Hunter v. Jefferson Parish Pub. Sch. Sys.

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
• Writing for the Court: MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOSEPH C. WILKINSON, JR.
• Decision Date: 13 October 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-2015
• Citation: Hunter v. Jefferson Parish Pub. Sch. Sys., CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-2015 (E.D. La. Oct 13, 2017)
• Parties: SHARON HUNTER v. JEFFERSON PARISH PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM ET AL.

SHARON HUNTER v. JEFFERSON PARISH PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-2015

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

October 13, 2017

MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOSEPH C. WILKINSON, JR.

ORDER AND REASONS ON MOTION

This is an employment discrimination action by plaintiff Sharon Hunter against the Jefferson Parish Public School System (the "School System"); the Jefferson Parish School Board (the "Board"); the Board's individual members, Cedric Floyd, Marion Bonura, Ricky Johnson, Raymond St. Pierre and Melinda Doucet; and the School System's Superintendent, Isaac Joseph. In her second supplemental and amending complaint, Record Doc. No. 41, Hunter asserts claims of sex discrimination, hostile work environment, constructive discharge and retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; reprisal in violation of the Louisiana Whistleblower Statute, La. Rev. Stat. § 23:967; breach of contract under Louisiana law; and constitutional rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She seeks compensatory damages. Complaint, Record Doc. No. 1; First Supplemental and Amending Complaint, Record Doc. No. 19; Second Supplemental and Amending Complaint, Record Doc. No. 41.

This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings and entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) upon written consent of all parties. Record Doc. No. 25.

Plaintiff's claims against the School System; Title VII claims against the individual defendants in their individual and official capacities, if any; retaliation claims under the Louisiana Code of Governmental Ethics, La. Rev. Stat. § 42:1169; claims for punitive damages; and claims, if any, asserted in paragraphs 36 and 37 of plaintiff's original complaint were previously dismissed with prejudice. Order and Reasons on Motion, Record Doc. No. 29.

Plaintiff received leave to amend her complaint a second time, Record Doc. Nos. 34, 40, 41, to reassert some claims in her original complaint and first supplemental and amending complaint; to assert new claims under Section1983 and for breach of contract; and to attach four documents: (1) attorney Harold Koretzky's investigative report (the "Koretzky Report") regarding Hunter's grievance against defendant Floyd; (2) an unsigned, undated copy of the "Executive Assistant to the Board" job description (the "Job Description"); (3) the "Sexual Harassment or Other Forms of Harassment" section of the Board's policy manual (the "Harassment Policy"); and (4) the "Complaints (Grievances) and Appeals" section of the Board's policy manual (the "Grievances Policy"). Record Doc. No. 41.

Defendants filed a second Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss all of plaintiff's claims, Record Doc. No. 44, which is pending before me. Plaintiff filed a timely memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion. Record Doc. No. 48. Defendant was granted leave to file a reply. Record Doc. Nos. 50-52.

Having considered the complaint as amended, the record, the written submissions of counsel, and the applicable law, IT IS ORDERED that defendant's Second Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under this rule, as clarified by the Supreme Court,

"a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" A claim for relief is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." A claim for relief is implausible on its face when "the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct."

Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007))).

"The Supreme Court's decisions in Iqbal and Twombly . . . did not alter the long-standing requirement that when evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), acourt must accept[ ] all well-pleaded facts as true and view[ ] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. at 803 n.44 (quotation omitted); accord Murchison Capital Partners, L.P. v. Nuance Commc'ns, Inc., 625 F. App'x 617, 618 n.1 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2065 n.5 (2014)).

"With respect to any well-pleaded allegations[,] 'a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.'" Jabary v. City of Allen, 547 F. App'x 600, 604 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Maloney Gaming Mgmt., L.L.C. v. St. Tammany Par., 456 F. App'x 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 695; Elsensohn v. St. Tammany Par. Sheriff's Ofc., 530 F.3d 368, 371 (5th Cir. 2008); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 n.10 (5th Cir. 2007)).

Hunter attached to her second supplemental and amending complaint the Koretzky Report regarding the grievance she filed against Floyd; the Job Description; the Harassment Policy; and the Grievances Policy. Record Doc. No. 41.

On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court generally must limit itself to the contents of the pleadings, including attachments thereto. The court may also consider documents attached to either a motion to dismiss or an opposition to that motion when the documents are referred to in the pleadings and are central to a plaintiff's claims.

Brand Coupon Network, L.L.C. v. Catalina Mktg. Corp., 748 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014) (quotation and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The Koretzky Report, the Job Description, and the Harassment and Grievances Policies are thus part of the pleadings.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983 Claims Against Defendants Floyd and Joseph

Defendants contend that plaintiff's civil rights claims must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and because the claims have prescribed. Defendants also assert an affirmative defense of qualified immunity, which is inapplicable at this stage of the proceedings.¹

As an initial matter, I find that plaintiff has asserted a Section 1983 claim against defendants Floyd and Joseph only, and not against the other individual defendants, as postulated by defendants at Record Doc. No. 44-2, p.1 n.2. Hunter clearly identifies only Floyd and Joseph in her second amended complaint in alleging that "Floyd and Joseph acted under color of state law . . . when they deprived Plaintiff of her federal rights,property interests and right to privacy and freedom from harassment," and that "Floyd and Joseph [committed] wrongful acts in violation of [Section] 1983." Record Doc. No. 41 at ¶¶ 70, 72, 73 (emphasis added). Hunter reiterates in her opposition memorandum that "[her Section] 1983 claims are based on [] Floyd and Joseph's violation of [her] constitutional rights to be free from gender based harassment, invasions of privacy and retaliation resulting [from] her constructive termination from her employment." Record Doc. No. 48 at p. 3 (emphasis added). The only mention of the other individual defendants in plaintiff's Section 1983 allegations is that they "voted not to receive[ ] the Koretzky report in violation of Plaintiff's right to file a complaint [and] have the complaint heard and reviewed." Record Doc. No. 41 at ¶ 78. This allegation is wholly insufficient to state a Section 1983 claim against the other defendants, especially in light of the remainder of plaintiff's allegations focused exclusively on Floyd and Joseph.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 states in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

Section 1983 claims and Title VII claims may be asserted concurrently, as plaintiff has done in this case. "When . . . unlawful employment practices encroach, not only on rights created by Title VII, but also on rights that are independent of Title VII, Title VIIceases to be exclusive. At this point, § 1983 and Title VII overlap, providing supplemental remedies." Flot v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd., No. 96-361, 1998 WL 915864, at *6-7 (E.D. La. Dec. 29, 1998) (citing Southard v. Tex. Bd. of Crim. J., 114 F.3d 539, 549 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Johnston v. Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1576 (5th Cir. 1989))); see also Jones v. City of Port Arthur, No. 1:12-CV-287, 2013 WL 149706, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2013) (citing Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 356 n.9 (5th Cir. 2001); Southard, 114 F.3d at 548-50; Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1573; Jackson v. City of Atlanta, 73 F.3d 60, 63 (5th Cir. 1996)) ("As correctly concluded by the magistrate judge, Title VII does not provide the exclusive remedy for discrimination claims against a government employer."). Specifically, "[a]ssertions of sex discrimination . . . under § 1983 are not preempted by Title VII." Southard, 114 F.3d at 550.

Hunter asserts that Floyd and Joseph "deprived plaintiff of her federal constitutional rights by violating [them] or allowing her to be harassed and discriminated against, and having her privacy and her safety and security violated." Record Doc. No. 41 at ¶ 70. Hunter's...