Hunt v. Missouri R. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 June 1886
• Citation: Hunt v. Missouri R. Co., 1 S.W. 127, 89 Mo. 607 (Mo. 1886)
• Parties: HUNT v. MISSOURI R. CO. and another.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

1 S.W. 127

89 Mo. 607

HUNT v.MISSOURI R. CO. and another.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

June 7, 1886.

APPEAL — AFFIRMANCE AS TO ONE RESPONDENT.

Under the statutes of Missouri (section 3776, Revision 1879) the court of last resort may affirm the judgment of the court below as to one joint respondent, and reverse it as to another.

Appeal from St. Louis court of appeals.

A. R. Taylor, for respondent, Martha Hunt.Dyer, Lee & Ellis, for appellants, Missouri R. Co. and another.

RAY, J.

This cause was before the St. Louis court of appeals, and is reported in 14 Mo. App. 160.The point most pressed at the oral argument before us, and in the brief of counsel for the railroad company, and the one we think of most importance as to it, is whether there is sufficient evidence of negligence on its part to go to the jury.A similar objection was also raised and urged by counsel for defendant Higgins as to him.We have carefully considered the evidence, and especially with reference to this objection.

The majority of the court are of opinion that as to the defendantMissouri Railroad Company there is no sufficient evidence, or, rather, there is an entire want of evidence, of negligence on its part authorizing the submission of the cause to the jury; and that, as to it, the judgment of the trial court, as well as that of the court of appeals, is erroneous, and should be reversed; and it is accordingly so ordered.In this conclusion and disposition of the case as to this defendant, NORTON, J., and myself do not concur.

As to the defendant Higgins, after a careful examination of the entire evidence, we see no sufficient reason to doubt that the conclusion arrived at by the trial court, as well as the court of appeals, is correct, and that the case made by the evidence was, as to him, one for the jury to pass on.Perhaps it is well to say that we do not mean to be understood as committed to an approval of some of the expressions which occur in the progress of the opinion of the court of appeals, as to what the disaster, in and of itself, may indicate to the practical minded jury, or as to what the juror, in his practical familiarity with current events, and with their physical and moral causes, may legitimately consider, whatever the witness may say.

The other questions made by the defendant Higgins, or involved in the case in his behalf, we have also considered, and, in our opinion, they also are properly considered and correctly disposed of by the court of...