Hunter v. Ward

• Decision Date: 08 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. 1D01-0139.,1D01-0139.
• Citation: Hunter v. Ward, 812 So.2d 601 (Fla. App. 2002)
• Parties: Robert HUNTER, Appellant, v. Phillip A. WARD and Dianne L. Putnam, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

812 So.2d 601

Robert HUNTER, Appellant, v.Phillip A. WARD and Dianne L. Putnam, Appellee.

No. 1D01-0139.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 8, 2002.

Tyrie A. Boyer of Boyer, Tanzler & Sussman, Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Susan S. Oosting, Esquire and Harris Brown, Esquire of Brown, Obringer, Beardsley & Decandio, P.A., for Appellee, Phillip A. Ward, Jacksonville; No appearance for Appellee, Dianne L. Putnam.

LEWIS, J.

Robert Hunter, the appellant, filed this personal injury action arising from a rearend collision against Phillip Ward, the appellee.The appellant challenges the trial court's denial of his motions for directed verdict on the issue of liability and his motion for a new trial.Based upon the supreme court's recent decision in Clampitt v. D.J. Spencer Sales,786 So.2d 570(Fla.2001), decided after the trial court denied the appellant's motions, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the appellee, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the motions.Consequently, we reverse and remand for entry of a directed verdict in favor of the appellant on the issue of liability and for a new trial on damages.

As the appellant filed a motion for directed verdict, we view all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the appellee.SeeTicor Title Guarantee Co. v. Harbin,674 So.2d 781(Fla.1st DCA1996)(stating that in ruling on motions for directed verdict, all conflicts in evidence must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party).On September 17, 1996, the appellant was traveling east in the left-hand lane of Atlantic Boulevard, a four-lane divided highway, in Jacksonville.He attempted a left turn at a break in the grass median designed for turning.However, his truck hitch extended into the left lane of Atlantic Boulevard approximately six inches.Dianne Putnam's vehicle "nose-dived" indicating that she braked hard to avoid the hitch protruding into the left lane.The traffic was heavy in the right-hand land; therefore, she could not pass the appellant's truck.Meanwhile, the appellee turned right onto Atlantic Boulevard into the right-hand lane.However, a beer truck was moving slowly, about five to ten miles an hour, in that lane, so the appellee cleared rear traffic by using his rearview mirror and moved into the left lane.When the appellee saw Putnam's vehicle stopping suddenly, he braked but could not stop in time.He struck her vehicle from behind which caused her vehicle to collide with the appellant's truck.

The appellant filed a complaint for personal injury damages against the appellee.¹At trial, after the close of all evidence, the appellant moved for a directed verdict on the issue of liability of the appellee.The appellant argued that no rebuttal was made to the presumption of negligence which arises in rear-end collisions.The appellee argued that he properly changed lanes at a reasonable speed but did not see Putnam's vehicle until he moved from behind the beer truck.The trial court held that the appellee's explanation was reasonable and rebutted the presumption; it, therefore, denied the appellant's motion.The issue of negligence was submitted to the jury.The jury declined to find negligence on the part of the appellee.The appellant subsequently moved for a directed verdict, judgment n.o.v. or, in the alternative, a new trial.The trial court also denied this motion.

In Florida, a presumption of negligence attaches to the driver of the rear vehicle in a rear-end collision.SeeSistrunk v. Douglas,468 So.2d 1059, 1060(Fla. 1st DCA1985).The rear driver can rebut this presumption by presenting evidence that "fairly and reasonably tends to show" that the presumption of negligence is misplaced.SeeGulle v. Boggs,174 So.2d 26(Fla.1965);see alsoWaters v. Williams,696 So.2d 386(Fla. 1st DCA1997).The Florida Supreme Court has further clarified the presumption of negligence in rear-end collisions in two recent cases: Clampitt,786 So.2d at 570andEppler v. Tarmac America, Inc.,752 So.2d 592(Fla.2000).

In Clampitt, three vehicles were following each other in the southbound lane of AlternateU.S. 27, south of Bronson, Florida.786 So.2d at 571.The owner of the first vehicle, a pickup truck pulling a trailer, signaled to turn left prior to entering the driveway of his place of business.Id. at 572.His pickup truck and trailer had turned almost completely off the highway when the trailer was struck from behind by Clampitt, the driver of the second vehicle.Id.Clampitt's vehicle came to a "dead stop."Id.The driver of the defendant's commercial tractor-trailer, the rear vehicle following Clampitt, failed to see, despite an unobstructed view of the two vehicles, the truck's turn signal and brake lights.Id.Although he had an unobstructed view of the first vehicle, he did not know that the truck was turning until he saw Clampitt's vehicle strike the pickup truck's trailer and push the pickup truck and trailer off the road.Upon seeing Clampitt's vehicle suddenly stop, he immediately slammed on his brakes but still struck Clampitt's vehicle.Id.At trial, the defendant did not present any additional evidence to rebut the presumption.Id.The district court reversed the trial court's granting summary judgment on the issue of fault in favor of Clampitt, stating that the evidence in favor of the defendant was sufficient to rebut the presumption.Id.However, the supreme court disagreed and quashed the district court's decision.The supreme court held that a sudden stop without more is insufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence.Id. at 575.A sudden stop could have reasonably been expected as the roadway was bordered by a school and multiple business and residential establishments.Id. at 576.

In the second supreme court case, Eppler was stopped in a line of traffic at a stoplight.Eppler,752 So.2d at 593.The light turned green, and all the vehicles in line accelerated and began moving forward in a routine fashion for several seconds.Id.In the bumper-to-bumper accelerating traffic, Eppler "suddenly—without warning and for no reason—slammed on her brakes."Id.The defendant struck Eppler from behind.Id.The supreme court held that the presumption of negligence was overcome as Eppler abruptly and arbitrarily stopped in a place not reasonably expected.Id. at 595.Thus, the trial court properly denied Eppler's motion for directed verdict.Id. at 596.

Therefore, if a vehicle suddenly stops in a roadway, but the stop happens at a place and time where it can reasonably be expected as in Clampitt, then the presumption of negligence is not rebutted, and the appellant is entitled to a directed verdict. i.e., However, if the stop is not expected, i.e., "abrupt and arbitrary" in a place not reasonably expected as in Eppler, then the presumption is rebutted, and the appellant is not entitled to a directed verdict.

After analyzing the above cases, we conclude that the facts of the instant case, like Clampitt, fall into the "sudden stop" category and warrant a directed verdict for the appellant on the issue of liability.The appellant was turning left at a crossing designed for that purpose.Because the appellant's truck extended into the left through lane and interfered with traffic, Putnam was suddenly stopping to allow him to complete his turn and clear the left through lane.However, the appellee was unable to stop in time.He struck Putnam's vehicle from behind which caused her vehicle to collide with the appellant's truck.Because a driver can reasonably expect to stop at a median crossing to allow a vehicle turning left to clear the through lane, the appellee failed to present any evidence showing that he was not negligent in hitting Putnam's vehicle, thereby hitting the appellant's vehicle.

In contrast, the dissent focuses solely on Putnam's stopping for support in affirming the trial court.However, even considering the fact that Putnam was stopping suddenly to avoid hitting the appellant's vehicle, she was stopping at a place where a stop could fairly and reasonably have been expected.She was stopping to allow the appellant to make a left turn and completely clear his entire vehicle from the left through lane.As noted above, the appellant was turning left at a crossing designed for that purpose.At such a crossing, a driver can reasonably expect vehicles traveling in the through lane to stop to allow a turning vehicle to clear the through lane.Thus, the appellee could have expected to encounter not only the appellant's vehicle but also Putnam's vehicle.More importantly, unlike Eppler, Putnam's sudden stopping was not in bumper-to-bumper traffic, nor was it an arbitrary, irresponsible, or dangerous act that invited a collision.CompareClampitt,786 So.2d at 573, 574withEppler,752 So.2d at 593.

Accordingly, the appellee's testimony that he could not see beyond the beer truck while he was changing lanes is not a substantial and reasonable explanation to overcome the presumption of negligence.Furthermore, as the supreme court stated in Clampitt,"[e]ach driver is charged under the law with remaining alert and following the vehicle in front of him or her at a safe distance."Id. at 575.Once the appellee changed lanes, he was under an obligation to be alert and expect vehicles turning left through a median to slow or even stop traffic.

Therefore, contrary to the dissent's interpretation of the evidence, the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the appellee, do not show that the appellee rebutted the presumption of negligence.Accordingly, we reverse and remand for entry of a directed verdict in favor of the appellant on the issue of liability and a new trial on the issue of damages.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

VAN NORTWICK, J., specially concurs; KAHN, J., dissents.

VAN NORTWICK, J., specially concurring.

I concur completely in the opinion of Judge Lewis.I write solely to point out...