Hunter v. State

• Decision Date: 11 April 1991
• Citation: 585 So.2d 220
• Parties: Robert HUNTER, Sr. v. STATE. CR 90-33.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 220

585 So.2d 220

Robert HUNTER, Sr. v. STATE.

CR 90-33.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 11, 1991.

Rehearing Denied May 17, 1991.

Certiorari Denied Aug, 2, 1991

Alabama Supreme Court 1901370.

Paul F. Meyers II, Dothan, for appellant.

Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Margaret S. Childers, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

PATTERSON, Presiding Judge.

The appellant, Robert Hunter, Sr., was convicted of child abuse and was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. Ala.Code 1975, § 26-15-3. He appeals, raising two issues.

I.

The appellant first contends that the trial court committed reversible error by denying his challenge of a prospective juror for cause. Immediately after the voir dire examination of the jury venire by the trial court and counsel for the parties, in which the venirepersons were advised that the case about to be tried involved child abuse, and just before a recess, the court stated: "If any of you would like to answer any of those questions or have some problems with the case privately, you need to come up and let the rest of them go ahead and be getting some coffee." Venireperson Shirley Franklin responded. The record shows that the following occurred:

"A JUROR: I'm Shirley Franklin. I'm an emotional person when it comes to children being abused.

"THE COURT: Do you think you could listen to the evidence and make a decision based on the evidence of the case?

"A JUROR: I don't know.

"THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, very much. Yes, ma'am."

She was not questioned further. Subsequently, in denying the appellant's challenge of Franklin for cause, the trial court stated only that its recollection of her testimony on voir dire was that she did not want to serve.

Our Supreme Court has held that "[n]o right of an accused felon is more basic than the right to 'strike' a petit jury from a panel of fair-minded, impartial prospective jurors." Ex parte Beam, 512 So.2d 723, 724 (Ala.1987). The propriety of a trial court's ruling in the challenge of a venireperson for cause based on bias must be measured against a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. Ex parte Beam; U.S. Const.Amend. VI, XIV. The qualification of a prospective juror is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and a trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause based on bias is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing of abuse of that discretion. Ex parte Rutledge, 523 So.2d 1118 (Ala.1988). An appellate court must look to the questions propounded to, and the answers given by, the prospective juror to see if this discretion was properly exercised. Knop v. McCain, 561 So.2d 229 (Ala.1989). "Ultimately, the test to be applied is whether the juror can set aside [his or] her opinions and try the case fairly and impartially, according to the law and the evidence." Id. at 232. "[A] prospective juror should not be disqualified for prejudices or biases if it appears from his or her answers and demeanor that the influence of those prejudices and biases can be eliminated and a verdict rendered according to the evidence." Id. See also Fordham v. State, 513 So.2d 31 (Ala.Cr.App.1986).

The venireperson in question in the instant case gave an equivocal answer when asked by the trial court if she could render a decision based on the evidence in the case, just after indicating a probable prejudice due to the nature of the case. The Supreme Court in Knop states the rule governing this type of situation, as follows:

"Once a juror makes an initial statement that is vague, ambiguous, equivocal, uncertain, or unclear or that shows confusion, it is the trial judge's function to question the juror further, so as to ascertain whether the juror can be impartial. However, once a juror indicates initially that he or she is biased or prejudiced or has deep-seated impressions, so as to show that he or she cannot be neutral, objective, or impartial, the challenge for cause must be granted. This is particularly true when a juror ... volunteers her doubts."

561 So.2d at 234. The trial court should have questioned the prospective juror further to ascertain whether she could be impartial. It did not do so, and in the posture in which the matter was left, the trial court should have granted the appellant's challenge for cause. As stated above, Franklin had indicated a probable prejudice...