Hunt v. Prior
| Decision Date | 26 March 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 15210,15210 |
| Citation | 673 A.2d 514,236 Conn. 421 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3039 Thomas HUNT v. John PRIOR et al. |
Joseph C. Morelli, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).
James G. Green, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Richard F. Wareing, Hartford, for appellees (defendants).
Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BERDON, NORCOTT and PALMER, JJ.
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court properly granted the motion of the defendants, the board of police commissioners for the borough of Naugatuck (board) and the individual members of the board, 1 to set aside a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Thomas Hunt, a member of the Naugatuck police department (department). The plaintiff brought this action seeking damages for his allegedly wrongful suspension by the board. Following a six week trial, the jury found for the plaintiff on all counts and awarded him $550,000. Upon the motion of the defendants, the trial court set aside the jury verdict and rendered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The plaintiff was hired as a police officer by the borough of Naugatuck (borough) in 1965. After several promotions within the department, the plaintiff, on March 5, 1985, was appointed an administrative captain. Shortly thereafter, however, on July 1, 1985, the plaintiff took an extended medical leave of absence from the department due to a claimed stress disorder and did not return to work until March 17, 1987. 2
Subsequent to the plaintiff's promotion to administrative captain and while he was on leave from the department, the board initiated an investigation into allegations that the plaintiff had violated certain departmental rules and regulations. 3 In November, 1986, Kevin McSherry, the attorney retained by the borough to conduct the investigation, presented the board with a list of allegations against the plaintiff. 4 The board, however, took no formal action on the allegations at that time.
Shortly before the plaintiff's return to active duty on March 17, 1987, 5 McSherry presented the board with a second set of allegations against the plaintiff, and on March 18, 1987, the board met to determine what action, if any, to take with respect to those allegations. At that meeting, which was attended by the plaintiff and his attorney, the board voted to file formal charges against the plaintiff. 6 The board also voted to suspend the plaintiff, with pay, pending a resolution of the charges. 7
On May 31, 1988, the board presented the plaintiff with a revised list of charges. 8 Prior to the commencement of a formal hearing on those charges, however, the board informed the plaintiff that it would proceed on only four of the allegations. 9 Finally, on March 7, 1989, 10 hearings on the remaining charges were commenced. 11 At the conclusion of the hearings, in August, 1989, the board dismissed all four charges and reinstated the plaintiff to active duty as administrative captain.
Prior to the commencement of the hearings, the plaintiff, on June 16, 1988, initiated this action, claiming that the filing of the charges and his suspension by the board were the result of a politically motivated vendetta against him by the borough's mayor, Terry Buckmiller, who was also a member of the board. 12 In the first count of his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he had been suspended without just cause in violation of the collective bargaining agreement between the borough and the plaintiff's union, the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 385. 13 In the second count of the complaint, he alleged that the board had committed a "wilful, wanton, capricious and illegal" breach of the collective bargaining agreement 14 by entertaining charges against him that were predicated upon an unsworn citizen's complaint 15 contrary to article XXII, § 22.05, of the agreement. 16 In the remaining three counts, 17 all brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 the plaintiff alleged that the board had: (1) suspended him without just cause in violation of his right to procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution; (2) violated his right to substantive due process under the federal and state constitutions by proceeding against him in a "wilful, arbitrary and capricious" manner; and (3) improperly singled him out for administrative action in violation of his right to the equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution and article first, § 20, of the state constitution. 19 The plaintiff sought permanent reinstatement to active duty as administrative captain, compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees and costs.
The jury found in favor of the plaintiff on all counts, awarding him compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $430,000 against the board, $90,000 against Buckmiller, and $6000 each against Prior, DeCarlo, Sharon, Mason and Jancis. At the conclusion of the trial, however, the trial court granted the defendants' motion to set aside the verdict with respect to each count. As to the plaintiff's two common law claims, the trial court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over those counts because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the collective bargaining agreement. The trial court also set aside the verdict with respect to the plaintiff's three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, concluding that, as to his due process claims, the plaintiff had failed to establish that the defendants' actions had deprived him of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest and, as to his equal protection claim, the plaintiff had not proved that the board had treated him differently from others similarly situated. 20
On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motion to set aside the verdict with respect to each of the five counts. Because we agree with the trial court that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief on any of his claims as a matter of law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The plaintiff maintains that the trial court improperly set aside the verdict with respect to the breach of contract and tortious breach of contract counts of his complaint. 21 Specifically, he argues that the trial court improperly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over those claims because he had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him under the collective bargaining agreement. 22 In support of this argument, the plaintiff asserts that he should be excused for failing to exhaust his administrative remedies both because it would have been futile for him to do so and because those remedies were inadequate in light of the relief he sought. We agree with the trial court that the plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies deprived the court of jurisdiction over his common law claims. 23
Article XXI of the collective bargaining agreement 24 establishes a three-step grievance procedure for employees who have been subjected to disciplinary action, including discharge or suspension. Under that procedure, an employee who wishes to challenge the imposition of any disciplinary measure must first file a grievance with the chief of police, who is required to render a written decision within seven days of receipt of the grievance. If dissatisfied with the decision of the police chief, the employee may then seek relief from the board, which must consider the matter at its next regularly scheduled meeting and render its decision no later than seven days thereafter. 25 Finally, if the employee does not agree with the board's decision, the employee's union is authorized to submit the grievance to the state board of mediation and arbitration, whose decision is final and binding on the parties.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Labbe v. Pension Commission, 229 Conn. 801, 811, 643 A.2d 1268 (1994). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 811-12, 643 A.2d 1268.
Despite the important public policy considerations underlying the exhaustion requirement, we have " 'grudgingly carved several exceptions' from the exhaustion doctrine." Cahill v. Board of Education, 198 Conn. 229, 241, 502 A.2d 410 (1985). We have recognized such exceptions, however, "only infrequently and only for narrowly defined purposes." LaCroix v. Board of...
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