Hunt v. Shettle
| Decision Date | 29 August 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-482A64,3-482A64 |
| Citation | 452 N.E.2d 1045 |
| Parties | Terry HUNT, Appellant (Petitioner Below), v. John T. SHETTLE and the Indiana State Police Board, Appellees (Respondents Below), Danny HIXENBAUGH, Appellant (Petitioner Below)-Cross Appellee, v. John T. SHETTLE, and the Indiana State Police Board, Appellees (Respondents Below)-Cross Appellants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
J. David Keckley, South Bend, for appellants Terry Hunt and Danny hixenbaugh.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Charles N. Braun II, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellees John T. Shettle and the Indiana State Police Bd.
Terry Hunt and Danny Hixenbaugh are Indiana State Police Officers who were disciplined by State Police Superintendent John Shettle and the Indiana State Police Board (Board) for violating department regulations. They sought judicial review of the Board's action in the trial court. In each case, the decision of the Board was affirmed in part and reversed in part. In this consolidated appeal, Hunt, Hixenbaugh,
and the Board all seek relief from the decision of the trial court. We address the following issues:
(1) Whether Shettle's failure to comply with applicable procedural requirements invalidates disciplinary action taken by him;
(2) Whether the findings of the Board are sufficient to enable review of its decision; and
(3) Whether the trial court erred in determining that the disciplinary action taken by the Board was supported by sufficient evidence.
Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.
State Police Superintendent Shettle charged Hunt with violating four different department regulations, all of which related to consuming excessive amounts of liquor and to damaging a State-owned police car. Hunt appeared before Shettle and pleaded not guilty to the charges. Shettle found Hunt guilty of consuming excessive amounts of intoxicating beverages while readily identifiable as a police officer and of committing misuse and waste of public property. It was Shettle's decision that Hunt be suspended for ten days.
Hunt appealed Shettle's decision to the State Police Board. The Board held a hearing at which Hunt was represented by counsel, allowed to present evidence, afforded an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and permitted to present opening and closing statements. The Board upheld the decision of Shettle as to the regulations violated by Hunt. However, the Board determined that the ten day suspension ordered by Shettle was excessive and replaced the suspension with a verbal reprimand.
Hunt then sought judicial review of the Board's order in the court below. The trial court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Board concluding, inter alia, that: (1) The Board's findings were sufficient to allow review of its action; (2) there was substantial evidence in support of the Board's conclusion that Hunt misused public property; and (3) there was no evidence that Hunt was intoxicated while readily identifiable as a police officer. The case was remanded to the Board for reconsideration of the discipline to be imposed. On remand, the Board ordered that Hunt, being guilty only of misuse of public property, should receive a verbal reprimand.
Hunt appeals the decision of the trial court, contending that the trial court erred in determining that the Board's findings were adequate and supported by substantial evidence. 1
It is axiomatic that an administrative board is required to set forth findings of fact in support of its decision. See e.g., Talas v. Correct Piping Company (1981), Ind., 416 N.E.2d 845; Hawley v. South Bend, Dept. of Redevelopment (1978), 270 Ind. 109, 383 N.E.2d 333.
The findings made by an administrative agency must include findings of basic fact which support its findings of ultimate fact and conclusion of law. Rork v. Szabo Foods (1982), Ind., 436 N.E.2d 64; Perez v. United States Steel Corp. (1981), Ind., 426 N.E.2d 29. The findings must be specific enough to enable the reader to understand the reasons which underly the Board's finding of ultimate fact. Id., at 33.
In Hunt's case, the Board supported its conclusion that Hunt had consumed excessive amounts of liquor while readily identifiable as a police officer and that Hunt misused and wasted public property with these findings:
We agree with Hunt's contention that these findings of fact are insufficient to support the conclusion that he committed misuse and waste of public property. Because these findings are practically devoid of findings of basic fact, we can only speculate as to why the Board found Hunt guilty of misuse of public property.
The record reveals that on the night of October 7, 1977, Hunt's police car was damaged when Hunt momentarily lost control of the car while driving through an "S" curve. There was evidence that Hunt had been drinking beer that evening, but Shettle determined that Hunt was not guilty of two charges which related to driving while intoxicated. There was evidence that Hunt was exceeding the speed limit, but there was also evidence that Hunt lost control of the car as he was trying to avoid an object in the road. Unfortunately, nowhere in its findings did the Board make any finding regarding the manner in which Hunt was driving or the cause of the accident.
The cause of Hunt's accident is an issue of fact. The trial court upheld the Board's determination that Hunt misused the car on the basis that Hunt admitted that he might have been driving too fast. In so doing, the trial court was necessarily engaged in fact-finding. This was error. Issues of fact are to be determined by the Board or agency, not by the reviewing court. Indiana Ed. Employment v. Board of School Trustees (1978), 176 Ind.App. 680, 377 N.E.2d 414.
Because the Board failed to make a basic finding as to the cause of Hunt's accident, it is impossible to review the Board's ultimate finding that Hunt was guilty of misuse of public property. Therefore, that portion of the decision of the trial court which affirms the Board's disciplinary action is reversed and remanded to the trial court with instructions to remand this case to the Board for more specific findings of fact.
After an appearance before Shettle and a hearing before the Board, Danny Hixenbaugh was found guilty of conveying false information to a fellow officer concerning official department business. The course of events which precipitated Hixenbaugh's appeal to this Court parallels that of Hunt. Shettle found Hixenbaugh guilty of the charge and demoted him in rank from Sergeant to Trooper. Hixenbaugh appealed Shettle's decision to the Board, and the Board upheld Shettle's action. Hixenbaugh then sought judicial review of the Board's order in the court below. The trial court, finding the action of the Board to be supported by substantial evidence, affirmed the Board's order. However, the court also determined that the procedure employed by Shettle was defective, and therefore the demotion was lawful only from the date of the Board's decision. Both the Board and Hixenbaugh appeal the decision of the trial court. The Board contends that Hixenbaugh's demotion should be effective from the date of Shettle's order because the procedure employed by Shettle was valid. Hixenbaugh contends that the Board's findings were insufficient and that its decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
On May 26, 1978, Shettle charged Hixenbaugh with violating a State Police regulation by conveying false information to a fellow officer concerning official department business. On June 6, 1978, Hixenbaugh was given the right, pursuant to Ind.Code 1976 10-1-1-6 (Burns Code Ed., 1981 Repl.), 2 to answer the charge in a personal appearance before Shettle. The "appearance" before Shettle was a proceeding attended by Shettle, Hixenbaugh, and a Captain Furnas. Shettle and Furnas questioned Hixenbaugh about the events which gave rise to the disciplinary charge and Hixenbaugh was given an opportunity to deny the charge and explain his conduct. Hixenbaugh requested that the charge against him be dismissed or, in the alternative, that he be afforded a hearing at which he could confront the evidence and witnesses against him, as well as present evidence himself. In response to that request, Hixenbaugh was told that IC 10-1-1-6 provided for no such hearing and that, if he were found guilty, he had the option to appeal to the Board where he would receive a full hearing. On June 14, 1978, Shettle found Hixenbaugh guilty of the charged violation and demoted Hixenbaugh from Sergeant to Trooper, effective June 17, 1978.
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