Hunter v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.
| Decision Date | 19 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:12-CV-2437-D |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
| Parties | ELENA HUNTER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; BLIND AMBITIONS GROUPS; and, BLIND AMBITIONS GROUPS, on behalf of its members and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY d/b/a BB&T, Defendant. |
Defendant's motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) presents the question whether plaintiffs have standing to litigate a federal-law claim complaining of the inaccessibility of one of defendant's automated teller machines ("ATMs") to blind persons. Concluding that plaintiffs have not established their standing, the court grants the motion to dismiss but also grants plaintiffs leave to replead.
Plaintiff Elena Hunter ("Hunter"), who is blind, resides in Dallas. According to plaintiffs' amended complaint, when Hunter attempted to use an ATM located at 2724 Greenville Avenue in Dallas that is owned and operated by defendant Branch Banking and Trust Company ("BB&T"), she found that it was not accessible to blind persons, as requiredby federal and state law. Soon afterward, she filed this lawsuit against BB&T on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated.
After Hunter filed suit, an amended complaint was filed that added a second plaintiff, Blind Ambitions Group ("Blind Ambitions"). Hunter is an active member of Blind Ambitions, an organization that provides support to the blind. In the amended complaint, plaintiffs allege several claims on behalf of Hunter and all others similarly situated, and on behalf of Blind Ambitions, its members, and all others similarly situated. The amended complaint alleges that a significant portion of BB&T's ATMs—including the one located at 2724 Greenville Avenue that Hunter attempted to use— violate the following laws: Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA") and its implementing regulations; the Texas Human Resource Code, Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 121.001 et seq. (West 2001 & West Supp. 2012-13); and the Texas Architectural Barrier Act, Tex. Gov't Code Ann. Ch. 469 (West 2012). Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction directing BB&T to take all steps necessary to bring all of its ATMs into full compliance with the law, as well as declaratory judgment and statutory damages.
BB&T moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), contending that Hunter and Blind Ambitions lack standing.1
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims." Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). "It is incumbent on all federal courts to dismiss an action whenever it appears that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking." Id.
It is well settled that "the issue of standing is one of subject matter jurisdiction." Cobb v. Cent. States, 461 F.3d 632, 635 (5th Cir. 2006). The doctrine of standing addresses the question of who may properly bring suit in federal court, and "is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). It "involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). To establish standing, a plaintiff must meet both constitutional and prudential requirements. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 560 (5th Cir. 2001). The only issue in this case is constitutional standing, which requires that a litigant establish three elements: (1) injury-in-fact that is concrete and actual or imminent, not hypothetical; (2) a fairly traceable causal link between the injury and the defendant's actions; and (3) that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision. E.g., Little v. KPMG LLP, 575 F.3d 533, 540 (5th Cir. 2009). To obtain injunctive relief, plaintiffs must be "likely to suffer future injury." City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983). "Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief[.]" O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495 (1974). The threat of futureinjury to the plaintiff "must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical." Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102 (quotation marks omitted).
When challenging subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), a party can make a facial attack or a factual attack. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. May 1981). If the party merely files its Rule 12(b)(1) motion, it is considered a facial attack, and the court looks only at the sufficiency of the allegations in the pleading and assumes them to be true. Id. If the allegations are sufficient to allege jurisdiction, the court must deny the motion. Id. This is akin to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in that the "pleading's allegations are presumed to be true, and '[i]f those allegations sufficiently allege a claim for recovery the complaint stands and the federal court must entertain the suit.'" Vinmar Overseas, Ltd. v. OceanConnect, LLC, 2012 WL 3599486, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2012) (quoting Jones v. SuperMedia Inc., 281 F.R.D. 282, 286 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (Boyle, J.)).
A party can also make a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction by submitting evidence, such as affidavits or testimony. See id.; IBEW-NECA Sw. Health & Benefit Fund v. Winstel, 2006 WL 954010, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2006) (Fitzwater, J.) (citing Paterson, 644 F.2d at 523). "A factual attack on the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, however, challenges the facts on which jurisdiction depends and matters outside of the pleadings, such as affidavits and testimony, are considered." Vinmar Overseas, 2012 WL 3599486, at *4 (quoting Oaxaca v. Roscoe, 641 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981)). The "court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. May 1981). "No presumptive truthfulnessattaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims." Id. The plaintiff in a factual challenge, as the party seeking to invoke jurisdiction, must "submit facts through some evidentiary method and . . . prov[e] by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction." Paterson, 644 F.2d at 523.
Hunter has not established standing to sue for injunctive relief under the ADA. BB&T requests that the court take judicial notice of Hunter's numerous other lawsuits against banks that she alleges operate ATMs that are not accessible to the blind. It argues that her litigation history is relevant because it casts significant doubt on whether she is likely to return to the ATM located at 2724 Greenville Avenue and thereby suffer an injury-in-fact. See, e.g., Molski v. Kahn Winery, 405 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (). The court grants BB&T's request to take judicial notice of Hunter's litigation history. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Washington v. Andrews, 2011 WL 2117548, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2011) (). Because the court has taken such judicial notice, BB&T's Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss presents a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction.2 Accordingly, Hunter was required to "submit facts through someevidentiary method" and to prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of that evidence. See Paterson, 644 F.2d at 523. Because Hunter has not adduced sufficient evidence to establish jurisdiction and has instead relied primarily on her pleadings,3 she has failed to meet her burden of establishing standing by a preponderance of that evidence.
The court next considers whether Blind Ambitions has established its standing.
There are two ways for an organization to demonstrate standing. First, the organization can assert representational standing on behalf of its members.
An association has standing to bring a suit on behalf of its members when: (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members.
Texans United for a Safe Econ. Educ. Fund v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 207 F.3d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. Co., 129 F.3d 826, 827-28 (5th Cir.1997)). When a defendant contests an organization's standing based on a factual challenge to the standing of a member whose standing to sue in her own right controls the organization's standing, the Rule 12(b)(1) motion is also a factual attack.
Second, an organization may have standing on its own behalf. To establish standing on its own, the organization must show that it has constitutional standing in the same manner as any individual. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378-79 (1992). Because this method of establishing standing does not rely on the independent standing of any of the organization's members or any other plaintiff, a challenge to this form of standing is facial unless the defendant adduces evidence attacking a jurisdictional fact on which standing relies. BB&T has not produced any evidence challenging Blind Ambitions' standing on its own behalf, and therefore the court treats this challenge as facial. See Jones, 281 F.R.D. 282, 286.4
Blind Ambitions has failed to show representational standing because the only member it identifies is Hunter, who does not have standing to...
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