Hunt v. Astrue

• Decision Date: 02 November 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:10-cv-01104
• Parties: CHARLES W. HUNT, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

CHARLES W. HUNT, Plaintiff,

v.MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social SecurityDefendant.

Civil Action No. 3:10-cv-01104

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION

Dated: November 2, 2012

Judge Nixon/ Knowles

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is a civil action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)and1383(c)(3), to obtain judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security finding that Plaintiff was not disabled and denying Plaintiff Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"), as provided under the Social Security Act ("the Act"), as amended.The case is currently pending on Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record. DocketNo. 12.Defendant has filed a Response, arguing that the decision of the Commissioner was supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed.DocketNo. 15.Plaintiff subsequently filed a Reply.DocketNo. 16.

For the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record be DENIED, and that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED.

I.INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff protectively filed his applications for DIB and SSI on March 24, 2008, alleging that he had been disabled since February 5, 2007, due to depression, diabetes, high bloodpressure, and pain on his right side.DocketNo. 10, Attachment ("TR"), TR 10, 128, 131, 161.Plaintiff's applications were denied both initially (TR 47, 48) and upon reconsideration (TR 50, 51).Plaintiff subsequently requested (TR 69) and received (TR 100) a hearing.Plaintiff's hearing was conducted on January 20, 2010, by Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ")Barbara Kimmelman.TR 22.Plaintiff and vocational expert ("VE"), Jane Brenton appeared and testified.Id.

On February 10, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision unfavorable to Plaintiff, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and Regulations.TR 7-17.Specifically, the ALJ made the following findings of fact:

1.The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2011.

2.The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 14, 2008, the amended alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

3.The claimant has the following severe impairments: diabetes mellitus; varicose veins; a depressive disorder; and alcohol abuse (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4.The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

5.After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following limitations: he can sit, stand, or walk for six hours each in an eight-hour workday; he must have the ability to change positions every 30 minutes, at will; and he is limited to the performance of simple and detailed tasks.

6.The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a security guard.This work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant's residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

7.The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act from April 14, 2008 through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f)).

TR 12-17.

On April 2, 2010, Plaintiff timely filed a request for review of the hearing decision.TR 6.On September 22, 2010, the Appeals Council issued a letter declining to review the case(TR 1-3), thereby rendering the decision of the ALJ the final decision of the Commissioner.This civil action was thereafter timely filed, and the Court has jurisdiction.42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)and1383(c)(3).If the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, based upon the record as a whole, then these findings are conclusive.Id.

II.REVIEW OF THE RECORD

The parties and the ALJ have thoroughly summarized and discussed the medical and testimonial evidence of Record.Accordingly, the Court will discuss those matters only to the extent necessary to analyze the parties' arguments.

III.CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A.Standards of Review

This Court's review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to the record made in the administrative hearing process.Jones v. Secretary, 945 F.2d 1365, 1369(6th Cir.1991).The purpose of this review is to determine (1) whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner's decision, and (2) whether any legal errors were committed in theprocess of reaching that decision.Landsaw v. Secretary, 803 F.2d 211, 213(6th Cir.1986).

"Substantial evidence" means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the conclusion."Her v. Commissioner, 203 F.3d 388, 389(6th Cir.1999)(citingRichardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401(1971))."Substantial evidence" has been further quantified as "more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but less than a preponderance."Bell v. Commissioner, 105 F.3d 244, 245(6th Cir.1996)(citingConsolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed. 126(1938)).

The reviewing court does not substitute its findings of fact for those of the Commissioner if substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's findings and inferences.Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387(6th Cir.1984).In fact, even if the evidence could also support a different conclusion, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge must stand if substantial evidence supports the conclusion reached.Her, 203 F.3d at 389(citingKey v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273(6th Cir.1997)).If the Commissioner did not consider the record as a whole, however, the Commissioner's conclusion is undermined.Hurst v. Secretary, 753 F.2d 517, 519(6th Cir.1985)(citing Allen v. Califano, 613 F.2d 139, 145(6th Cir.1980)(citingFuternick v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 647(6th Cir.1973)).

In reviewing the decisions of the Commissioner, courts look to four types of evidence: (1) objective medical findings regarding Plaintiff's condition; (2) diagnosis and opinions of medical experts; (3) subjective evidence of Plaintiff's condition; and (4)Plaintiff's age, education, and work experience.Miracle v. Celebrezze, 351 F.2d 361, 374(6th Cir.1965).

B.Proceedings At The Administrative Level

The claimant carries the ultimate burden to establish an entitlement to benefits byproving his or her "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months."42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)."Substantial gainful activity" not only includes previous work performed by Plaintiff, but also, considering Plaintiff's age, education, and work experience, any other relevant work that exists in the national economy in significant numbers regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which Plaintiff lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists, or whether Plaintiff would be hired if he or she applied.42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

At the administrative level of review, the claimant's case is considered under a five-step sequential evaluation process as follows:

(1) If the claimant is working and the work constitutes substantial gainful activity, benefits are automatically denied.

(2) If the claimant is not found to have an impairment which significantly limits his or her ability to work (a "severe" impairment), then he or she is not disabled.

(3) If the claimant is not working and has a severe impairment, it must be determined whether he or she suffers from one of the "listed" impairments¹ or its equivalent.If a listing is met or equaled, benefits are owing without further inquiry.

(4) If the claimant does not suffer from any listing-level impairments, it must be determined whether the claimant can return to the job he or she previously held in light of his or her residual functional capacity (e.g., what the claimant can still do despite his or her limitations).By showing a medical condition that prevents him or her from returning to such past relevant work, the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability.

(5) Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability,the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish the claimant's ability to work by proving the existence of a significant number of jobs in the national economy which the claimant could perform, given his or her age, experience, education, and residual functional capacity.

20 CFR §§ 404.1520,416.920(footnote added).See alsoMoon v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175, 1181(6th Cir.1990).

The Commissioner's burden at the fifth step of the evaluation process can be satisfied by relying on the medical-vocational guidelines, otherwise known as "the grid," but only if the claimant is not significantly limited by a nonexertional impairment, and then only when the claimant's characteristics identically match the characteristics of the applicable grid rule.Otherwise, the grid cannot be used to direct a conclusion, but only as a guide to the disability determination.Id.In such cases where the grid does not direct a conclusion as to the claimant's disability, the Commissioner must rebut the claimant's prima facie case by coming forward with particularized proof of the claimant's individual vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs, which is typically obtained through vocational expert testimony.SeeVarley v. Secretary, 820 F.2d 777, 779(6th Cir.1987).

In determining residual functional capacity for purposes of the analysis required at stages four and five above, the Commissioner is required to consider...