Hunter v. Parsons

• Decision Date: 27 October 1870
• Citation: 22 Mich. 96
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Alexander L. Hunter v. Adelbert F. Parsons

22 Mich. 96

Alexander L. Hunter v. Adelbert F. Parsons

Supreme Court of Michigan

October 27, 1870

Heard October 25, 1870 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Error to Livingston circuit.

This was an action of assumpsit brought by Adelbert F. Parsons, in the circuit court for the county of Livingston, against Alexander L. Hunter, upon a promissory note for two hundred dollars, with interest at ten per cent, payable to J. C Fitzgerald or bearer, on or before the first day of September, 1869, a copy of which was appended to the plaintiff's declaration. The defendant pleaded the general issue, and filed with his plea an affidavit denying "that he ever executed any such note or agreement as the one described and referred to in the notice annexed to and served with the copy of the declaration."

The bill of exceptions states that on the trial of the cause "a jury of twelve good and lawful men were called into the jurors' seats, and on application of S. F. Hubbell, attorney for plaintiff, each and every of said jurors was sworn to answer all such questions as should be put them touching their qualifications to serve as jurors in said cause. That each and all said jurors were then questioned by the attorney for the plaintiff as to their qualifications, before any peremptory challenges were made by said plaintiff to any of said jurors so called and sworn to answer questions; that after the attorney for the plaintiff had so examined said jurors and passed them without making any peremptory challenge, he claimed the right to challenge peremptorily, and did challenge peremptorily one of the jurors first examined on his voir dire, as to his qualifications, and asked the court to set aside said juror without cause, to which the counsel for the defendant objected, for the reason that after the counsel for the plaintiff had examined a juror on his oath as to his qualifications to sit in the cause as a juror, and no objections being found to him, that the counsel for the plaintiff must determine before going through with the whole panel, for cause, whether he will challenge the juror peremptorily or not; which objection of the defendant's counsel was overruled by the court, to which decision of the court the counsel for the defendant excepted."

The plaintiff was sworn in his own behalf, and testified substantially as follows: "I own the note in this suit; I know Hunter, the defendant; have had a conversation with him in regard to the note; he said it was his signature; I bought the note on the twenty-sixth day of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-nine, of Alexander McPherson, and paid him the sum of two hundred and five dollars for the same; I saw the defendant when it became due; I told him I had bought the note; he said I was a little foolish in buying such notes. I saw him again that night; the note was due; I told him the note was due, and I would like the money; he said the note had been altered; he said the words "or bearer," had been put in after the A. D. Fitzgerald; I replied he had told McPherson it was all right. He afterwards came to the store and said it had been altered; when he gave the note it read, for value received with interest; and it now reads, for value received with interest at ten per cent. I had three conversations with defendant; he, defendant, said in McPherson's bank the morning I saw him, that he signed the note; he said so four of five times as he was leaving the bank; it was his signature or a close limitation; I bought the note for five dollars less than the face of it."

The note was offered in evidence and objected to on the ground that the proof of the signature was not sufficient. The objection was overruled by the court, and the note read in evidence, to which decision the defendant excepted.

Alexander McPherson, of whom the plaintiff bought the note, was called by the plaintiff, and testified as to the genuineness of the note and the defendant's declarations concerning it. On his cross-examination he was asked: "What did you pay for the note?" Objected to as immaterial and incompetent. The objection was sustained by the court, to which the defendant excepted.

The defendant was sworn as a witness and testified that in the note he signed "there was no day in September stated for the payment; the words or bearer were not in it, and the place for the rate of interest which the instrument was to bear was blank.

The plaintiff further called as a witness James O'Donnell, who testified that he was a printer and resided in the city of Jackson, and was publisher of the Jackson Citizen. He was asked: "Will you look at that note and say whether you printed it or not?" The question was objected to as irrelevant and immaterial. The court overruled the objection, and the defendant excepted. The witness answered: "It was printed at my office; I did not do it myself; it was done in 1868; the printed matter I do not think had anything added to it; it was printed at first as it is now, and I read the proof." He was further asked: "How do you know it was so printed?" The question was objected to as irrelevant, immaterial and not rebutting testimony. The objection was overruled and the testimony admitted, to which decision the defendant excepted. The witness answered: "I saw and read the proof-sheets; there is no alteration in it from what it was when first printed for Mr. Fitzgerald."

At the request of the plaintiff the court charged: 1. That this note is negotiable, and may become the property of the holder by mere delivery. 2. That the law will sustain the claim of an innocent or bona fide holder of a negotiable promissory note, purchased before due, however viciously other parties may have acted, or whatever objections to the consideration may arise. 3. If the jury finds that the plaintiff purchased this note before it became due, innocently, and for a valuable consideration, by giving money, or money and goods, for it in the usual course of trade, he is entitled to recover on it, unless they find it is altered in a material part since its execution.

To each of which the...