Hunt v. Dist. Of D.C.., 357.

Decision Date11 July 1946
Docket NumberNo. 357.,357.
PartiesHUNT v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, Criminal Division.

Judy Hunt was convicted of vagrancy, and she appeals.

Reversed with instructions.

John T. Bonner, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Milton D. Korman, Asst. Corp. Counsel, of Washington, D. C. (Vernon E. West, Corp. Counsel, Chester H. Gray, Principal Asst. Corp. Counsel, and Henry E. Wixon, Asst. Corp. Counsel, all of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellee.

Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and HOOD and CLAGETT, Associate Judges.

HOOD, Associate Judge.

Appellant was charged with vagrancy in violation of Section 22-3302 of the District Code. Prior to her trial, the government moved to consolidate the case against appellant with those of two other persons who had been arrested at the same time and place and were similarly charged. The motion being granted, a single trial was had on the three informations. Appellant was convicted and here asserts that the trial court erred in consolidating the cases for trial.

Authority for joinder of offenses and defendants in the Criminal Branch of the Municipal Court is outlined by rule 5(a) and (b) of that court:

(a) Joinder Of Defendants. Two or more defendants may be charged in the information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses.

(b) Trial Together Of Informations. The Court may order two or more informations to be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants if there is more than one, could have been joined in a single information. The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under such single information.’

It is clear from this rule that the consolidation was proper only if the defendants were alleged to have participated in the same act or series of acts which constituted the offense with which each was charged. It is our opinion that the acts of each were separate and distinct and had to be separately proven, and that the trial court erred in granting a consolidation.

The information upon which the appellant was charged consisted of two counts. Since she was found not guilty on the first count, we shall confine ourselves to a consideration of the second. That count alleged that the appellant since February 3, 1945, had been a vagrant, ‘to wit; a person who frequents, and is employed in a house and establishment of ill fame, and who engages in and commits acts of fornication and perversion for hire.' 1

The informations charging the other two defendants were similar except that the period of time over which the alleged vagrancy had continued differed in each case. The only common ground between the acts of all defendants, however, was that they took place at 1713 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W., and ‘divers other places in the District of Columbia.’ There is no conspiracy or joint commission of a crime alleged.

Vagrancy is a status or condition and the statute punishes one for being a certain kind of person, not for the doing of an overt act. The crime is personal and individual. It is not a crime that can be committed jointly or in concert, for in essence it is a personal condition arrived at not instantaneously but by a mode of living. Even if it be possible for several persons to conspire to become vagrants of the sort charged here, no claim is made that the vagrancy of any of the defendants resulted from joint acts or agreements with the others. While the same government witness testified that he had engaged in relations with each of the defendants at different times, that testimony had no weight in proving that the three had been involved in the same acts or transactions. True, they were similar acts but they were not the same act or the same series of acts.

With regard to the assertion that the same...

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9 cases
  • State v. Manney, s. A--88
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • 31 de março de 1958
    ...325 U.S. 888, 65 S.Ct. 1570, 89 L.Ed. 2001 (1945); Firotto v. United States, 124 F.2d 532 (8 Cir., 1942); cf. Hunt v. District of Columbia, 47 A.2d 783 (D.C.Mun.Ct.App.1946), affirmed 82 U.S.App.D.C. 159, 163 F.2d 833 The constitutional guarantee of indictment is not involved. The constitut......
  • Ricks v. United States
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 6 de abril de 1967
    ...Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The argument seems bottomed on our dictum in Hunt v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 47 A.2d 783, 784, affirmed, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 159, 163 F.2d 833 (1947), that "Vagrancy is a status or condition and the statute punishe......
  • Simcic v. United States
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 11 de janeiro de 1952
    ...v. United States, 1 Cir., 179 F.2d 905; United States v. Needleman, D.C., 6 F.R.D. 205. Our decision in Hunt v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 47 A.2d 783, 784, is of no help to defendants. There three defendants were charged with vagrancy for frequenting and being employed in a house ......
  • Jenkins v. United States, 2235.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 24 de novembro de 1958
    ...status or condition declared wrong by law, and punishment is directed against one who places himself in such status. Hunt v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 47 A.2d 783. Affirming, in 82 U.S.App.D.C. 159, 163 F.2d 833, 835, the court said: "A vagrant is a probable criminal; and the purp......
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