Hunter v. United States
| Docket Number | 3:21-cv-1322 (SRU) |
| Decision Date | 31 August 2023 |
| Parties | TERRELL HUNTER, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
RULING DENYING PETITIONER'S SECTION 2255 PETITION
Terrell Hunter (a.k.a. “Rell” and “Killer”), proceeding pro se, has moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In his original petition, Hunter claims that he is entitled to relief because his counsel provided unconstitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to and appeal on the basis that the evidence was insufficient to convict him. In his amended petition, Hunter principally argues that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Taylor, 142 S.Ct. 2015 (2022) invalidates his conviction based on 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). For the following reasons, Hunter's contentions are without merit and provide no basis for relief. His petition as amended, is denied.
On August 21, 2018, following a jury trial, Hunter and co-defendants Gerund Mickens and Harold Cook were convicted of Kidnapping Resulting in the Death of a Person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1) and 2 (“Count One”), and the Firearm-Related Murder of Charles Teasley/Hobbs Act Robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(j)(1) and 2 (“Count Three”). Cr. Docs. No. 1, 320.
Each defendant thereafter moved under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 for a judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, under Rule 33 for a new trial. Hunter principally argued that he was entitled to set aside on the jury's guilty verdict on both counts of conviction because the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Cr. Docs. No. 330, 441, 442. Regarding both Counts One and Three, Hunter argued, inter alia, that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal under a theory that the purportedly deficient testimony of cooperating witness Jesus Ashanti was incredible on its face and defied physical realities. See generally Cr. Doc. No. 441; Cr. Doc. No. 442, at 19-20. In a lengthy written ruling reviewing and considering the evidence presented at trial, I concluded that the jury was entitled to take all of Ashanti's testimony into consideration when evaluating his credibility, and that the jury could rely on Ashanti's testimony in finding the defendants guilty. Cr. Doc. No. 485, at 5-14. Regarding Count Three specifically, Hunter incorporated by reference arguments made by his codefendants, including that the government had failed to prove the interstate nexus element of Hobbs Act Robbery and, therefore, that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal. Cr. Doc. No. 442, at 20. In my written ruling, I concluded that a jury could have found that the defendants had robbed a known drug dealer of money that the defendants knew was intended to be used for purchasing drugs, but for their interruption of the drug transaction, and that satisfied the interstate commerce requirement of Hobbs Act robbery as a matter of law. Cr. Doc. No. 485, at 14-16. Accordingly, I denied the defendants' motions on September 6, 2019. Id. at 42.
In January of 2020, I sentenced each of Hunter, Mickens, and Cook to life imprisonment. Cr. Docs. No. 527, 550, 553. Hunter was sentenced to concurrent life terms on each of his two counts of conviction. Cr. Doc. No. 553.
Hunter and his co-defendants directly appealed their convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Cr. Docs. No. 529, 559, 564. On appeal, Hunter reiterated his argument that the evidence was insufficient to convict him because Ashanti's testimony was incredible and defied physical realities; and he again adopted his co-defendants' arguments, including that the government had failed to satisfy the interstate commerce element necessary to convict the defendants of Hobbs Act robbery. See generally App. Doc. No. 100.
The Second Circuit affirmed the convictions by summary order on July 26, 2021. Cr. Doc. No. 582, republished at United States v. Mickens, 2021 WL 3136083, at *5 (2d Cir. July 26, 2021). After “thorough[ly]” evaluating the “totality of the record evidence,” the Second Circuit rejected the defendants' Rule 29 sufficiency of the evidence argument on the basis that “a reasonable jury had a sufficient foundation to credit Ashanti's overall version of the events and determine that these three Defendants kidnapped, robbed, and murdered Teasley.” Cr. Doc. No. 582, at 10.
Hunter and his co-defendants sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court denied. See Hunter v. United States, 142 S.Ct. 515 (2021) (Mem.).
Hunter now moves under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his conviction and sentence. Pet., Doc. No. 1. In his original petition (“the Petition”), filed on October 5, 2021, Hunter sets forth two claims. First, Hunter argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his lawyers allegedly failed to object to, argue in post-trial motions that, and argue on appeal that the government failed to prove the essential interstate nexus element to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), because “the conduct that formed the basis for the Kidnapping count[,]” apparently two phone calls placed into evidence in the trial record, “did not fall within the ambit of the statute allegedly violated.” Id. at 2-4. Second, Hunter asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel allegedly failed to object to, argue in post-trial motions that, and argue on appeal that the government failed to prove that the firearm-related murder for which Hunter was convicted occurred during and in relation to the robbery of the murder victim. Id. at 4-5.
I entered an order to show cause, doc. no. 4, and the government responded by arguing that: (1) the Petition fails to state cognizable section 2255 claim, because it challenges the sufficiency of the trial evidence rather than the adequacy of Hunter's representation; (2) the claims asserted in the Petition were raised on appeal and are procedurally barred by the mandate rule; and (3) the ineffective assistance claims fail on the merits. See generally Doc. No. 10.
Hunter subsequently sought to supplement the Petition, which I construed as a motion to amend the Petition and granted. Docs. No. 11, 13. In the Amended Petition, Hunter principally argues that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Taylor, 142 S.Ct. 2015 (2022), which held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 942(c), compels the vacatur of his conviction for firearm-related murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). See Am. Pet., Doc. No. 11.
In response, the government contends that I should decline to review the new claims pursuant to the concurrent sentence doctrine; in the alternative, it contends that Hunter's supplemental challenges fail on the merits and/or are procedurally defaulted. See generally Doc. No. 13.
I decide this motion without a hearing because the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively demonstrate that Hunter is not entitled to relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).
A section 2255 petition provides a prisoner in federal custody an opportunity to challenge the legality of his or her sentence. To obtain relief under section 2255, a petitioner must show that his prior sentence was invalid because: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States; (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeded the maximum detention authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
The standard is stringent; even constitutional errors will not be redressed through a section 2255 petition unless they have had a “substantial and injurious effect” that results in “actual prejudice” to the petitioner. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 637 (1993) (internal citations omitted); see also Underwood v. United States, 166 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1999) (). The petitioner bears the burden of proving that he or she is entitled to relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Triana v. United States, 205 F.3d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 2000).
A petitioner is barred from raising a claim on habeas review that was not properly raised on direct review unless the petitioner is able to show “cause and actual prejudice” or “actual innocence.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998) (cleaned up). A petitioner may, however, bring a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that was not raised previously at trial or on appeal. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003).
A petitioner asserting ineffective assistance of counsel must establish that (1) counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) that the petitioner was actually prejudiced as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). “[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to . . . address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 697. With respect to the performance prong, there is a “strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. “In assessing the attorney's performance, a reviewing court must judge his conduct on the basis of the facts of the particular case, ‘viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct.'” Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d 528, 533 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). With respect to...
To continue reading
Request your trial