Hunt v. BROTHERHOOD OF TRANSPORTATION WORKERS, ETC.

• Decision Date: 30 October 1942
• Docket Number: No. 1011.,1011.
• Citation: 47 F. Supp. 571
• Parties: HUNT et al. v. BROTHERHOOD OF TRANSPORTATION WORKERS, LOCAL 107, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, STABLEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

47 F. Supp. 571

HUNT et al. v. BROTHERHOOD OF TRANSPORTATION WORKERS, LOCAL 107, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, STABLEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA et al.

No. 1011.

District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

October 30, 1942.

Hirsh W. Stalberg and Peter P. Zion, both of Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs.

William A. Gray, of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.

KALODNER, District Judge.

The issues having come to trial on Complaint and Answer, and having heard the testimony of witnesses and the argument of counsel, I make the following

Findings of Fact.

1. The plaintiffs are copartners trading under the name of Hunt's Motor Freight and Food Products Transport, with their principal place of business at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

2. For a long period of time prior to the filing of this Complaint, the plaintiffs were engaged in the business of hauling produce and foodstuffs.

3. For a period of about fourteen years prior to February 4, 1939, practically the sole business of the plaintiffs was to operate under contracts, both written and oral, with the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company (hereinafter referred to as A & P), by the terms of which plaintiffs hauled and transported merchandise for the A & P.

4. From eighty to eighty-five per cent of the operations of plaintiffs described in Finding No. 3 were interstate from and to Philadelphia.

5. The defendant, Brotherhood of Transportation Workers, Local 107, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of America (hereinafter referred to as the Union) is an unincorporated association of drivers and helpers engaged in "over the road hauling" and is affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. It is affiliated with numerous locals and subsidiary unions situated throughout the United States, each of which represents a separate branch or class of employees engaged in and about the loading and hauling of produce by trucks. Its main office is located at 105 Spring Garden Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

6. Sometime in 1937 the Union called a strike of the truckers and haulers of the A & P in Philadelphia for the purpose of enforcing a "closed shop".

7. The plaintiffs attempted to operate during the strike, and in July of 1937 refused the offer of the Union to negotiate.

8. The strike was attended with great violence and on September 4, 1937, one of the men connected with the Union was shot and killed at or near the Union headquarters.

9. One of the plaintiffs, Edward A. Hunt, was tried for the homicide described in Finding No. 8 and was acquitted.

10. On December 13, 1938, A & P entered into a "closed shop" agreement with the Union whereby A & P recognized the Union as the bargaining agent for its employees, as a result of which the various contract haulers who were similarly situated as the plaintiffs with the said A & P recognized the defendant Union as the bargaining agent for their employees.

11. As a result of the said agreement between the said A & P and the defendant Union, all employees of the various contract haulers situated as were the plaintiffs with the said A & P were notified that they were required to join and become members of the defendant Union.

12. At the time of the making of the "closed shop" agreement, A & P had been employing the services of some twenty-five haulers (including plaintiffs) who were using about forty-eight trucks. The plaintiffs had eight trucks.

13. All the haulers of A & P except plaintiffs joined the Union or made "closed shop" agreements with it.

14. Plaintiffs (after the "closed shop" agreement was made with A & P and the Union) attempted to make an agreement with the Union. The Union refused to negotiate, and still refuses to do so.

15. The employees of the plaintiffs have attempted to join the Union, but were refused admission as long as they were employees of the plaintiffs.

16. On February 4, 1939, A & P at the instigation of the Union cancelled its contract with the plaintiffs as of March 10, 1939, on the ground that plaintiffs were non-union. The plaintiffs' services had otherwise been satisfactory.

17. From about November 6, 1939, to February 12, 1940, plaintiffs did interstate hauling for Sterling Supply Company of Philadelphia, but were compelled to desist under the same circumstances as accompanied the loss of the A & P contract.

18. The elimination of the plaintiffs' services did not in any manner affect the interstate operations of A & P or the Sterling Supply Company.

19. The business of plaintiffs has been destroyed by reason of the Union's refusal to negotiate with plaintiffs and the Union's unwillingness to admit plaintiffs and their employees into the Union.

Discussion.

This action is under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1, et seq., as amended by the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15. The plaintiffs petition:

(1) that the Union be enjoined from refusing plaintiffs' employees admission to the Union;

(2) from interfering with plaintiffs' business;

(3) from boycotting plaintiffs and others who wish to deal with plaintiffs; and

(4) that the defendants be required to pay plaintiffs three-fold damages, together with costs, etc.

Defendants contend:

(1) that the Sherman Act is inapplicable;

(2) that this is a labor dispute and that plaintiffs have failed to comply with the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq.; and

(3) that the Union has been justified in its conduct toward the plaintiffs and has the right to confer or deny membership as it sees fit.

The latter two contentions of the defendants raise some very interesting questions, but it is unnecessary to consider them, because I have come to the conclusion that under the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 1940, 310 U.S. 469, 60 S.Ct. 982, 84 L.Ed. 1311, 128 A.L.R. 1044, and the cases which follow it, that there has been no violation of the Sherman Act.

Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S. C.A. § 1, provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal: * * *."

In his opinion in the Apex Hosiery Co. case, from which I must generously quote, Justice (now Chief Justice) Stone points out, at pages 490, 491, 492, 493 of 310 U.S., at page 990 of 60 S.Ct., 84 L.Ed. 1311, 128 A.L.R. 1044:

"* * * The legislative history of the Sherman Act as well as the decisions of this Court interpreting it, show that it was not aimed at policing interstate transportation or movement of goods and property. The legislative history and the voluminous literature which was generated in the course of the enactment and during fifty years of litigation of the Sherman Act give no hint that such was its purpose. * * * It was another and quite a different evil at which the Sherman Act was aimed. It was enacted in the era of `trusts' and of `combinations' of businesses and of capital organized and directed to control of the market by suppression of competition in the marketing of goods and services, the monopolistic tendency of which had become a matter of public concern.

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"For that reason the phrase `restraint of trade' which, as will presently appear, had a well-understood meaning at common law, was made the means of defining the activities prohibited. pages 494, 495 of 310 U.S., page 990 of 60 S.Ct., 84 L.Ed. 1311, 128 A.L.R. 1044.

* * * * * *

"The common law doctrines relating to contracts and combinations in restraint of trade were well understood long before the enactment of the Sherman law. They were contracts for the restriction or suppression of competition in the market, agreements to fix prices, divide marketing territories, apportion customers, restrict production and the like practices, which tend to raise prices or otherwise take from buyers or consumers the advantages which accrue to them from free competition in the market. Such contracts were deemed illegal and were unenforcible at common law. But the resulting restraints of trade were not penalized and gave rise to no actionable wrong. Certain classes of restraints were not outlawed when deemed reasonable, usually because they served to preserve or protect legitimate interests, previously existing, of one or more parties to the contract.

"In seeking more effective protection of the public from the growing evils of restraints on the competitive system effected by the concentrated commercial power of `trusts' and `combinations' at the close of the nineteenth century, the legislators found ready at their hand the common law concept of illegal restraints of trade or commerce. In enacting the Sherman law they took over that concept by condemning such restraints wherever they occur in or affect commerce between the states. They extended the condemnation of the statute to restraints effected by any combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, as well as by contract or agreement, having those effects on the competitive system and on purchasers and consumers of goods or services which were characteristic of restraints deemed illegal at common law, and they gave both private and public remedies for the injuries flowing from such restraints. pages 497, 498 of 310 U.S., page 994 of 60 S.Ct., 84 L.Ed. 1311, 128 A.L.R. 1044.

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