Hunt v. State
| Decision Date | 11 February 1994 |
| Citation | 659 So.2d 933 |
| Parties | Gregory HUNT v. STATE. CR 89-1407. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
J. Massey Relfe, Jr., Birmingham, for appellant.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Stephen Dodd, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Charles D. Baker, Dist. Atty., for appellee.
In the early morning hours of August 2, 1988, Karen Lane was savagely and brutally murdered in the apartment she shared with another young woman. In March 1989, Gregory Hunt, the appellant, was charged by a three-count indictment with the capital offenses of intentional murder during sexual abuse in the first degree, as defined in Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-5-40(a)(8), and intentional murder during a burglary in the first degree, as defined in § 13A-5-40(a)(4). 1 On June 19, 1990, a jury found the appellant guilty of all three counts of the indictment and, by a vote of 11 to 1, recommended that punishment be fixed at death. On July 27, 1990, the trial judge sentenced the appellant to death. This is the direct appeal of that conviction and sentence.
This appeal was not submitted for decision until December 14, 1993. The delay in the submission of this appeal is largely attributable to the creation and completion of the record on appeal. The original record on appeal was filed on January 22, 1991. That record was supplemented on April 5, 1991; on December 26, 1991; on May 29, 1992; and on June 9, 1993. In addition, the appellant's trial counsel did not represent him on appeal. Out-of-state counsel filed notice of appearance on behalf of the appellant on February 19, 1991, but later withdrew. New counsel was appointed to represent the appellant on May 19, 1993. The appellant, through appointed counsel, filed his brief on October 1, 1993. The attorney general's brief was filed on December 10, 1993.
The appellant complains that his constitutional rights were violated because he was denied access to a law library while he was incarcerated.
On October 11, 1989, the appellant, by written pro se motion, requested the circuit court to order the county sheriff "to give the Defendant being held on Capital charges access to complete law library for at least (4) four hours a week." R. 1000. It does not appear that the trial judge ever ruled on this motion.
On January 25, 1990, a pretrial hearing was held on pending motions. At that hearing, the appellant's attorneys moved to withdraw from representing the appellant on the grounds that the appellant had accused counsel of engaging in unethical conduct and because the appellant had acted "directly contrary to the advice" of counsel. R. 4, 1013-12. At that hearing, the appellant opposed the motion to withdraw and stated, "Well, I'm not here to represent myself." R. 9.
During the hearing, the following occurred:
From this exchange, it is clear to this Court that the appellant was not seeking to exercise his right to represent himself, but was instead seeking to be allowed to act in the capacity of some sort of co-counsel.
Holland v. State, 615 So.2d 1313, 1320 (Ala.Cr.App.1993). " Burks v. State, 600 So.2d 374, 380 (Ala.Cr.App.1991). See also Whitehead v. State, 593 So.2d 126, 129 (Ala.Cr.App.1991); Ford v. State, 515 So.2d 34, 43-44 (Ala.Cr.App.1986), affirmed, 515 So.2d 48, 51 (Ala.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1079, 108 S.Ct. 1061, 98 L.Ed.2d 1023 (1988). "While prison officials must provide prisoners with direct legal assistance or access to a law library, they are not required to provide both, so long as the constitutional requirement of 'meaningful access' is met." Ex parte Thigpen, 513 So.2d 101, 102 (Ala.Cr.App.1987). We find no error in this regard.
The appellant complains of numerous alleged errors in the prosecutor's comments and the presentation of certain evidence during the guilt phase of his trial concerning "other criminal acts."
After the jury had been selected but before the attorneys made their opening statements, defense counsel made an oral motion in limine, asking "the court to direct the state, at least in so far as opening statements are concerned, not to refer to any other offense other than the one we are concerned with, including the alleged arson." R. 216. The assistant district attorney responded: R. 217. The trial judge denied the motion in limine. R. 218.
The appellant complains of the following comments by the prosecutor in his opening statement to the jury:
1) R. 223.
The trial court overruled defense counsel's objection. The prosecutor had earlier explained that the burning of the house, shortly before the murder, was part of the appellant's plan or scheme to harm the victim. R. 216-17.
2) "Loretta will testify that he told her he wanted to get out of jail and wanted to escape and would she get him some money." R. 225.
The trial judge sustained defense counsel's objection.
3) "We will show you a card, an identification card that he gave to Loretta while he was in jail." R. 226.
In response to the prosecutor's argument that he intended to prove "flight to avoid prosecution," the trial judge instructed the district attorney, R. 226. The trial judge then denied the appellant's request for a mistrial. R. 226-27.
4) R. 224-25.
There was no objection to this comment.
The appellant complains of the following comments by the prosecutor in his guilt-phase closing argument to the jury:
5) "She [the victim] and he had been seeing each other and had had a stormy relationship and he had been drinking that night and taking some type of drugs, prescription drugs, maybe non-prescription drugs." R. 848.
There was no objection to this comment.
6) R. 848-49.
There was no objection to these comments.
The appellant complains of the following incident which occurred during the prosecutor's direct examination of state's witness Loretta Martin:
7) "Q. Did you have any conversation with him relevant to his drinking or anything?
There was no objection at trial.
The appellant complains of the following incident, which occurred during the prosecutor's direct examination of state's witness Jamie Sanders:
8) "Q. Greg [the appellant] came to her apartment?
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