Hunnicutt v. Kitt
| Decision Date | 13 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 3:10-cv-857 (CSH) |
| Parties | CARNELL HUNNICUTT, SR., Plaintiff, v. TAWANDA KITT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Carnell Hunnicutt, Sr., incarcerated and pro se, has filed an amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff names twenty defendants: Tawanda Kitt, Dennis Marinelli, Angel Quiros, Lauren Powers, Stephen Faucher, Kim DiCioccio, Michael Lajoie, Lieutenant Comier,1 Kim Weir, Correctional Officer Wilson, Karl Krob, Lieutenant Pafumi, Lieutenant Siwicki, Scott Peterson, Jason Cahill, Darryl Little, Melvin Saylor, Lieutenant Sharp, Ayesha Mumin and Counselor Tourangeau. All defendants are named in their individual and official capacities. The defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Rule 56(c), Fed. R. Civ. P.; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). The moving party may satisfy this burden "by showing—that is pointing out to the districtcourt—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Once the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and present such evidence as would allow a jury to find in his favor in order to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000). Merely verifying the allegations of the complaint in an affidavit is insufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Zigmund v. Foster, 106 F. Supp. 2d 352, 356 (D. Conn. 2000) (citing cases).
When reviewing the record, the court resolves all ambiguities and draws all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. Patterson v. County of Oneida, NY, 375 F.3d 206, 218 (2d Cir. 2004). If there is any evidence in the record on a material issue from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment is inappropriate. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2004). However, "'[t]he mere of existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [plaintiff's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [plaintiff].'" Dawson v. County of Westchester, 373 F.3d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252)).
At all times relevant to the claims in this action, the plaintiff was confined at Northern Correctional Institution and the defendants were employees of the Connecticut Department of Correction, working at Northern Correctional Institution.
On October 30, 2009, the plaintiff was issued a disciplinary report for threats. He was charged with making threatening statements to defendant Kitt. On February 5, 2010, the plaintiff received a second disciplinary report for threats. He was charged with sending defendant Kitt a document containing threatening, degrading, and abusive language. The plaintiff admits sending the document but contends that the language was not threatening. Defendant Comier was the Disciplinary Hearing Officer for both of the disciplinary charges. The hearings were held on November 17, 2009, and February 17, 2010. The plaintiff was provided an advocate and an opportunity to rebut the charges. At the November 2009 hearing, the plaintiff submitted a written statement arguing that he used insulting but not threatening language. At the conclusion of the hearings, defendant Comier reviewed the evidence and found the plaintiff guilty of both charges. The plaintiff received sanctions of fifteen days confinement in punitive segregation and ninety days loss of phone and commissary privileges on each charge.
On July 29, 2010, the plaintiff received a disciplinary report for interfering with safety and security by slipping his handcuffs from the back to the front. The disciplinary hearing was held on August 25, 2010, at which the plaintiff was found guilty. The plaintiff again received sanctions of fifteen days confinement in punitive segregation and ninety days loss of phone and commissary privileges.
In his amended complaint the plaintiff includes fourteen claims for relief: (1) defendant Kitt retaliated against the plaintiff for filing a grievance by issuing false disciplinary reports and destroying his property; (2) defendants Marinelli, Quiros, Powers, and Faucher censored, threatened and punished the plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment rights; (3) defendants DiCioccio, Peterson, Wilson, Krob, and Comier denied the plaintiff substantive due process at his disciplinaryhearings by denying him staff witnesses, denying him assistance preparing his defense, tampering with and withholding evidence and punishing the plaintiff for utilizing the grievance process; (4) defendants Powers, Faucher, Pafumi, Quiros, Marinelli, Siwicki, Lajoie, Weir, Cahill, Little, and Saylor failed to prevent defendant Kitt from retaliating against the plaintiff; (5) defendants Quiros, Marinelli, Powers, and Faucher confiscated artwork intended for an outside audience; (6) defendants Kitt and Pafumi harassed and retaliated against the plaintiff for using the grievance process by destroying his personal property; (7) defendants Quiros, Marinelli, Faucher, Powers, Little, Cahill, Weir, Lajoie, Pafumi, Siwicki, and Saylor allowed and condoned defendant Kitt's harassment and retaliatory conduct; (8) defendant Comier, Wilson, Krob, DiCioccio, and Peterson conspired to hold disciplinary hearings that deprived the plaintiff of procedural and substantive due process; (9) defendants Marinelli, Quiros, Faucher, and Powers threatened the plaintiff to stop him from exercising his First Amendment rights through drawing cartoons; (10) defendant Cahill acted with defendants Kitt, Pafumi, Sharp, and Marinelli to deprive the plaintiff of his personal property; (11) defendant Saylor sexually harassed the plaintiff; (12) defendant Mumin retaliated against the plaintiff for filing a grievance by denying him legal calls and hygiene items; (13) defendants Quiros, Faucher, Powers, and Little failed to reprimand defendants Saylor and Pafumi, thereby encouraging them to confiscate his personal property; and (14) defendant Quiros placed the plaintiff on grievance restriction in retaliation for his filing grievances regarding defendant Kitt and naming supervisory staff in those grievances.
The defendants do not address separately the plaintiff's claims for relief. Instead, they argue that none of the plaintiff's allegations state constitutionally viable claims. The defendants assert the following arguments: (1) the plaintiff's claims that he was wrongfully charged with threats and wrongfully found guilty of the charges are not cognizable and any retaliation claim based on theissuance of the disciplinary reports also fails; (2) the plaintiff fails to state a constitutionally recognized retaliation claim against any defendant based on his allegations of adverse actions; (3) the plaintiff fails to satisfy the physical injury requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); and (4) the defendants are protected by qualified immunity.
The plaintiff contends that he was denied procedural and substantive due process in connection with the three disciplinary reports, the October 30, 2009 charge for threatening and insulting language, the February 5, 2010 charge for written threats, and the July 29, 2010 charge for interfering with safety and security. He also argues that the issuance of the disciplinary reports and the conduct of several defendants in connection with the disciplinary hearing process was retaliatory. The Court will consider the due process claims in this section and the retaliation claims below.
Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that he was denied the required degree of assistance from an advocate at the three hearings in question. "Substantive due process protects individuals against government action that is arbitrary, conscience-shocking, or oppressive in a constitutional sense, but not against government action that is 'incorrect or ill-advised.'" Lowrance v. Achtyl, 20 F.3d 529, 537 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted). A prison disciplinary decision comports with due process "if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board." Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). "A prisoner has a limited right to assistance of an advocate at a disciplinary hearing." Eng v. Coughlin, 858 F.2d 889, 897-98 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Muhmmaud v. Murphy, 632 F.Supp.2d 171, 177 (D.Conn. 2009).
The first disciplinary report concerns statements allegedly made by the plaintiff. Unlike the second and third disciplinary reports, the plaintiff denies making the threatening statements andstates that several correctional officers were present and could corroborate his version of the incident. None of these officers provided written statements or testified at the hearing. The plaintiff alleges that his advocate refused to investigate the matter and he was prevented from calling any of the correctional officers as witnesses at the hearing. His request for another advocate was ignored. Although the quantity of evidence required to support a disciplinary decision may be small, there is an issue of fact as to whether the defense...
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