Hupp v. Danielson, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-CV-00375
| Decision Date | 24 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-CV-00375 |
| Parties | SCOTT HUPP AND DONNA HUPP, Plaintiffs, v. DAVID DANIELSON, DD PRECISION AND KEMAH HARDWARE AND SUPPLY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
This dispute between friends tests the scope of federal courts' power to hear "cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Plaintiff Scott Hupp seeks damages for injuries sustained while assisting Defendant David Danielson with the purchase and cleaning of his boat. The injuries occurred while the boat was in a boat lift on a canal behind Danielson's home. Danielson now moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This Court has considered the parties' arguments, the applicable authorities, and the facts of the case, and determines that maritime jurisdiction exists. The Court therefore DENIES Danielson's motion to dismiss.
On June 23, 2012, Danielson purchased a new 35 Executioner powerboat. The manufacturer promotes the 35 Executioner as offering the "latest in offshoretechnology at an affordable price." Fountain Powerboat, Inc., 35 Executioner, http://www.fountainpowerboats.com/sport/exc35_overview.asp (last visited June 18, 2013). It includes such features as twin Mercury 425hp 496 cubic inch engines that can reach speeds over 78 miles per hour, along with a spacious cabin. Id.
Unfortunately, the first day Danielson owned the boat did not bring the relaxation and enjoyment that one would expect. His friend Hupp, who was present earlier in the day for an inspection and test run of the 35 Executioner, helped transport the boat to the canal behind Danielson's house. The canal is a narrow, man-made space that allows the residents of the properties surrounding the canal access to nearby Clear Lake. When the boat arrived behind Danielson's home, it was floated onto a boat lift and raised for cleaning. According to Hupp, the hull was less than a foot out of the water, and the bottoms of the drives were still in the water. Hupp took a break from the cleaning to answer a phone call. When he returned, he attempted to step onto one of the beams of the boat lift. The lift failed without warning, causing cables and other parts of the lift to strike Hupp. Hupp fell against the lift, breaking his pelvis on its beam. He then fell into the water, sustaining further injuries to his legs and hips.
Hupp brought suit in this Court on March 28, 2013. Danielson now moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the suit does not fall within the Court's maritime jurisdiction.
In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the standard of review is the same as that for dismissals for failure to state a claim under rule 12(b)(6). Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992). The "court accepts 'all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Federal jurisdiction over matters of maritime law flows from 28 U.S.C. § 1333, the congressional implementation of Article III, section 2 of the Constitution. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 204 (1971). Federal maritime jurisdiction exists where "the tort occurs on navigable waters and the tort bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." Sanders v. Placid Oil Co., 861 F.2d 1374, 1376-77 (5th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has developed a two-part test with "location" and "connection" inquiries todetermine whether a case falls under maritime jurisdiction. See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995).
"A court applying the location test must determine whether the tort occurred on navigable water or whether the injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water." Id. at 534 (citation omitted). The first inquiry under the location test is whether the water on which the tort occurred—in this case, the canal behind Danielson's house—is navigable. The Supreme Court articulated the test for navigability in The Daniel Ball, which held that waters are navigable "when they form . . . a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries." The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870); see also The Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 442 (1874) (). To be considered navigable, the waters must be "capable . . . of navigation in interstate travel or commerce." Sanders, 861 F.2d at 1377; 1 Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Jessica L. McClellan, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 3.3 (5th ed. 2011) (). In its analysis of navigability, the Court considers both whether the canal is part of a "continuedhighway" over which interstate or foreign commerce can be conducted and whether the canal itself is capable of being used for commercial activity. See Schoenbaum & McClellan, supra at § 3.3 .1
Danielson disputes this latter requirement, arguing that the water is not navigable because the canal was made "for residents to park their pleasure craft behind their houses, and not to facilitate commercial interstate travel from the . . . neighborhood." Docket Entry No. 12 ¶ 17. But this mischaracterizes the inquiry, which is not whether the canal was created for commercial maritime activity, or even whether such activity is actually occurring, but only whether such activity is capable of occurring: "The capability of use by the public for purposes of transportation and commerce affords the true criterion of the navigability of a river, rather than the extent and manner of that use." The Montello, 87 U.S. at 441; see also Sanders, 861 F.2d at 1377. The capability of the canal at issue in this case to be used for commercial purposes is demonstrated by a recent case within this circuit in which the district court found that a pipeline canal was navigable because"small commercial vessels—utilized by fur trappers, alligator hunters, and fishermen . . . have entered, and traveled through . . . the pipeline canal." Landry v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., No. 04-3290, 2009 WL 4064107, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 23, 2009). Commercial fishermen could also use such small vessels in the canal behind Danielson's home. Moreover, on the day in question, Hupp and Danielson had to navigate around a commercial vessel that was blocking the canal, a fact that shows that the canal is indeed capable of being used for commercial purposes. See fig. 1, infra.
And the canal unquestionably is part of a continued highway of waters which reaches ports in other states and countries. As the Fifth Circuit has shown, this is just a matter of map tracing. The court of appeals concluded that Catahoula Lake in Louisiana was navigable because, through a series of connections to smaller tributaries, it eventually connected to the Mississippi River, "a majormaritime commercial artery" that traverses many states. Sanders, 861 F. 2d at 1377-78. In the canal case already mentioned, the district court found that the waterway was navigable in part because it had been used "by uniting with other waters, as a continued highway for commerce with another state or foreign country." Landry, 2009 WL 4064107, at *1. Performing the same exercise here, the canal in question "connects to Clear Lake" which "empties into Galveston Bay [,] and Galveston Bay connects to the Gulf of Mexico." Docket Entry No. 19 at 6. The canal is therefore navigable for purposes of maritime jurisdiction.
That brings the Court to the closer question: whether the tort occurred on the navigable canal. Danielson argues that the incident "occurred on the boat lift, which is an extension of the land or shoreline," rather than part of the water. Docket Entry No. 22 ¶ 4. The parties (as well as the Court) did not find a maritime jurisdiction case involving a boat lift similar to Danielson's, so both sides analogize to other structures. Danielson compares the boat lift to piers, wharves and docks, over which courts have found maritime jurisdiction lacking. See, e.g., Victory Carriers, 404 U.S. at 206-07. Hupp compares the boat lift to liftboats and dry docks, which courts have found to be part of navigable waters. See The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 34 (1903) (dry dock); Strong v. B.P. Exploration & Prod., Inc., 440 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 2006) (liftboat); Sea Vessel, Inc. v. Reyes, 23 F.3d 345, 348-49 (11th Cir. 1994) (dry dock). In Strong, the Fifth Circuit heldthat a liftboat, which was "jacked up and not 'under sail,' qualifi[ed] as a vessel on navigable waters." Strong, 440 F.3d at 669. The Eleventh Circuit has found that a fire occurring on a vessel in dry dock came under maritime jurisdiction because the dry dock constituted navigable waters, and the vessel therefore was in navigable waters at the time of the fire. Reyes, 23 F.3d at 348-49. The Fifth Circuit has even gone so far as to find a boat, stored in a marina completely separate from the water for the purposes of "obviat[ing] storage in salt water [and] . . . keeping the boats barnacle free," to be in navigable waters for the purposes of maritime jurisdiction. See Am. E. Dev. Corp. v....
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