Huot v. Com.

• Decision Date: 13 February 1973
• Citation: 292 N.E.2d 700,363 Mass. 91
• Parties: Douglas Paul HUOT v. COMMONWEALTH.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 700

292 N.E.2d 700

363 Mass. 91

Douglas Paul HUOT v. COMMONWEALTH.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 7, 1972.

Decided Feb. 13, 1973.

William P. Homans, Jr., Boston (Thomas G. Shapiro, Boston, with him), for petitioner.

Edward W. Kirk, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen. (John T. Gaffney, Asst. Dist. Atty., with him), for the Commonwealth.

Before TAURO, C.J., and BRAUCHER, HENNESSEY, KAPLAN and WILKINS, JJ.

TAURO, Chief Justice.

The petitioner (Huot) pleaded guilty to so much of an indictment for murder in the first degree as charged him with murder in the second degree. Huot was sentenced to life imprisonment and, by this petition for a writ of error, he now contests the constitutional validity of his plea. After a hearing on the petition a single justice of this court affirmed the judgment and filed a reservation and report of his findings (which are not in dispute), his rulings and the question of law presented by the petition. We are asked to decide 'Whether the petitioner's plea of guilty was so made and accepted that the imposition of judgment and sentence was in violation of any right of the petitioner to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States?'

On February 10, 1967, Huot was indicted for the first degree murder of one Betty Jeanne Orrill in which he pleaded not guilty. He was brought to trial on July 11, 1967. The Commonwealth proceeded to present evidence, and by July 19, 1967, the Commonwealth's case was substantially completed. On that day, after discussion with a lawyer, one Mr. Robert M. Murphy, and his own trial attorney Mr. Albert L. Hutton, Jr., Huot changed his plea to guilty to so much of the indictment as charged second degree murder. He was then sentenced to life imprisonment.

The petition for writ of error alleges, in substance, that Huot's plea of guilty to second degree murder was not knowingly and voluntarily made but was the result of coercion and terror. The single justice heard testimony from Huot and his trial counsel and concluded that 'Huot's plea was voluntary, was made after reasonable inquiry by the judge, and is subject to no constitutional infirmity.' We agree.

We summarize the findings of the single justice which were based upon his review of substantial portions of the trial transcript and upon testimony given by Mr. Hutton and Huot at the hearing before him. Huot had 'dated' the victim ten or twelve times before her death. On the evening of the murder, the victim and two of her friends had eaten supper with Huot who drank considerably throughout the evening. The group then went to the Playboy Club where Huot had at least seven Manhattan cocktails. Huot and the victim had an argument and left the club at approximately 12:30 A.M. About 4:40 A.M. the police, responding to a telephone call from Huot, found him in the bedroom of the victim's apartment 'nude from the waist down' trying to resuscitate the girl. ¹ The medical examiner testified that there were substantial brutal injuries to the victim. ² There was evidence permitting an inference that Huot had tried to wash blood from the victim's and his own clothes. A recent room-mate of Huot's testified that Huot had said that he would 'beat the hell out of . . . (the victim)' if she continued to resist his sexual advances.

From the evidence the single justice concluded that the 'jury might well have decided that Huot had murdered the victim with extreme atrocity and cruelty' which would have justified a first degree murder conviction. A review of the transcript leads us to believe that the single justice's conclusion was correct.

After Huot was arrested he consulted with Mr. Murphy who then referred the case to Mr. Hutton who acted as trial counsel. Mr Murphy was not present at the trial until the day the plea of guilty was made. The single justice found that Mr. Hutton was an experienced trial attorney and that he had ample time to prepare the defence.

Prior to pleading guilty, Huot (after hearing the Commonwealth's evidence against him) had a conversation with Mr. Murphy and Mr. Hutton. Mr. Murphy told Huot that the case was going very unfavorably and that the jury would 'fry his ass.' Mr. Hutton concurred with the substance of Mr. Murphy's assessment that the case was going very badly. Huot testified that Mr. Murphy had told him that the jury 'wanted . . . (his) blood,' that he was 'going to die if . . . (he) took the stand' and that he would 'burn' if he did not change his plea. When asked what Mr. Murphy had said to him, however, Huot replied, 'He (Mr. Murphy) said you have to plead guilty. I didn't believe it. I wanted to see Mr. Hutton.'

Mr. Hutton spoke with his client. He explained the consequences of the various pleas and verdicts but did not advise Huot to plead guilty. After talking with Mr. Hutton, Huot, who had previously protested his innocence, then asked Mr. Hutton if the district attorney would accept a plea of guilty to second degree murder. Mr. Hutton conferred with the trial judge and the district attorney and then formally addressed the trial judge and requested the court to accept Huot's plea of guilty to second degree murder. He stated to the trial judge that Huot remembered going to the Playboy Club and being with the deceased girl but that he had 'spotty recall of . . . the balance of the evening.' Mr. Hutton further stated to the trial judge that Huot did 'remember enough of the facts--and he tells me--to know that he is the person responsible for this homicide.'

Before accepting the plea, the trial judge addressed Huot. He asked him if he was aware of the severity of the offence, the seriousness of the sentence and what the plea meant in terms of his future. Huot replied affirmatively to all questions. When asked whether he had been promised any favor in return for his guilty plea, Huot replied, 'No.' ³ Huot then pleaded guilty to the charge of second degree murder and was sentenced.

The single justice of this court found that Mr. Hutton had not advised Huot to plead guilty but had pointed out all the possibilities and consequences of a guilty plea. He found that a 'reasonably deliberate conference between Huot and Mr. Hutton followed Mr. Murphy's colorful statements' and that Mr. Hutton had behaved in a 'proper, wise, fair, and well reasoned' manner.

When Mr. Hutton testified before the single justice of this court he stated that 'Huot had never admitted his guilty to me and, as a matter of fact never has.' Mr. Hutton went on to explain, however, that Huot 'said words to the effect that it must have been him, but that he could not remember having committed the crime.' ⁴ The single justice of this court did not fully accept this testimony and found that Mr. Hutton's statement before the trial judge, suggesting that Huot did remember enough of the facts to conclude that he was responsible for the homicide, was more likely to be accurate than his testimony before the single justice which occurred four years after the plea.

Huot also testified before the single justice. In spite of his statement that after he had talked with Mr. Murphy his 'state of mine . . . was that there was no choice,' so that he 'gave in,' the single justice found that Huot's plea was his own reluctant choice. He found that Mr. Hutton had given 'reasonable, dispassionate advice in good faith, justified by the case which had been presented by the Commonwealth.' He also found that the trial judge had 'in good faith and reasonably concluded that . . . (Huot's) plea was voluntarily made,' and that there was not the 'slightest evidence that Huot's plea was in any way whatsoever induced by the judge or any representative of the Commonwealth.'

The petitioner maintains that his guilty plea was not made voluntarily but was the result of coercion and terror. It is elementary that a guilty plea is void if it is involuntary and unintelligent for any reason. See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542--543, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568; Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.Ed. 1009; Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653. Coercion that results in an involuntary plea will render the plea void as in violation of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235--238, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716; Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286, 61 S.Ct. 574, 85 L.Ed. 830; Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104, 62 S.Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed. 1302; Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747.

The petitioner argues that Mr. Murphy's statements so terrorized him that his subsequent guilty plea was not made voluntarily. ⁵ Throughout the petitioner's brief Mr. Murphy is characterized as 'one of the attorneys representing the petitioner at the time of the plea.' (at 4, 5) The single justice found that after Huot's arrest, an appearance was entered for him by Mr. Murphy, but that Mr. Hutton acted as Huot's trial counsel. From this finding and from the fact that Mr. Murphy does not appear to have assisted either in the preparation of the defence or at the trial, the Commonwealth argues that Mr. Murphy was acting in the capacity of 'a friend of Huot.' Regardless of this and in light of the fact that Huot sought Mr. Hutton's advice before deciding to enter his plea, it could reasonably be concluded that Huot looked upon Mr. Hutton as his attorney. But Mr. Murphy's status is not determinative here since in whatever capacity Mr. Murphy offered his advice, we believe that the single justice correctly found that his advice to Huot to plead guilty did not result in an involuntary plea.

The petitioner relies heavily upon Colson v. Smith, 438 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir.), to support the view...