Hunter v. United States
Decision Date | 19 December 1967 |
Docket Number | No. 20093.,20093. |
Citation | 388 F.2d 148 |
Parties | Roy HUNTER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
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Butterworth & Smith, David G. Waller (argued) Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.
Edwin L. Weisl, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Roger P. Marquis (argued) Carl L. Sandstrom, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Manuel L. Real, U.S. Atty., James R. Akers, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.
Before BARNES and KOELSCH, Circuit Judges, and TAYLOR, District Judge.
The United States, complaining that Roy Hunter persistently grazed and watered his cattle within the boundaries of the Death Valley National Monument without a permit from the National Park Service, brought this suit against him in the United States District Court to secure an injunction against further trespasses.1
Hunter urged justification; in addition, he sought a declaration that he possessed water and grazing rights. He alleged that long before the monument was established his predecessors in interest continually had watered livestock, which they pastured within its present boundaries, at 26 springs and a stream therein. His theory was that this taking and use of the water constituted an appropriation vesting in his predecessors a water right, together with an appurtenant right of way to graze cattle, which rights the general government was bound to honor under the provisions of the Act of 1866, Rev.Stat. § 2339 (1875), 43 U.S.C. § 661, para. 1 (1964), formerly Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 253 ( ).2
The District Court found that:
Despite these favorable findings, the court concluded that Hunter possessed no rights either to the waters or in the lands and granted an injunction. Hunter has appealed.
The trial court in the instant case concluded that "* * * no legal basis for the acquisition of an appropriation to water by virtue of local customs, laws or decisions of California has been established." We believe that the District Court misconstrued the applicable local authority and that Hunter did establish a legal basis for the acquisition of an appropriation to water by virtue of local decisions.
It is clear that Hunter need prove the appropriative right only by local customs, laws or decisions, for "the union of the three conditions in any particular case is not essential to the perfection of a right by priority." Basey v. Gallagher, 20 Wall. 670, 684, 87 U.S. 670, 684, 22 L.Ed. 452 (1874). The local customs regarding proprietorship by appropriation have long since become crystalized into law by judicial decision or statute. As Mr. Weil notes in his work entitled Water Rights in the Western States, vol. 1, § 635 (3d ed. 1911):
In 1872 the California Legislature enacted statutes providing for the appropriation of public waters; but the Supreme Court of that State held that the statutory method was not exclusive:
"One may by a prior actual and completed appropriation and use, without proceeding under the code, acquire a right to the water beneficially used, which will be superior and paramount to the title of one making a subsequent appropriation from the same stream in the manner provided by that statute."
Lower Tule River Ditch Co. v. Angiola Water Co., 149 Cal. 496, 499, 86 P. 1081, 1082 (1906); See also Duckworth v. Watsonville Water and Light Co., 158 Cal. 206, 211, 110 P. 927, 929-930 (1910). Thus it was not incumbent upon Hunter to establish compliance with a positive provision of California law and furthermore no statute precluded his claim.
Judicial authority makes the law on appropriation quite clear. Justice Field, commenting upon the declaration of the California Supreme Court in Tartar v. Spring Creek Water and Mining Co., 5 Cal. 395 (1855), which announced the settled policy of the State regarding recognition of rights, added: "Ever since that decision it has been generally held throughout the Pacific States and Territories that the right to water by prior appropriation for any beneficial purpose is entitled to protection." Basey v. Gallagher, supra, 20 Wall. at 683. Moreover, Justice Field unequivocally declared: "No distinction is made in those States and Territories by the custom of miners or settlers, or by the courts, in the rights of the first appropriator from the use made of water, if the use be a beneficial one." Basey v. Gallagher, supra at 682.
To constitute an appropriation, therefore, there must co-exist "the intent to take, accompanied by some open, physical demonstration of the intent, and for some valuable use." McDonald & Blackburn v. Bear River and Auburn Water and Mining Co., 13 Cal. 220, 232-233 (1859). The outward manifestation is most often evidenced by a diversion of the water from its natural source prior to the use; Simons v. Inyo Cerro Gorda Mining & Power Co., 48 Cal.App. 524, 192 P. 144 (1920) hearing denied by California Supreme Court, 48 Cal.App. 541, 192 P. 152 (1920) but it also can be evidenced in other ways, for example, as in this case, by watering livestock directly from the source Steptoe Livestock Co. v. Gulley, 53 Nev. 163, 295 P. 772 (1931) or as in other cases by placing water wheels into a stream in order to use the flowage as power to operate a mill located on the bank. Ortman v. Dixon, 13 Cal. 33 (1859); Tartar v. Spring Creek Water and Mining Co., supra.
In this case there is no lack of proof of the asserted appropriation; to the contrary, a clearer showing could hardly be imagined. The Hunters' intent to use the water is made plain by the evidence. Year after year for nearly a century they have pastured their livestock in this isolated enclave, surrounded by miles of impassable desert; except for the water provided by these springs and the...
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