Hunter v. Brown
| Court | Supreme Court of Tennessee |
| Writing for the Court | BIRCH; ANDERSON |
| Citation | 955 S.W.2d 49 |
| Parties | Regina Darlene HUNTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ed BROWN, Jr., Defendant-Appellee. |
| Decision Date | 10 November 1997 |
Page 49
v.
Ed BROWN, Jr., Defendant-Appellee.
at Knoxville.
Jerrold L. Becker, Knoxville, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Patrick C. Cooley, John M. McFarland, Kingston, Thomas A. Pavlinic, Annapolis, MD, as amicus curiae for Defendant-Appellee.
BIRCH, Justice.
In this action for damages, the plaintiff, Regina Darlene Hunter, alleged that as a child she was sexually abused by the defendant, Ed Brown, Jr., but was unable to file this action prior to 1993 because she repressed the memory of the abuse. The trial court found no reason to toll the statute of limitations and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The issue before us is whether the discovery rule applies to affect the accrual of Hunter's claim. We conclude, after a thorough examination of the record and a careful consideration of the arguments, that under the circumstances here presented, the discovery rule does not apply. Consequently, Hunter's claim accrued in 1982, and her action filed July 15, 1993, is untimely. Accordingly, the order of summary judgment granted to the defendant is affirmed.
Page 50
I
Regina Darlene Hunter was born on October 13, 1967, and she spent the greater portion of her childhood in foster care. In June 1981, she was placed in the foster home of Mr. and Mrs. Ed Brown, Jr. According to Hunter, Ed Brown, Jr., began sexually abusing her in July 1981--a month after her placement in the Brown home. The abuse progressed from fondling to fairly frequent sexual intercourse, and Hunter became pregnant in the spring of 1982.
When Patricia Martin, the Department of Human Services caseworker in charge of Hunter's case, learned of the pregnancy, she removed Hunter from the Brown home. Martin then arranged for an abortion at a Knoxville facility, and the pregnancy was terminated in June 1982.
In addition to the physician who determined Hunter was pregnant and Martin, Hunter told others of the abuse. At the physician's insistence, Hunter told the defendant's wife that Brown had impregnated her--this was done while the plaintiff and Mrs. Brown were still in the physician's office. In addition, Martin and Hunter talked with the district attorney general about the abuse. Hunter has no specific recollection of the conversation with the district attorney general, and there is no indication that the complaint was ever investigated. After the abortion, Hunter was re-located to a group home in Nashville, Tennessee. According to Hunter, at a time subsequent to the 1982 abortion, she repressed the memory of it.
Approximately eight years later, in August 1990, Hunter gave birth to a daughter. The medical records associated with the birth contain the following references to the 1982 rape and abortion: "6/27/90 Surgery: abortion--Knox age 15; raped does not know much about it," "Abortion--age 15--raped--doesn't remember," and "PAST HISTORY: Positive only for an abortion at an early age". In an affidavit, Hunter states:
I deny any memory of ever having told anyone about my abortion in 1982 while under Dr. Foote's care in 1990 or at Harriman Hospital in 1990.
In 1992, Hunter became pregnant again. She decided to abort and returned to the facility where the 1982 pregnancy had been terminated. She underwent an abortion procedure in June 1992. As she was recovering from the effects of the anesthesia, Hunter began to remember the prior abortion. In her affidavit, Hunter stated that "until I [went] to the Reproductive Health Center in July of 1992, I had completely repressed my...
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Pendleton v Mills, 00-03097
...appellate courts must make a fresh determination that the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been satisfied. Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn. 1997); Mason v. Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tenn. 1997). We must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movi......
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Brooks Cotton Co. v. Williams, No. W2011–01415–COA–R9–CV.
...Mathews Partners, L.L.C. v. Lemme, No. M2008–01036–COA–R3–CV, 2009 WL 3172134, at *3 (Tenn.Ct.App. Oct. 2, 2009) (citing Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W.2d 49, 50–51 (Tenn.1997)). When a motion for summary judgment is made, the moving party has the burden of showing that “there is no genuine issue......
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State v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co., No. M2010-01955-COA-R3-CV
...Mathews Partners, LLC v. Lemme, No. M2008-01036-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3172134, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2009) (citing Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn. 1977)). When a motion for summary judgment is made, the moving party has the burden of showing that "there is no genuine issue......
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Rains v. Bend of the River, No. M2000-00439-COA-R9-CV.
...Rather, we determine for ourselves whether the moving party has satisfied the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56. Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn.1997); Cantrell v. DeKalb County, 78 S.W.3d 902, 905 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001). In this process, we must consider the evidence in the light......
-
Pendleton v Mills, 00-03097
...appellate courts must make a fresh determination that the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been satisfied. Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn. 1997); Mason v. Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tenn. 1997). We must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movi......
-
Brooks Cotton Co. v. Williams, No. W2011–01415–COA–R9–CV.
...Mathews Partners, L.L.C. v. Lemme, No. M2008–01036–COA–R3–CV, 2009 WL 3172134, at *3 (Tenn.Ct.App. Oct. 2, 2009) (citing Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W.2d 49, 50–51 (Tenn.1997)). When a motion for summary judgment is made, the moving party has the burden of showing that “there is no genuine issue......
-
State v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co., No. M2010-01955-COA-R3-CV
...Mathews Partners, LLC v. Lemme, No. M2008-01036-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3172134, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2009) (citing Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn. 1977)). When a motion for summary judgment is made, the moving party has the burden of showing that "there is no genuine issue......
-
Rains v. Bend of the River, No. M2000-00439-COA-R9-CV.
...Rather, we determine for ourselves whether the moving party has satisfied the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56. Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn.1997); Cantrell v. DeKalb County, 78 S.W.3d 902, 905 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001). In this process, we must consider the evidence in the light......