Hunsaker v. People

• Decision Date: 20 December 2021
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 20SC360
• Citation: 500 P.3d 1110
• Parties: William J. HUNSAKER, Jr., Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

500 P.3d 1110

William J. HUNSAKER, Jr., Petitioner,

v.The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 20SC360

Supreme Court of Colorado.

December 20, 2021

Attorneys for Petitioner: Hunsaker Emmi, P.C., William J. Hunsaker, Arvada, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Megan C. Rasband, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE HART delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 After criminal defendants are convicted, Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 provides them with three types of postconviction remedies. A defendant may seek correction of an illegal sentence "at any time"—even many years after the conviction. Crim. P. 35(a). A defendant may ask the court to reduce a sentence within certain limited timeframes. Crim. P. 35(b). And a defendant may bring other specified types of postconviction challenges to a conviction or sentence but must generally do so within three years of the date of conviction. See Crim. P. 35(c) ; § 16-5-402(1), C.R.S. (2021). The question we are asked to answer here is how Crim P. 35(a), which permits the correction of a sentence "at any time," should interact with Crim. P. 35(c), which has a three-year statute of limitations subject to only a few specific exceptions provided in section 16-5-402(1).

¶2 We have considered this question once before, in Leyva v. People , 184 P.3d 48 (Colo. 2008), but that opinion has been construed by two different divisions of the court of appeals in mutually exclusive ways. One division has found that, under Leyva , correction of an illegal sentence renews the limitations period for all arguments for postconviction relief, entirely restarting the three-year clock. See People v. Baker , 2017 COA 102, ¶¶ 37–42, 461 P.3d 534, 540, rev'd on other grounds , 2019 CO 97M, 452 P.3d 759. In contrast, the division in this case found that, under Leyva , correction of an illegal sentence only renews the Crim P. 35(c) limitations period for arguments "related to how the illegality in the original sentence potentially affected a defendant's original conviction." People v. Hunsaker , 2020 COA 48, ¶ 16, 490 P.3d 688, 692. We must now determine which of these two competing interpretations is correct.

¶3 We reaffirm our conclusion in Leyva that, where a court corrects an illegal sentence, the defendant may thereafter pursue an otherwise time-barred Crim. P. 35(c) motion. However, the corrected sentence only allows defendants to raise arguments addressing how the illegality in their sentence potentially affected the original conviction. In reaching this conclusion, we reaffirm our holding in People v. Hampton , 876 P.2d 1236, 1240 (Colo. 1994) —"the meaning of the word ‘conviction’ in section 16-5-402(1) refers to a conviction after a defendant's appeal has been exhausted"—and we disavow Leyva 's contrary suggestion that a "conviction" does not occur until a sentence is correct.

¶4 In this case, defendant William Hunsaker, Jr., missed the deadline for filing his Crim. P. 35(c) motion. However, his original sentence was illegal, and the district court corrected it. His late filing of a collateral attack related to the illegality in his sentence is thus justifiably excused. We affirm the court of appeals' conclusion that one of Hunsaker's Crim. P. 35(c) arguments is related to the illegality in his sentence and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶5 William Hunsaker, Jr., has spent the last fifteen years challenging his convictions for two criminal offenses. In June 2006, a jury found him guilty of sexual assault on a child ("count I") and sexual assault on a child as a pattern of abuse ("count II"). The trial court found that these were "extraordinary risk" crimes, subject to an enhanced sentence for that reason, and sentenced Hunsaker to eight years to life for count I and sixteen years to life for count II, to run concurrently. Hunsaker appealed, and his convictions were affirmed. On January 31, 2011, the mandate issued.

¶6 Two months later, Hunsaker filed a Crim. P. 35(a) motion, arguing that his sentence was illegal as to both counts because neither was an extraordinary risk crime. The prosecution agreed that neither count constituted an extraordinary risk crime but maintained that the count II sentence to sixteen years was nonetheless lawful because that count charged a per se crime of violence. The district court concluded that both sentences were illegal and, in June 2011, amended the mittimus to reflect Hunsaker's sentence of six years to life for count I and twelve years to life for count II.

¶7 The prosecution appealed the court's finding as to count II. In January 2013, a division of the court of appeals concluded that the original count II sentence was lawful, and in June 2015, we affirmed. Hunsaker v. People , 2015 CO 46, ¶ 40, 351 P.3d 388, 396. In February 2016, the district court amended the mittimus to reinstate the original count II sentence.

¶8 That same month, Hunsaker filed the Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction review that is now before this court. He argued that his conviction was infirm because the district court had violated his rights to a jury trial, to due process, and to be free from double jeopardy. Additionally, Hunsaker argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel for several reasons, including because counsel failed to object to the imposition of an illegal sentence. The district court found Hunsaker's motion timely, and the prosecution did not argue otherwise. Nonetheless, it denied Hunsaker's motion on the merits without a hearing.

¶9 Hunsaker appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed, albeit on different grounds. See Hunsaker , ¶ 1, 490 P.3d at 690. Addressing an argument the prosecution raised for the first time on appeal, the division found all but one of Hunsaker's arguments time-barred. ¹

Id. As the division explained, under section 16-5-402(1), most felony defendants must file a Crim. P. 35(c) motion within three years of the date of their conviction. Hunsaker , ¶ 13, 490 P.3d at 691. Applying the holding of Hampton —that the date of Hunsaker's conviction was the date his appeal was exhausted—the division determined that the limitations period expired on January 31, 2014. Id. , 490 P.3d at 691–92. Hunsaker had missed that deadline because he filed his Crim. P. 35(c) motion on February 16, 2016. Id. , 490 P.3d at 692.

¶10 The division then asked whether Leyva might nonetheless allow Hunsaker's motion to proceed. Id. at ¶¶ 14–16, 490 P.3d at 692. It determined that, under Leyva , correction of an illegal sentence allows a defendant to pursue otherwise time-barred Crim. P. 35(c) claims "that are related to how the illegality in the original sentence potentially affected a defendant's original conviction." Id. at ¶ 16, 490 P.3d at 692. The division concluded that only one of Hunsaker's arguments arguably fell into this category; namely, that counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the court sentenced him for an extraordinary risk crime as to count I—the count that was found to have included an illegal sentence. Id. at ¶ 17, 490 P.3d at 692. Assuming without deciding that this claim was timely, the division found that it nonetheless failed as a matter of law because the only prejudice Hunsaker alleged related to his count II sentence, which was not illegal. Id. at ¶¶ 23–29, 490 P.3d at 693–94.

¶11 In reaching this conclusion, the division of the court of appeals here disagreed with another division, which had concluded that, under Leyva , correction of an illegal sentence renews the limitations period for filing a Crim. P. 35(c) motion with regard to all claims. See Baker , ¶¶ 37–42, 461 P.3d at 540.

¶12 Hunsaker filed a petition for certiorari review, which we granted.²

II. Analysis

¶13 After setting out the standard of review, we examine the law leading up to our decision in Leyva and acknowledge that certain contradictory language in that case has caused confusion. We then explain that, although Leyva incorrectly stated that a conviction is not final until a sentence is lawful, its narrower holding is correct: The correction of an illegal sentence allows a defendant to subsequently pursue a collateral attack related to the illegality in the original sentence. This is true because the tardiness of these arguments is justifiably excused under section 16-5-402(2) (d). We also reaffirm Hampton 's conclusion that a "conviction" for purposes of section 16-5-402(1) occurs once appeal is exhausted.

¶14 We then turn to Hunsaker's Crim. P. 35(c) motion, finding that it was filed after the deadline established by section 16-5-402(1), but, because his original sentence was illegal, the late filing of arguments related to that illegality is permitted by section 16-5-402(2)(d). Because neither the district court nor the court of appeals has had an opportunity to consider arguments about the applicability of section 16-5-402(2)(d) to Hunsaker's other claims under the particular circumstances of this case, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A. Standard of Review

¶15 We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. People v. Huckabay , 2020 CO 42, ¶ 13, 463 P.3d 283, 286. In interpreting section 16-5-402, we must give effect to the legislature's intent. Hampton , 876 P.2d at 1239. We begin with the plain language of the statute and aim to harmonize the procedures applicable to motions under Crim. P. 35. Leyva , 184 P.3d at 50.

¶16 "This court has plenary authority to promulgate and interpret the rules of criminal procedure." People v. Bueno , 2018 CO 4, ¶ 18, 409 P.3d 320, 325 (quoting People v. Steen , 2014 CO 9, ¶ 10, 318 P.3d 487, 490 (citing Colo. Const. art. VI, § 21) ). Accordingly, we review constructions of those rules de novo, "employing the ‘same interpretive rules applicable to statutory construction.’ " Bueno , ¶ 18, 409 P.3d at 325 (quoting People...