Hunter v. Miller

• Decision Date: 23 May 1947
• Docket Number: 32245.
• Citation: 27 N.W.2d 638,148 Neb. 402
• Parties: HUNTER v. MILLER.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

27 N.W.2d 638

148 Neb. 402

HUNTER v. MILLER.

No. 32245.

Supreme Court of Nebraska

May 23, 1947

Syllabus by the Court.

1.The Placement and Unemployment Insurance Law (chapter 48 article 6, R.S.1943) is to be liberally construed so that its beneficent purposes may be accomplished.This rule of construction applies to the law and not to the evidence to support a claim by virtue of the law.The rule does not dispense with the necessity of claimant establishing a right to the benefits of the act, nor does it permit an award of benefits where the requisite showing that claimant is entitled to the benefits of the act is lacking.The act cannot be extended by construction to noncompensable claims.

2.Registration for work under the act, alone, is not sufficient to show a prima facie right to the benefits of the act.

3.A hard and fast rule as to when a claimant is available for work under section 48-627, R.S.1943, cannot be adopted.It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

W G. Whitford, of Neligh, for appellant.

Clarence A. H. Meyer and John E. Sidner, both of Lincoln, for appellee.

Heard before SIMMONS, C. J., and PAINE, CARTER, MESSMORE, YEAGERCHAPPELL, and WENKE, JJ.

SIMMONS Chief Justice.

The plaintiff here seeks the benefit of the Placement and Unemployment Insurance Law (chapter 48, article 6, R.S.1943).The principal question presented is this: Was she'available for work' within the meaning of that phrase in section 48-627, R.S.1943?The appeal tribunal denied her the benefits of the act.She appealed to the district court where benefits were denied.She appeals here.We affirm the judgment of the district court.

At the time this action began plaintiff was a married woman, the mother of two children.Her home was at Oakdale.Before her marriage she did housework.After marriage she was not employed until just prior to January 1945, when she was employed in a diet kitchen for less than two months.In January 1945, she secured work at the ordnance plant near Grand Island, where she worked until June 1945.She quit because of a temporary illness.

Apparently her husband worked at the ordnance plant also, and they had living quarters at Grand Island.About the time the plaintiff left her employment, the husband secured employment at North Platte and plaintiff went there to be with him.His employment was terminated and they returned to Oakdale, living one mile out of town.The husband was employed around Oakdale for a time, and became unemployed in December 1945.Both husband and wife then applied for the benefits of the act.

At the hearing before the appeal tribunal, plaintiff testified that she was unable to secure employment at Oakdale; that it was a a town of 560 population with no industries other than 'stores' and hardly any work was available; and that housework was not available.A report of an investigator shows that plaintiff reported she would accept only daytime employment, and that she would not accept work as sales clerk or waitress, but would as a cook.

She was offered a job at Norfolk as a cook, but refused it because there was no assurance of living quarters for herself and her family, and she had no transportation.

At the hearing before the district court, plaintiff testified that since the hearing before the appeal tribunal her husband had died; that she had moved into the village of Oakdale and had been working four or five days a week.The nature of her employment is not shown, nor is the time and length of the employment.

The plaintiff contends here that the act should be liberally construed.The defendant agrees.We think the rules applied to the Workmen's Compensation Act, R.S.1943, § 48-101 et seq., should be applied here.The act is to be liberally construed so that its beneficent purposes may be accomplished.This rule of construction applies to the law and not to the evidence to support a claim by virtue of the law.This rule does not dispense with the necessity of claimant establishing a right to the benefits of the act, nor does it permit an award of benefits where the requisite showing that claimant is entitled to the benefits of the act is lacking.SeeHassmann v. City of Bloomfield, 146 Neb. 608, 20 N.W.2d 592.Likewise, the act cannot be extended by construction to noncompensable claims.Burlage v. Lefebure Corporation, 137 Neb. 671, 291 N.W. 100;Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Society v. Olsen, 141 Neb. 776, 4 N.W.2d 923.

The plaintiff further contends that registry with the employment office creates a prima facie case of availability for work within the meaning of the act, and that the burden of proof does not rest upon her to show availability for work, but that when she registered for work a prima facie case of availability was shown.Section 48-627 R.S.1943 , provides that an unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits 'only' if the Commissioner of Labor...