Hunt v. Jones

• Decision Date: 18 December 1919
• Docket Number: 1 Div. 112
• Citation: 203 Ala. 541,84 So. 718
• Parties: HUNT v. JONES et al.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

84 So. 718

203 Ala. 541

HUNT v. JONES et al.

1 Div. 112

Supreme Court of Alabama

December 18, 1919

Appeal from Circuit Court, Mobile County; Claude A. Grayson, Judge.

Bill by Robert L. Jones and William C. Sims against Joseph H. Hunt for rescission and an accounting. From decree for complainants, respondent appeals. Reversed and rendered.

Harry T. Smith & Caffey, of Mobile, for appellant.

Jesse F. Hogan, of Mobile, for appellees.

BROWN J.

The appellant, Hunt, being the owner of the lands described in the bill, in the year 1915 was approached by the appellees Jones and Sims, with a proposition to purchase all the merchantable timber thereon, and this led to negotiations between the parties, which on the 22d of September, 1915 resulted in the purchase of the lands by appellees; and on the date above stated Hunt, for and in consideration of $1,500 in cash paid by them, executed and delivered to them a warranty deed to the land, passing the title in fee simple.

It appears that the purpose impelling appellees to purchase the land was to acquire the right to cut and remove all the merchantable timber located thereon; they at the time being engaged in the timber business. After they had cut and removed a considerable portion of a certain class of timber and had, for a consideration of $650, granted to the Lucas E Moore Stave Company all the timber--except tupelo gum and cotton wood--remaining thereon, with the right of ingress and egress for cutting and removing the same, on April 14, 1916, sold and reconveyed the lands to Hunt, with a reservation in the conveyance of all the timber and logs then on the land and the full right of ingress and egress for a term of two years to cut and remove such of the timber as was conveyed to the stave company, and a term of five years for the removal of tupelo gum and cotton wood, this conveyance containing the usual covenants of warranty, and the consideration therefor was $300 paid in cash.

Without previous notice of their purpose or desire to rescind, and after practically all the timber had been cut and removed from the land, and without making tender to Hunt of the purchase money paid to them as a consideration for the reconveyance of the land to him, or otherwise offering to put him in statu quo, the appellees, on the 29th of July, 1918, filed this bill, praying for a rescission, not only to of the sale made by Hunt to them, but also of the resale by them to Hunt, and for the cancellation of both of said deeds, and praying for a reference to the register "for the purpose of determining the amount due from the said Joseph H. Hunt to your complainants on account of the rescission of said sale" and for general relief.

The sole ground upon which the equity of the bill is rested is that complainants were misled to their injury by the fraudulent representations of the respondent as to the location of the lines bounding the tract of land, the lines pointed out embracing a quantity of valuable timber that was not in fact situated on the land in question. The trial court overruled the demurrers to the bill as originally filed and as amended, attacking it for want of equity and for the reason that it disclosed that the complainants had an adequate remedy at law, and on final hearing, on pleadings and proof, decreed a rescission of the sales and cancellation of both deeds, and rendered a money decree in favor of the complainants; and for the purpose of enforcing the decree declared a lien on the land.

"Fraud of itself is never a distinctive ground of equity jurisdiction; that is, it is never, of itself, a foundation which will uphold a bill in equity. On the contrary, fraud is, in many cases, cognizable in a court of law." Smith's Ex'r v. Cockrell, 66 Ala. 77; Williams et al. v. Neal et al., 152 Ala. 435, 44 So. 551; 24 R.C.L. p. 363, sec. 653.

As illustrative of this principle, it was held in Munroe v. Pritchett, 16 Ala. 785, 50 Am.Dec. 203, that the vendee of lands could maintain an action at law to recover damages for the false representations of the vendor "that the tract embraced a certain designated portion of good land, whereby the vendee was induced to make the purchase," and that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the vendor knew that the representations were false at the time he made them. This holding has been reaffirmed in Pritchett v. Munroe, 22 Ala. 501; Russell v. Little, 28 Ala. 160; Harton v. Belcher, 195 Ala. 186, 70 So. 141; Berry v. Wooddy (App.) 77 So. 942; Id., 201 Ala. 698, 78 So. 988.

It has likewise been held, where a wrong can be compensated in money and an action at law affords an adequate remedy therefor, a court of equity is without jurisdiction, unless some independent matter of equitable cognizance is shown. Ashurst v. Ashurst, 175 Ala. 667, 57 So. 442; Gulf Compress Co. v. Harris, etc., Co., 158 Ala. 343, 48 So. 477, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 399; Gulf Compress Co. v. Sykes-Tweedy & Co., 159 Ala. 669, 48 So. 481; Gulf Compress Co. v. Jones Cotton Co., 159 Ala. 670, 48 So. 481; 5 Ency.Dig.Ala.Rep. 478.

It is manifest from the foregoing statement that a rescission of the sales between the parties and a cancellation of the deed from Hunt to complainants and the deed from complainants back to Hunt would leave the title to the land where it rested at the filing of the bill--in Hunt; and the only substantial relief sought by the bill, and granted, is a decree for a sum of money representing the damages sustained as a consequence of the fraudulent representations of the vendor, which, under the authorities, is recoverable in an action at law. Munroe v. Pritchett, supra.

Otherwise stated, in so far as the rescission of the contract and the cancellation of the deeds are concerned, the court is asked to do something rendered vain and useless by the voluntary act of the complainants in reconveying the lands to the respondent for a valuable consideration paid by respondent to them, and this a court of equity will not assume jurisdiction to do. But appellees insist that they had a right to have the court declare a lien upon the land for the enforcement of the decree, and that this could not be done in an action at law. Foster v. Gressett's Heirs, 29 Ala. 393, is cited to support this contention. In that case, at the time the bill was filed, the title to the land was in the complainants, and its equity depended upon the necessity for the cancellation of the deed made to the...