Huntington v. Barton

Decision Date30 September 1872
Citation64 Ill. 502,1872 WL 8357
PartiesHERMAN L. HUNTINGTONv.JOHN O. BARTON.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county.

Mr. D. J. SCHUYLER, for the appellant.

Messrs. E. & A. VANBUREN, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was a proceeding commenced by appellee, in the circuit court of Cook county, against appellant and Samuel P. Pearson, to enforce a mechanic's lien on two houses and lots in the city of Chicago.

It appears that Pearson was a builder, and contracted with appellant to construct for him two buildings; that appellee contracted with Pearson to furnish all the materials and do the mason work of the buildings for $1675; that, under his contract, appellee commenced and furnished materials and work, and so continued until about the 10th day of December, when Pearson discharged appellee from the work and employed other persons to finish the plastering of the buildings.

It appears that appellee was discharged from or quit work on the buildings from the 10th to the 15th of December, 1870, and served a notice that he claimed a lien, on the 17th, and the petition for a mechanic's lien was filed on the 1st day of April, 1871, about three and a-half months after appellee ceased to work on the buildings.

The first section of the act of 1869 (Sess. Laws, p. 255,) provides that a sub-contractor, who shall furnish materials or labor on a building, etc., shall have a lien for such materials and labor on the house and land.

The fifth section provides that if the money shall not be paid the sub-contractor, by the owner, within ten days after service of the notice required by the act, the sub-contractor may sue the owner and contractor.

The ninth section declares that the lien created by the act shall continue for three months from the time of the sub-contractor's doing the work or furnishing the materials, except where suit shall be commenced by petition, and in such cases all liens shall be barred by decree entered in the cause.

The filing of the petition referred to is given by the seventh section, in these words: “Should the original contractor, for any cause, fail to complete his contract, any person entitled to a lien as aforesaid may file his petition in any court of record against the owner or lessee and the contractor, setting forth the nature of his claim, the amount due, as near as may be, and the names of the parties employed on such house...

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4 cases
  • Cairo & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Cauble
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 31 Julio 1879
    ...in error; that the statute relating to liens for materials must be strictly construed, cited Rothgerber v. Dupuy, 64 Ill. 452; Huntington v. Barton, 64 Ill. 502; Canisius v. Merrill, 65 Ill. 67; Dunphy v. Riddle, 86 Ill. 22; Crowl v. Nagle, 86 Ill. 437. The lien continues for three months o......
  • The PhŒnix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Batchen
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 31 Marzo 1880
    ...Cook v. Heald, 21 Ill. 429; Kinzey v. Thomas, 28 Ill. 502; Brady v. Anderson, 24 Ill. 112; Rothgerber v. Dupuy, 64 Ill. 452; Huntington v. Barton, 64 Ill. 502. Mr. DAVID FALES, Mr. E. B. PAYNE and Messrs. MILLER & FROST, for various appellees; that there is no force to the objection that th......
  • Langdon v. Wilcox
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 20 Noviembre 1883
    ...on other creditors, will be strictly construed, and persons seeking its benefit must bring themselves within its provisions. Huntington v. Barton, 64 Ill. 502. There was no error in striking from the files the common counts and plea joining issue thereon, because chapter 12, known as the “W......
  • Mccreedy v. Mier
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 30 Septiembre 1872

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