required for progress through the Connecticut phase program.
Inmates in administrative segregation were denied access to congregate religious services. Although they could speak with religious leaders, they had to do so through the cell door and were afforded no opportunity for private conversation. The library of general reading material within the unit was inadequate. Although inmates could file grievances, no receipts were provided and the grievances often were lost.
Hunnicutt was not provided a meaningful classification review as required under department policy. He could not participate in or be present at any reviews to determine whether he should be permitted to advance to the next phase of the three-phase program.
Hunnicutt asserts seventeen claims in his amended complaint addressing the following areas: (1) indefinite confinement in Administrative Segregation; (2) forced participation in the mental health based phase program; (3) time spent in segregation in Virginia; (4) double-celling; (5) use of in-cell restraints, four-point restraints and excessive force; (6) the disciplinary hearing and appeal process; (7) conspiratorially planned sanctions; (8) lack of recreation and outdoor exercise; (9) denial of religious services; (10) inadequate personal reading material; (11) inadequate grievance procedures; (12) lack of meaningful classification review; (13) secret hearings; (14) violation of personal privacy rights; (15) lack of psychological evaluations and fraudulent mental health services; (16) retaliatory punishment and (17) denial of medical treatment.3
Defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint on eight grounds: (1) the Eleventh Amendment bars any claims for damages against them in their official capacities; (2) Hunnicutt includes no personal allegations against defendants Lajoie, Butler, Myers, Coates, Whidden, Faneuff, Weir, Katz-Feinberg, Chaplin, Wooven, Power, Matos and Tokarz; (3) many claims were included in cases previously settled and are barred by res judicata; (4) Hunnicutt alleges no actual injury suffered as a result of the denial of medical care; (5) forced participation in the phase program is not a constitutional violation; (6) Hunnicutt has no constitutional right to a single cell; (7) Hunnicutt has alleged no actual physical injury from the alleged failure to conduct mental health evaluations; and (8) the defendants are protected by qualified immunity as to any claim regarding recreation in restraints. In response, Hunnicutt challenges the validity of the referenced settlement and argues that he described the actions of many of the defendants in inmate grievances he filed.
The court first considers defendants' argument that many of Hunnicutt's claims are barred by res judicata.
On May 3, 2002, Hunnicutt signed a settlement agreement and release settling six pending federal lawsuits and fifteen pending state court actions in exchange for $5000.00 and an agreement that the state would pursue an out-of-state transfer. Hunnicutt was represented by counsel during the settlement negotiations. The court takes judicial notice of the settlement agreement and release. These documents have been filed in the six federal cases and copies of the documents are attached to defendants' memorandum. The court also takes judicial notice of the complaints and petitions filed in several of the settled actions. These documents were filed in the state or federal court and copies are attached to defendants' memorandum.
The doctrine of res judicata precludes a party from litigating a claim more than once. Under the doctrine, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties from relitigating claims that were or could have been raised in that action. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980...
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