Hunter v. Sukkar
Decision Date | 15 December 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 482-0054,482-0054 |
Citation | 111 Ill.App.3d 169,66 Ill.Dec. 848,443 N.E.2d 774 |
Parties | , 66 Ill.Dec. 848 Minnie Lee HUNTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dr. Fred SUKKAR, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
John Gadau, Zimmerly, Gadau, Stout, Selin & Otto, Champaign, Assisted by James D. Koerber, Law Clerk, for plaintiff-appellant.
Richard F. Record, Jr., Craig & Craig, Mattoon, for defendant-appellee.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against Dr. Fred Sukkar alleging negligence in post-operative care which defendant provided her. The case was heard before a jury in Champaign County circuit court and a verdict was returned in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff's post-trial motion for a new trial was denied. Plaintiff claims error by the trial court on several rulings made during the course of the trial and seeks a new trial.
We affirm.
The issues raised here require only a brief summary of the facts presented at trial. Plaintiff's forearm was severely injured on March 19, 1977. On March 22, 1977, defendant operated on the arm and thereafter continued treatment. Defendant used a surgical technique known as ASIF. It involves using metal plates and screws to join together and promote the healing of bone fractures. The technique was developed in Switzerland and the standards for its use are of a universal character. Plaintiff's arm failed to heal properly which necessitated a further operation which was performed by defendant. When the arm still failed to heal, plaintiff had a third operation which was done by another physician.
Plaintiff apparently did not claim negligence in the surgery itself, but rather, maintained defendant was negligent in his instructions and warnings to plaintiff regarding her returning to work and using the injured arm. Defendant's failure to sufficiently instruct plaintiff allegedly led to the overuse of the arm and its failure to heal properly. Plaintiff called Dr. David L. Becker of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, as an expert witness. Becker testified that he is an orthopedic surgeon licensed to practice in Wisconsin since 1969. He is engaged in a group practice. He had never seen plaintiff before trial. He admitted that his evaluation and testimony regarding defendant's care of plaintiff's injury was done for remuneration. Prior to the present case, Becker had testified in one previous trial. However, he had done other evaluations and given evidence depositions for both plaintiffs and defendants. Between 1976 and 1980, Becker gave between 30 and 50 such consulting opinions. Becker's testimony was based on national standards for the use of the ASIF technique. In his opinion based on such national standards, the warnings and instructions given by defendant to plaintiff regarding the use of her arm were inadequate.
During defendant's closing arguments, the following exchange took place:
Defense counsel then continued his closing argument in which course he made the following statements to which plaintiff raised no objections:
On appeal, plaintiff objects to those portions of the above comments to which emphasis has been added and contends they are so improper and prejudicial that plaintiff was denied a fair trial.
"Counsel in the case are officers of the court and owe a duty to the court, to opposing counsel, to the cause of justice and to themselves." (Eizerman v. Behn (1956), 9 Ill.App.2d 263, 286, 132 N.E.2d 788, 799.) (Hopwood v. Thomas Hoist Co. (1966), 71 Ill.App.2d 434, 443, 219 N.E.2d 76, 81.) "The closing arguments of counsel must be confined to those matters that are in evidence or admitted and uncontroverted." (Foerster v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. (1974), 20 Ill.App.3d 656, 661, 315 N.E.2d 63, 67.) Regan v. Vizza (1978), 65 Ill.App.3d 50, 53, 22 Ill.Dec. 89, 91, 382 N.E.2d 409, 411.
Examining the first alleged prejudicial comment, and the ruling upon objection, we agree that the trial court's statement would have been better formulated if it had said, "that's a fair comment" rather than "fair statement" since there is some implication in the latter that the court agreed with counsel's assessment. However, we find the language ambiguous, and the error, if any, was de minimis.
We also find that the substance of the trial court's ruling was correct.
(Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Anastoplo (1958), 14 Ill.2d 216, 222, 151 N.E.2d 337, 341.)
Illinois courts have taken a dim view of counsel impugning the integrity of physicians testifying as expert witnesses. See Mattice v. Klawans (1924), 312 Ill. 299, 143 N.E. 866; Walsh v. Chicago Rys. Co. (1922), 303 Ill. 339, 135 N.E. 709; Ryan v. Monson (1961), 33 Ill.App.2d 406, 179 N.E.2d 449.
The evidence at trial established that Dr. Becker was a medical expert testifying at the behest of plaintiff and received compensation for that testimony. While inartfully worded, the context of the objected to, incomplete remark suggests that defense counsel was only calling the jury's attention to the fact that the witness was potentially biased because he was procured and compensated by defendant. The remark was not improper. Anastoplo.
The balance of the alleged prejudicial remarks occurred six pages later in the transcript and were received without objection. Generally, alleged error in closing arguments to the jury will not be considered on appeal in the absence of a ruling by the trial court as to the propriety of the argument. (Anastoplo.) Plaintiff maintains that her only objection and the trial court's ruling went to all of the alleged inflammatory and prejudicial remarks and that further objections were not necessary and would only have served to prejudice the jury. Since the balance of the remarks must have taken place several minutes after the first objection, and since we find them to be of a different nature than that to which the objection was made, we conclude that counsel had an obligation to raise a new objection.
In the alternative, plaintiff argues that the unobjected-to remarks were so inflammatory and prejudicial that they constitute plain error. If the argument of counsel is seriously prejudicial, the trial court has a duty to inject itself into the proceeding sufficiently to insure that the litigants receive a fair trial. (Belfield v. Coop (1956), 8 Ill.2d 293, 312, 134 N.E.2d 249, 259; Paulsen v. Gateway Transportation Co. (1969), 114 Ill.App.2d 241, 247, 252 N.E.2d 406, 409; Rudolph v. City of Chicago (1954), 2 Ill.App.2d 370, 377, 119 N.E.2d 528, 531).
Plaintiff has compared the closing remarks she objects to here with those in three other Illinois cases where a new trial was ordered because of prejudicial remarks. In Regan v. Vizza (1978), 65 Ill.App.3d 50, 22 Ill.Dec. 89, 382 N.E.2d 409, plaintiff's medical expert was a physician who worked at the hospital where plaintiff sought medical attention and was recommended to plaintiff by the emergency care physician. The physician had previously testified for...
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