Huntington v. Parkhurst
| Decision Date | 28 July 1891 |
| Citation | 87 Mich. 38,49 N.W. 597 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | HUNTINGTON v. PARKHURST. |
Error to circuit court, Ingham county; ROLLIN H. PERSON, Judge.
Action by Charles G. Huntington against Charles G. Parkhurst to recover for the rent of a store-house. There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendant thereupon took this writ. Affirmed.
Q. A. Smith, (A. D. Prosser, of counsel,) for appellant.
A B. Haynes, (Montgomery & Lee, of counsel,) for appellee.
This action was commenced before a justice of the peace to recover for the use and occupation of certain premises before then claimed to have been leased by the plaintiff to the defendant. The plaintiff had judgment before the justice, and the case was appealed to the circuit court, and there, after hearing the testimony, the court directed a verdict for the plaintiff. We quote, with a few amendments, the statement of facts taken from the supplemental brief of counsel for defendant, namely: The plaintiff was the owner of a store building, in which was contained a stock of goods which had been attached, and was sold by the sheriff at public auction and purchased by the defendant. When the goods were offered for sale, the plaintiff informed the auctioneer, and he so announced, that any purchaser of the stock of goods might obtain a lease of the store. Immediately after the purchase by the defendant, the plaintiff and he talked together with reference to leasing the store, and it was then agreed between them that the plaintiff would execute to defendant a written lease of the premises for a term of one year, with the privilege of three or five years in addition for a yearly rental of $500, payable monthly in installments of $41.66. The defendant agreed to accept and enter into such a lease on those conditions, and on account of the lateness of the hour the plaintiff said he would have the lease drawn after he returned home, and they could execute it at some future time. Without any other agreement or understanding defendant occupied the store two months, and paid the monthly rental of $41.66. The defendant, through his father, during this period of time, requested the plaintiff to execute the lease, who replied that he would do so, but that, the defendant not being present to execute the lease with him, he would have it drawn so that when they came together it could be signed. The term commenced on the 6th day of May, 1890, and the rent was paid to July 6, 1890. On the 3d day of July the defendant removed from the premises. On the Sunday before he had an interview with the plaintiff, in which he told him that he was going to vacate, to which the plaintiff replied that he had rented the store for a year. The defendant, after he had removed from the premises, locked the door, and left the key in a bank with which plaintiff was connected, with directions to deliver it to plaintiff. Plaintiff refused to accept the key or the possession of the premises, and, after the next month's rent became due and payable, brought his action to recover for the use and occupation of the premises.
The first question to be decided is, what was the nature and extent of defendant's holding under the facts above stated? The question so ably argued by defendant's attorney in his original and supplemental briefs, and orally before the court, namely, that the testimony shows that no actual lease was entered into, but that there was an agreement for a lease for a term of one year, with the privilege of three or five years, at an annual rental of $500, payable monthly at the rate of $41.66, does not reach and dispose of the merits of the controversy. The terms of the lease were agreed upon, and it was agreed they should be reduced to writing. This doubtless was an agreement for a lease to be executed according to the terms agreed upon, but the testimony shows further that the defendant went immediately into possession under the agreement that he should have a written lease for one year with the privilege of three or five years, as above stated, and occupied the premises and paid the stipulated rent for two months. Under such facts, the relation of landlord and tenant was created. The defendant became a tenant at will. It is laid down by Taylor, in his work on Landlord and Tenant, that "where a party enters into the possession of premises under an agreement to accept a lease for twenty months, and subsequently refuses to accept the lease, he becomes by such refusal a strict tenant at will, for he may be ejected immediately; but, if the landlord accepts rent from him monthly or according to the terms of the original agreement, a general tenancy at will is created, commencing from the time of entry;" and "while a man who enters under a void lease is strictly a tenant at will, if he pays rent, he becomes a general tenant at will or from year to year, according to circumstances." Tayl. Landl. & Ten. � 60. In this case the agreement for a periodical rent, and the agreed term of a year, at all events, makes the holding of defendant a tenancy from year to year. See Id. � 56, and cases cited in note 2. Counsel for the defendant claims that an entry under an agreement for a lease is a mere license, and can be terminated by either party before the written lease is executed, and cites Tayl. Landl. & Ten. � 37. The author does make use of the expression that "such an agreement, however, will operate as a license to enter upon the premises agreed to be demised;" but it was not the intention, as I think, of the author, to convey the idea that a person so agreeing for a lease might enter and occupy the premises, and pay rent in accordance with the agreement, without becoming a tenant. The distinction is this: if he enters awaiting the execution of the agreement, his entry is one under a license, but if, after being in possession of the premises, he pays rent for the use of them in accordance with the agreement, which was to be reduced to writing, his relation is that of a tenant at will; and the distinction is plainly pointed out at the close of the section cited, where the author says: "Any person, however, who may be in possession of land in pursuance of an agreement to let, may, by the payment of rent or other circumstances, become a tenant from year to year." Indeed, it would seem not to require any citation of authorities to prove that when a party, under an agreement for a lease, enters in possession and pays rent for the use of the premises, the relation between the parties cannot be other than that of landlord and tenant; it certainly is not that of licensor and licensee. The tenant has acquired rights of which he cannot be divested without the proper notice, and so has the landlord. The same result follows where a lease is made by parol for a longer term than one year, and the party enters into possession under it, and pays rent, which it is agreed shall be reduced to writing, as it does where a lease is made for a longer term than one year by parol, and is void under the statute of frauds, and the tenant enters and occupies, paying rent, and is ruled by the same principles which apply to the latter class. In such cases it has been uniformly held that an implied tenancy from year to year will arise in cases where occupation is had under a parol demise for more than a year, void because exceeding the period allowed by the statute of frauds. Tayl. Landl. & Ten. � 56. Some cases hold that such a lease, although void for the period beyond a year, is good for one year, because it will be presumed that the parties intended to effect the lease for the term for which one could legally be made; but I think the better reasoning is that a contract which is void by the terms of the statute of frauds is not good for any purpose further than to indicate what the intentions of the parties were with reference to the terms of the letting. The rights of the parties must be judged by the relation they have assumed with each other independently of the void contract. Courts, however, have referred to the contract as throwing light upon the intentions of the parties, and it has been generally held that, where a tenant enters and occupies under a parol lease for more than a year, the...
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