Hunt v. State

• Citation: 9 A. 199,48 N.J.L. 613
• Decision Date: 15 June 1886
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
• Parties: CAROLINE R. HUNT, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. THE STATE, SIGMUND WARSHUNG, PROSECUTOR, DEFENDANT IN ERROR

9 A. 199

48 N.J.L. 613

HUNT

v. STATE, (WARSHUNG, Prosecutor.)

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

1887.

In error to the supreme court.

Certiorari to review tax of 1876 on certain land in Rahway and the sale thereunder, made January 5, 1878, to the mayor and common council.The land was assessed in the name of Julia Chapman, and return is made of the certificate of sale, the assignment of said certificate, and the declaration of sale to Caroline H. Hunt.The following decision was made in the supreme court, the opinion being by Scudder, J.:

"The first motion is made on the behalf of the defendants to dismiss the writ of certiorari, because not allowed within six years from the date or time of the sale, according to the 'supplement to the act to regulate the practice of courts of law,'(P. L.1884, p. 269,) approved April 28, 1884.The sale of these lands for taxes was made January 7, 1878, the certificate of sale is dated March 20, 1878, and the writ was allowed October 20, 1884, after more than six years had elapsed.The writ was purchased in aid of an action of ejectment, and is within time, unless this recent statute is applicable.State v. Jersey City,40 N. J. Law, 483.The act is brief, and enacts that no writ of certiorari shall hereafter be granted or allowed to review any assessment for taxes, to recover which taxes any sale has been had or made by virtue of any special or local law, or to review the proceedings of any such sale, unless such writ be granted or allowed within six years from the date or time of such sale.'It is to take effect immediately.

"This sale was made under a special and local law, to-wit, the charter of the city of Railway, and is, in this respect, within the terms of the statute.But the important question is whether the whole act is intended to be retrospective or prospective only.Its terms are prospective, and apply to all cases where, in the future, any sale has been had or made for the recovery of taxes.The fact of such sale is made the point on which the limitation shall begin to act, and the writ can only be granted or allowed within six years thereafter.It is true that the words 'has been had' or 'has been made' might apply to a sale that had been made before the law was enacted, but the construction already given, that it may indicate a sale in the future, is sufficient to decide which shall be adopted, for the rule of construction of statutes is that every reasonable endeavor shall be made so to interpret the statutory text as to give the law a prospective and not a retroactive effect.Proprietors v. Jones,36 N. J. Law, 206;State v. Newark,40 N. J. Law, 92;McGovern v. Connell,43 N. J. Law, 106;Citizens' Gas-Light Co. v. Alden,44 N. J. Law, 648;Boylan v. Kelly,36 N. J. Eq. 331.

"If a retroactive effect were given, then the cases of municipal sales in the past, where the parties may by statute(Bevision, p. 1045, § 15,) have the proceedings reviewed by certiorari, are suddenly deprived of this remedy, without any time given before the act takes effect.A law limiting the time in which an action shall be brought has been held not to apply to a suit which was begun after the act was passed, but before it took effect.State v. Bergen,34 N. J. Law, 438.

"It is conceded that while there is no power in the legislature to take from this court the right to allow a writ of certiorari, or to deprive the writ of any of its essential attributes as a prerogative writ, yet a reasonable regulation or limitation as to the time within...