Hunt v. St. Louis Housing Authority, 39411

• Decision Date: 31 October 1978
• Docket Number: No. 39411,39411
• Parties: Raymond HUNT, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS HOUSING AUTHORITY, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent. . Louis District, Division Two
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 728

573 S.W.2d 728

Raymond HUNT, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS HOUSING AUTHORITY, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent.

No. 39411.

Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, Division Two.

Oct. 31, 1978.

Michael U. Bastian, Legal Aid Society, St. Louis, for appellant.

Edward C. Cody, Klutho, Cody & Kilo Attorneys, Inc., Warren W. Friedman, St. Louis, for respondent.

STEPHAN, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order sustaining defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's petition, which sought actual and punitive damages under § 290.140, RSMo 1969, Missouri's "service letter statute". Plaintiff's petition alleged that he had been an employee of defendant St. Louis Housing Authority, that upon his discharge he requested a service letter pursuant to the statute, that the letter issued to him by defendant failed to state the true reason for his dismissal and that such failure prevented him from obtaining similar employment and thereby caused him great mental and emotional distress. As noted, defendant's motion to dismiss this petition was sustained, on the grounds that § 290.140 does not permit a service letter suit to be brought against a municipal corporation.

Section 290.140 provides that:

"Whenever any employee of any corporation doing business in this state shall be discharged or voluntarily quit the service of such corporation, it shall be the duty of the superintendent or manager of said corporation, upon the written request of such employee to him, if such employee shall have been in the service of said corporation for a period of at least ninety days, to issue to such employee a letter, duly signed by such superintendent or manager, setting forth the nature and character of service rendered by such employee to such corporation and the duration thereof, and truly stating for what cause, if any, such employee has quit such service; and if any such superintendent or manager shall fail or refuse to issue such letter to such employee when so requested by such employee, such superintendent or manager shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine in any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for a period not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment."

Although the statute recites criminal sanctions for its violation, it was recognized early that it created a civil cause of action in favor of an employee entitled to its protections and injured by its breach. When the statutory violation is accompanied by legal malice, the employee may obtain punitive as well as actual damages. Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 192 S.W. 387, 390 (Mo.1917). See also Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 223 S.W. 754, 756 (Mo.App.1920). ¹

The threshold question which we address is whether the defendant St. Louis Housing Authority is a "corporation doing business in this state" as that term is used in the statute. For reasons hereinafter stated, we have concluded it is not and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant St. Louis Housing Authority was created in 1939 by the Housing Authorities Law, now §§ 99.010 to 99.230, RSMo 1969. ² The purpose of the Authority is to clear and rehabilitate areas of substandard housing by planning and developing subsidized housing projects for low-income families, §§ 99.030 and 99.080. Such projects are not to compete with private enterprise, § 99.030, nor may they be constructed or operated for profit or as a source of revenue, § 99.090. By legislative declaration and judicial definition, defendant constitutes a municipal corporation as that term is used in its broader sense to include public and quasi-corporations which act as arms of local government and exercise essential governmental functions. Section 99.080 and Laret Investment Co. v. Dickmann, 345 Mo. 449, 134 S.W.2d 65, 68 (1939). See also State ex rel. Housing Authority of St. Louis County v. Wind, 337 S.W.2d 554, 557(1) (Mo.App.1960). The Missouri Supreme Court, in St. Louis Housing Authority v. City of St. Louis, 361 Mo. 1170, 239 S.W.2d 289 (1951), practically erased the distinction between the terms "municipality" and "municipal corporation", as applied to defendant, by holding defendant a municipality within the meaning of a statute which authorized municipalities and other political subdivisions of the state to cooperate with one another for public improvements. The court there stated that:

"By both judicial recognition and common usage 'municipality' is a modern synonym of 'municipal corporation'. 'Municipality' is all embracing. It includes, of course, cities of all classes, as well as towns, but it includes also a non-profit agency, such as plaintiff, which is authorized to exercise public and essential governmental functions."

"Municipality now has a broader meaning than 'city' or 'town', and presently includes bodies public or essentially governmental in character and function and distinguishes public bodies, such as plaintiff, from corporations only quasi-public in nature. . . . But the two terms (municipality and municipal corporation) are often interchangeably used." Id. 294-295.

In this view, a municipal corporation such as defendant is simply a branch or department of the local government which created it.

Our Constitution and statutes consistently recognize the difference between private business corporations and municipal corporations. We have found no instance and plaintiff has cited us to none where the word "corporation" alone in a constitutional provision or in a statute is clearly intended to refer to, or include, a municipal corporation. Indeed, it has been judicially noted that a "well settled distinction exists between the two" terms. In re East Park Dist. of Kansas City, 361 Mo. 829, 237 S.W.2d 118, 120 (1951). In City of Webster Groves...