Huntington v. Toledo, St. L. & W.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 14 December 1909
• Docket Number: 1,931.
• Parties: HUNTINGTON v. TOLEDO, ST. L. & W.R. CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

175 F. 532

HUNTINGTON v. TOLEDO, ST. L. & W.R. CO.

No. 1,931.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

December 14, 1909

An action at law cannot be maintained in a federal court for breach of a parol agreement for the employment of plaintiff by defendant, alleged to have been made between them as part consideration for a release by plaintiff of a claim for damages for a personal injury, where subsequent to such alleged agreement a written contract of settlement and release was made between the parties, complete in itself and the terms of which were fully understood and carried out, but which contained no provision for plaintiff's employment.

This suit was brought by William A. Huntington, a citizen and resident of Lucas county, Ohio, against the Toledo, St. Louis & Western Railroad Company, a corporation of Indiana, owning and operating a railroad from Toledo to St. Louis. On November 7, 1903, Huntington was in the employ of the railroad company as conductor of passenger trains, and was on that day injured through alleged neglect of the railroad company. In the petition it is alleged that in December 1903, or January, 1904, he entered into an agreement of settlement with the company 'for the damages which he had suffered by reason of receiving said injuries'; that 'as a part of the terms of said settlement he was paid for loss of time'; and, further, that the company 'agreed as part of the consideration of the plaintiff releasing it from the damages * * * to retain plaintiff in the service of the company, and give him employment at his regular work of a conductor or at such other work as he might be able to perform so long as the plaintiff desired to remain in the service of the company." It is averred, further that this agreement 'was partly in writing and partly verbal; * * * that in carrying out the terms of said settlement plaintiff did release the defendant from said damages and the defendant * * * did continue plaintiff in its service as a conductor until on or about the month of March or April, 1905,' when the company discharged him without just cause, and refused longer to retain plaintiff in its employ or pay. Damages in a large sum are asked for breach of the agreement.

In the answer it is admitted that Huntington was in the company's employ as a conductor, that he had been injured, but it is denied that the company was in fault. It is averred in the third defense that in January, 1904, the parties entered into an agreement in writing which in substance bound the company to pay $210, and Huntington to release and discharge the company from any and all liability for his injuries. In the fourth and fifth defenses it is admitted that Huntington thereafter continued in the employ of the company until as averred he was discharged in 1905 for just cause, and the other allegations of the petition are denied.

In the reply it is admitted that Huntington signed some paper at the time of making the settlement, but it is averred that, if there is any language therein purporting to release the company upon the payment of $210, 'the same was written in the paper without the knowledge or consent of this plaintiff, and through fraud practiced by the person or persons, who caused said paper to be prepared.'

The case was tried before the court and a jury, and in the course of Huntington's testimony he stated that one Reifsnider claim agent of the company, called to see him in regard to a settlement. He was then asked to state the conversation had between them. Objection was made, which resulted in the written release (set out in the opinion) being identified, and Huntington's signature to it admitted. Leave was thereupon asked and given to amend the petition by striking from it the paragraph containing the allegation that 'the agreement was partly in writing and partly verbal.'

Huntington was permitted against objection to testify to conversations had by him with Frazier, superintendent of the company, and also with the claim agent, Reifsnider, concerning the settlement. He testified that Frazier said: 'I will give you full time for the time you have lost and promise you a permanent position with the company as long as you wish to remain,' and, further, that Reifsnider, on presenting the paper for his signature, stated that Frazier had told him substantially the same thing, whereupon he signed the paper. He then proceeded in his direct examination: 'Q. What, if anything, was said by Mr. Reifsnider to you on the subject of putting the agreement in writing for your services or for employment? A. I asked him if he would put the agreement in writing and he said, 'No'; that they didn't do that, but Mr. Frazier had promised it and he had all the respect in the world for Mr. Frazier, and thought it was all right and he would live up to his part of the agreement."

Huntington having stated that he did not read the release, the following occurred in his cross-examination: 'Q. Now, Mr. Huntington, didn't Mr. Reifsnider at that time read that voucher to you and didn't you remark, 'I don't see anything here relative to the arrangement of my continuing in the employ of the company which Mr. Frazier made with me,' or words to that effect? A. I think I asked the question if it was in there, and he said, 'No.' Q. Then at the time you were signing this release you knew that there was nothing about re-employment in this release? A. I supposed that there wasn't.'

Reifsnider, on being called by plaintiff, testified against objection that he read over the written release to Huntington, and in other respects his testimony was about the same as Huntington's. Some other testimony of the same general character was received. When plaintiff rested, the defendant moved to strike out all the testimony of conversations had prior to or at the time of the execution of the release. The motion was overruled. Defendant thereupon formally offered the release, and offered testimony of Frazier denying making any oral agreement, also offered copies of papers including the by-laws of the company.

At the close of all the evidence, the company renewed its motion to exclude the evidence offered by Huntington, and also moved to exclude all the evidence. dence. These motions were overruled, but a verdict was on motion directed for defendant. Thereupon plaintiff's counsel moved that a juror be withdrawn and the cause continued, and that plaintiff be 'permitted to file a bill on the equity side of this court to reform this contract,' which motion was overruled. The cause is pending here upon proceedings in error.

C. A. Thatcher, for plaintiff in error.

C. A. Schmettau, for defendant in error.

Before LURTON, SEVERENS, and WARRINGTON, Circuit Judges.

WARRINGTON Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

The theory of recovery in this case is that plaintiff in error is entitled to maintain an action at law for breach of an oral agreement of settlement, which was made shortly prior to the execution of a written agreement upon the same subject. As pointed out in the statement, the oral agreement purports to embody the settlement of a claim of plaintiff in error for injuries received by him through alleged negligence of the railroad company. It is to be observed, however, that the action is not to recover for such injuries, but is to recover upon the agreement itself. The case therefore differs from a class of actions at law in which recovery has been allowed upon the original liability or obligation, as against a defense of settlement which under proper averment is shown to have been obtained through fraud. Wagner v. National Life Ins. Co., 90 F. 395, 33 C.C.A. 121. When recovery is founded on the alleged agreement of settlement, and the testimony offered discloses the existence of an agreement in writing upon the subject of the very settlement in question--...