Hunziker v. School Dist. 26, Sheridan County

Decision Date25 January 1941
Docket Number34995.
CitationHunziker v. School Dist. 26, Sheridan County, 109 P.2d 115, 153 Kan. 102 (Kan. 1941)
PartiesHUNZIKER v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 26, SHERIDAN COUNTY, et al.
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied March 14, 1941.

Syllabus by the Court.

Lands in school district at time of issuance of district bonds are subject to taxation for full payment of principal of and interest on bonds, which have all properties of liens on property in territory within municipality when bonds were issued.Gen.St.1935, 10-101, 10-105, 10-112, 72-404, 72-2001 72-2003, 72-2004.

In construing statute, it is fundamental rule, to which all other rules are subordinate, that Legislature's purpose or intent, when ascertainable from statute, governs, though words, phrases, or clauses at some place in statute must be omitted or inserted.

The fact that statute, providing for attachment of territory of disorganized school district to adjacent district does not expressly excuse property in such territory from liability for taxes to pay principal of, and interest on, bonds subsequently issued by adjacent district for refunding of its bonded indebtedness outstanding at time of annexation, shows no intent to impose such liability, in absence of provision that property in attached territory shall be liable for such taxes.Laws 1917, c. 275, § 1;Gen.St.1935, 72-809, 72-812 to 72-814, 72-819, 72-820, 72-2004.

Where under the provisions of Laws 1917, ch. 275, a school district was disorganized for failure to maintain a school as therein provided, and the territory of such disorganized district was attached to another school district then having an outstanding bonded indebtedness, the territory of such disorganized district was not liable for the payment of such bonded indebtedness, nor if such bonded indebtedness be refunded is it liable therefor.

Appeal from District Court, Sheridan County; W. K. Skinner, Judge.

Action by H. Hunziker against School DistrictNo. 26, Sheridan County, and others, for a declaratory judgment determining whether property in territory of disorganized school district is subject to taxation for payment of bonded indebtedness of defendant district to which it was attached.From an order overruling defendant district's demurrer to the petition it appeals.

Ray C Sloan, of Hoxie, E. R. Sloan, W. Glenn Hamilton, Floyd A. Sloan, and Eldon R. Sloan, all of Topeka, for appellant.

W. L. Sayers and W. P. Sayers, both of Hill City, for appellees.

THIELE Justice.

This was an action for a declaratory judgment.Defendants' demurrer to the petition was overruled and it appeals.The question to be determined is the liability of the territory of a disorganized school district for the payment of the bonded indebtedness of the district to which it was attached.

The petition disclosed that prior to August 4, 1927, there was in existence in Sheridan County, School DistrictNo. 28, embracing in its boundaries at least ten sections of land, the plaintiff being then and ever since the owner of a one-half section thereof.That the district failed to maintain a school for three consecutive years, and on August 4, 1927, under the provisions of Laws 1917, ch. 275, the county superintendent disorganized the district and attached the territory to School DistrictNo. 26, which maintained a graded school.At the time of the disorganization of DistrictNo. 28, it had no bonded indebtedness.Its schoolhouse was sold and the proceeds of the sale went to and were received by DistrictNo. 26.At the same date DistrictNo. 26 had an outstanding bonded indebtedness of $40,000, which became due and delinquent and on March 1, 1937, the district issued refunding bonds in the sum of $44,500 and with the proceeds refunded the outstanding bonded indebtedness.Beginning in 1937, DistrictNo. 26 caused a levy to be made on the entire territory of the district, including that formerly comprised in DistrictNo. 28, for the purpose of paying interest on and accumulating a sinking fund to retire the refunding bonds, the various levies for 1937, 1938 and 1939 being set forth.

Plaintiff further alleged that the levy and tax represented an unlawful charge against the property in the territory formerly constituting DistrictNo. 28 and particularly against the property of the plaintiff; that the tax is substantial and the defendant district continues to levy against plaintiff's property to raise funds to pay the above-mentioned refunding bonds; that he has paid the first half of his 1939 tax under protest; and that he now owes for the last half of that year.That the purpose of the action is to determine the right of DistrictNo. 26 to levy a tax on the property formerly included in DistrictNo. 28 to pay interest on and retire the bonded indebtedness, and that it should be determined the district has no such right, but the defendant district continues to exercise such claimed right and authority.Defendant's demurrer on the ground the petition did not state a cause of action was overruled and it appeals.

In a preliminary way, it may be stated that appellee does not contend there is any specific statutory provision which compels the relief he seeks, but that the statutes generally compel the result, while the appellant contends that there being no such specific provision, under the law generally it has the right and authority to make the levy.The answer requires consideration of the statute under which DistrictNo. 28 was disorganized and possibly other statutes.There is no contention but that the present bond issue represents an indebtedness of DistrictNo. 26 existing prior to the annexation.

Under Laws 1917, ch. 275, sec. 1, it was provided that if a school district failed for three successive years to maintain a school as therein provided, the district should be disorganized and attached to adjacent districts, or where the district was adjacent to a third class city maintaining a high school or graded school, it should be attached to the school district in which the city is located.Section 1 of this act was amended by Laws 1921, ch. 228 and later appeared in revised form as R.S.1923, 72--818.This last-mentioned section was amended by Laws 1933, ch. 254, and was repealed by Laws 1935, ch. 255.The various changes made do not affect the question now submitted.Under the allegations of the petition, School DistrictNo. 26 maintained a graded school but it is not disclosed whether the district includes a third class city.Under sec. 2 of the first-mentioned act, now appearing as G.S.1935, 72-819, provision is made for payment of floating indebtedness of the disorganized district by a levy to be made by the board of county commissioners on the territory of the district.Under sec. 3, now appearing as G.S.1935, 72-820, any money, unpaid taxes, buildings and other property of the disorganized district shall be applied as provided in sections 8931and8932, G.S. 1915(G.S.1935, 72-812, 72-813), and any bonded indebtedness be paid as provided in section 8928, G.S.1915(G.S.1935, 72-809).Reference to those sections discloses they are parts of Laws 1901, ch. 307, providing for disorganization of school districts which have become depopulated as defined therein, for disposition of property, payment of bonded debt, etc.Sec. 8931 provided moneys and unpaid taxes should be applied to payment of floating and bonded indebtedness, any remaining sums to go to the districts to which the disorganized territory was attached.Sec. 8932 provided for sale of the buildings and other property and for similar disposition of the proceeds.Sec. 8928 provided that if the disorganized district had a bonded indebtedness, the county commissioners should levy a tax upon the real and personal property in such disorganized territory sufficient to meet the interest and provide a sinking fund, and provision for refunding the debt is also made.Sec. 10 of the above chapter 307, later appearing as G.S.1915, sec. 8933, and now appearing as G.S.1935, 72-814, and not referred to in Laws 1917, ch. 275, read: "The territory of any school district so disorganized shall not be liable for any debt, floating or bonded, or any contract of any district to which it may be attached, existing at the time of such attachment."

Appellant contends that because the last-quoted section was not referred to in Laws 1917, ch. 275, but the other provisions quoted were specifically mentioned, it must be concluded a disorganized district must not only pay its own debt floating or bonded, and that any excess of its taxes, money or property must be delivered to the district to which it was attached, but that the property in the disorganized territory becomes liable for the existing debt of the district to which it...

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