Hunt v. Drielick
| Decision Date | 09 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | SC: 157478,SC: 157477,SC: 157476,COA: 333632,COA: 333630,COA: 333631 |
| Citation | 956 N.W.2d 514 (Mem) |
| Parties | Marie HUNT, Personal Representative of the Estate of Eugene Wayne Hunt, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Garnishor-Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. Roger DRIELICK, d/b/a Roger Drielick Trucking, Defendant/Counterplaintiff/Cross-Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant-Appellee, and Corey A. Drielick, Defendant/Counterplaintiff/Cross-Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant-Appellee, and Great Lakes Carriers Corp., Defendant/Cross-Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, and Great Lakes Logistics & Services, Inc., and Mermaid Transportation, Inc., Defendants, and Sargent Trucking, Inc., Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, and Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company, Garnishee-Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Brandon James Huber, Plaintiff/Garnishor-Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. Corey A. Drielick and Roger Drielick, d/b/a Roger Drielick Trucking, Defendants/Counterplaintiffs/Cross-Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants-Appellees, and Great Lakes Carriers Corp., Defendant/Cross-Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, and Great Lakes Logistics & Services, Inc., and Mermaid Transportation, Inc., Defendants, and Sargent Trucking, Inc., Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, and Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company, Garnishee-Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Thomas Luczak and Noreen Luczak, Plaintiffs/Garnishor-Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v. Corey A. Drielick and Roger Drielick, d/b/a Roger Drielick Trucking, Defendants/Counterplaintiffs/Cross-Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants-Appellees, and Great Lakes Carriers Corp., Defendant/Cross-Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, and Great Lakes Logistics & Services, Inc., and Mermaid Transportation, Inc., Defendants, and Sargent Trucking, Inc., Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, and Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company, Garnishee-Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
On October 7, 2020, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal, as cross-appellants, the December 14, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered. MCR 7.305(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals correctly held that prejudgment interest on the underlying actions should be calculated from the dates the underlying complaints were filed through March 14, 2000, the date of the consent judgments. However, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that no other interest should be awarded.
Here, writs of garnishment were issued on December 4, 2000. Judgment on those writs entered on June 2, 2016. Although the writs were predicated upon the consent judgments awarded in the underlying actions, the writs themselves constitute a separate action. See MCR 3.101. Accordingly, the judgments on the writs of garnishment mark a separate date from which to calculate prejudgment and postjudgment interest. Similar to the Court of Appeals’ analysis of prejudgment interest on the underlying actions, prejudgment interest should be awarded from the dates the writs of garnishment were issued until the date the judgment on those writs entered. Postjudgment interest should also be awarded from the dates the judgment on those writs entered, as Empire has participated in and defended against the garnishment action. We REMAND this case to the Bay Circuit Court for calculation of prejudgment and postjudgment interest.
I concur in the order that reverses in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I write separately to respond to Justice VIVIANO ’s dissent, wherein he cites caselaw from 1889 up to 1960 and rhetorically asks,
Sometime after the cases cited by Justice VIVIANO were decided, the court rule governing garnishment was amended. Specifically, when MCR 3.101(M)(1) was adopted in 1985, it provided, as it does currently, that "[i]f there is a dispute regarding the garnishee's liability or if another person claims an interest in the garnishee's property or obligation, the issue shall be tried in the same manner as other civil actions." In addition, the rule currently indicates that "[t]he verified statement acts as the plaintiff's complaint against the garnishee, and the disclosure serves as the answer." MCR 3.101(M)(2). Finally, the court rule provides that garnishment proceedings may result in entry of a money judgment against the garnishee-defendant that may include interest. See MCR 3.101(O)(1).
Because MCR 3.101(M)(1) and (O)(1) provide ample authority allowing for a court to award interest on the judgment resulting from writs of garnishment in a disputed action, I concur in the order that reverses in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I dissent from the majority's decision because I do not believe that a garnishment proceeding constitutes a separate action for purposes of calculating statutory interest under MCL 600.6013. As a result, I do not believe that a separate award of prejudgment interest is permitted against a garnishee-defendant from the date of issuance of a writ of garnishment.
This case arises out of a fatal multivehicle accident that occurred on January 12, 1996. All parties except Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company (Empire), which insured the semi-tractor involved in the accident under a "bobtail" policy, stipulated to entry of consent judgments resolving the parties’ various claims. The consent judgments were entered on March 14, 2000. As part of the settlement, defendant Roger Drielick assigned his rights under the insurance policy with Empire to plaintiffs, Sargent Trucking, Inc. (Sargent), and Great Lakes Carriers Corporation (GLC). Thereafter, Sargent and GLC served writs of garnishment against Empire. After extensive litigation over the policy exclusions, including an appeal in this Court, the trial court determined that the exclusions were inapplicable. The Court of Appeals summarized well what happened next:
Thereafter, garnishor-plaintiffs moved for entry of judgment against Empire, seeking a judgment that Empire was liable for payment of the amounts owing under the consent judgments, including statutory interest. Empire argued that its responsibility for payment of the liabilities under the consent judgments was limited to the $750,000 policy limit because the policy contained no provision for the payment of prejudgment interest in excess of the policy limit, and because the policy's "Supplementary Payments" provision contained an interest clause that provides that postjudgment interest will be paid only in suits in which Empire assumes the defense.[1 ] In other words, Empire argued that it was not obligated to pay postjudgment interest because it did not defend the underlying suits. The trial court found that Empire had breached its duty to defend under the policy and that the breach had negated the provision in the policy that limited the payment of postjudgment interest to those suits in which Empire had assumed the defense. The trial court entered final orders of judgment inclusive of statutory judgment interest from the date the underlying complaints were filed through June 2, 2016 .... [ Hunt v. Drielick , 322 Mich. App. 318, 328-329, 914 N.W.2d 371 (2017).]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed that Empire is "responsible for prejudgment interest calculated based on the policy limit, even if the judgment amounts plus prejudgment interest exceed the policy limits." Id. at 336, 914 N.W.2d 371. On the issue of whether prejudgment interest could be assessed on the money judgments issued on the writs of garnishments, however, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court's ruling, explaining as follows:
The trial court awarded prejudgment interest from the dates the underlying complaints were filed until the final judgments on the writs of garnishment were entered on June 2, 2016. Empire argues that prejudgment interest can only be measured from the date of the original complaints through March 14, 2000, the date of the consent judgments. We agree. The settling parties memorialized their agreements in consent judgments. When those judgments were entered, the prejudgment-interest period ended and the postjudgment-interest period began. [ Matich v. Modern Research Co. , 430 Mich. 1, 20, 420 N.W.2d 67 (1988) ]. See also Madison v. Detroit , 182 Mich. App. 696, 700-701, 452 N.W.2d 883 (1990). Therefore, prejudgment interest accrued until the consent judgments were entered; interest that accrued after entry of the consent judgments is postjudgment interest. Empire is obligated to pay prejudgment interest on the policy limits from the dates the complaints in the underlying actions were filed until the date of the consent judgments were entered. [ Id. ]
We heard oral argument on the application filed by GLC and Sargent challenging the Court of Appeals’ ruling limiting prejudgment interest to the period prior to entry of the consent judgments in the underlying action. In a terse order, the majority now reverses the Court of Appeals on this point, but provides little in the way of explanation or legal support for its holding. Indeed, the majority's analysis is boiled down to a single sentence and a single citation: I cannot agree with this assertion for the following reasons.
First and foremost, we have clearly and repeatedly held to the contrary for over a century. See Milwaukee Bridge & Iron Works v. Wayne Circuit Judge , 73 Mich. 155, 157, 41 N.W. 215 (1889) (...
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