Hunt v. State
| Decision Date | 20 January 1892 |
| Docket Number | 410 |
| Citation | 29 N.E. 933,3 Ind.App. 383 |
| Parties | HUNT v. THE STATE |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
From the Sullivan Circuit Court.
Judgment reversed.
J. S Bays and W. S. Maple, for appellant.
O. B Morris, for the State.
The trial resulted in a conviction of the defendant, and he appeals.
No question is raised respecting the sufficiency of the affidavit, so we intimate no opinion thereon. But it is contended that the evidence does not support the finding.
The evidence showed that appellant lived upon his father's farm, for whom he worked, and on the 10th day of December, 1890, he was hunting in a tract of timber on such farm, which was enclosed with other land used for pasture, and in which enclosure appellant's father had a drove of sheep. Upon the same day Clinton Bicknell and another were hunting foxes with six hounds and other proper accoutrements, and, when they came near the enclosure in which appellant was hunting, the hounds discovered a fox trail which led across such enclosure, and which they followed on the run. When they entered the enclosure where the sheep were pasturing, the sheep became very much frightened, and started towards the woods as fast as they could run, with the hounds after them. They were about twenty-five feet behind the sheep when they entered the woods. Appellant had no knowledge of the hunters or of the chase of the hounds, until he was startled by the sheep running in a greatly excited condition, with the hounds closely following at their heels. Several sheep had recently been killed in the enclosure by dogs, and appellant supposed that the hounds were chasing the sheep, and for the purpose of protecting them he shot one of the hounds, and it fell dead instantly. Bicknell and his companion were about a half mile away at the time, and were not in sight of appellant. The shooting was in Sullivan county and on the date stated in the affidavit, and the hound was the property of Bicknell. This was the substance of the evidence.
Section 2101 provides, among other things, that whoever "cruelly beats or needlessly mutilates or kills any animal" shall be fined, etc. Counsel for the State are in error in the assumption that the cruel killing of an animal constitutes an offense under the statute. The adjective "cruelly" qualifies "beats," and "needlessly" qualifies "mutilates or kills," so the simple charge of a cruel killing constitutes no offence. The point is not made that there is a possible variance between the evidence and the charge, so we need not consider that question, but as the affidavit charges the killing of the animal, and the evidence sustains the charge to that extent, we shall, in the discussion of the evidence, treat the charge as if it were for a needless killing, the only kind punishable.
This statute was evidently designed to inculcate a humane regard for the rights and feelings of the brute creation by reproving evil and indifferent tendencies in human nature in its intercourse with animals, but not to limit man's proper dominion "over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth." Both the protection of the animal and the elevation and refinement of the man seem to be the end of the law. If one destroys the life of an animal for the honest purpose of protecting his person or property, and the circumstances are of such a character as to reasonably justify the belief that the measure is necessary to that end the act would not be in violation of the statute under consideration, though it turned out...
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