Hurd v. Doty

• Decision Date: 26 September 1893
• Citation: 56 N.W. 371,86 Wis. 1
• Parties: HURD v. DOTY.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

86 Wis. 1

56 N.W. 371

HURD

v.DOTY.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Sept. 26, 1893.

Appeal from circuit court, Dane county; R. G. Siebecker, Judge.

Action by Richard W. Hurd against Amanda M. Doty to enforce a trust in the proceeds of certain life insurance. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The other facts fully appear in the following statement by CASSODAY, J.:

It appears in effect, from the record, that January 27, 1885, one Fannie E. Nash received from the Northwestern Mutual Relief Association of Madison a certificate of membership for insurance in an amount not exceeding $4,000, with one-half payable to E. E. Doty, and the remainder equally divided between the plaintiff and C. C. Chittenden as beneficiaries. That March 29, 1889, the said Fannie E. signed an application for change of beneficiary in said insurance, so as to make $2,000 thereof payable to the plaintiff, and the balance thereof to be equally divided between E. E. Doty and C. C. Chittenden, and therein and thereby returned and surrendered said former certificate of insurance. That thereupon, and on July 19, 1890, the said company issued to said Fannie E. a new certificate for insurance, not exceeding $4,000, of which sum $2,000 was payable to the plaintiff, and the remainder to be equally divided between E. E. Doty and C. C. Chittenden, and they to pay all her just debts and expenses of last sickness and funeral. That the plaintiff held said certificate for said Fannie E. until it was surrendered, as hereinafter mentioned. That said Fannie E. was a cousin, by birth, of the plaintiff's wife, and a second cousin of his son. That she was an inmate of the plaintiff's family, and had a home there, for some time during the latter years of her life. That November 19, 1891, at the home of the defendant, the said Fannie E. and the plaintiff met the defendant, and the question arose between them whether said plaintiff and the said E. E. Doty, who is the husband of the defendant, not being blood relations of the said Fannie E., were entitled to be named as beneficiaries in the said policy; and thereupon, and in order to carry out the wishes of the said Fannie E., it was then and there mutually agreed by and between this plaintiff and the defendant and the said Fannie E. that the benefit certificate in the nature of a life insurance policy then existing in said company should be changed, and that C. C. Chittenden should be a beneficiary in such certificate for $100 only, and that the defendant Amanda M. Doty, who was an aunt and blood relation of the said Fannie E., should be named as beneficiary for the remainder of $4,000, namely, for the sum of $3,900, but on the trust, promise, and agreement of said defendant that she would accept said trust and accept the fund so as to come to her as such beneficiary, and from and out of the same at once hand over and deliver to the plaintiff the sum of $1,950, which the said Fannie E. then and there determined and directed should be paid to the plaintiff. That during said negotiations the said Fannie E. proposed that the plaintiff's wife should be named in said certificate as beneficiary, but in trust, in fact, for the said sum of $1,950, which the said Fannie E. then and there determined and fixed upon as the amount to be paid to the plaintiff of said insurance money; and that the defendant thereupon interfered and urged the said Fannie E. to have the certificate made to her as beneficiary for the said sum of $3,900, at the same time assuring the said Fannie E. that she could safely trust her (the defendant) to perform the trust, and pay over to the plaintiff the said sum of $1,950 to be received on said certificate; and that said Fannie E. and the plaintiff relied on said assurance and agreement of said defendant, and were thereby led to dismiss the suggestion of having the wife of the plaintiff, or some other person named as beneficiary in behalf of the plaintiff for said said sum of $1,950. That up to that time, November 19, 1891, the plaintiff had possession of the then outstanding policy of insurance, and at the request of the said Fannie E. was holding the same for safe-keeping. That the plaintiff, relying upon the promise and agreement of the said defendant, and confiding therein, and in pursuance of the said agreement, thereupon delivered the said policy or certificate of insurance to the said company, and the secretary of said company thereupon made out a blank application for a change of beneficiary, wherein the outstanding certificate was surrendered, and the said association directed to issue and forward to the said Fannie E. a new certificate for the same amount of insurance, in which $1,950 should be payable to this plaintiff, and $100 to said C. C. Chittenden, and the balance to the said E. E. Doty, who was therein to pay all her just debts and all her funeral expenses. That upon the back of such filled-up blank application the said Fannie E. made and signed the following instrument or writing, to wit: “Burke, Wis., Nov. 24, 1891. Mr. Parkinson, (the Sec'y of the Company:) I think this should be changed to read just a little different, like this: R. W. Hurd, $1,950, and he to pay all expenses to present date; C. C. Chittenden, $100; E. E. Doty, the remaining $1,950, and expenses from this date. Please make this change and oblige Fannie E. Nash.” That thereupon the manager of such company wrote a letter to the said Fannie E., bearing date November 24, 1891, saying in effect: “Your note to Mr. Parkinson relative to the change in the reading of your application for a change of beneficiaries, has been referred to me. Replying, I have to say that the statutes under which the association is incorporated declare that its object is to provide for the families of its members and their kindred. ‘Kindred,’ as we understand it, means ‘blood relation.’ We had supposed that the beneficiaries named in your certificate were in accordance with our rules and the statutes of the state, but I have to-day, for the first time, learned that R. W. Hurd does not sustain a relationship to you that would entitle him to be one of your beneficiaries. You will therefore please name such persons for beneficiaries as will be legally entitled to claim insurance in the event of your death, in compliance with the law above quoted in this regard, and oblige.”“P. S. The same objection made to R. W. Hurd applies to E. E. Doty, but in the case of the latter you can substitute your aunt, Mrs. Doty, as beneficiary.” To that letter the said Fannie E. replied, under date of November 25, 1891, to the effect: “Please make out new policy at once leaving C. C. Chittenden $100, and Mrs. A. M. Doty [[[defendant] the remaining $3,900, and oblige.” That on the same day the said Fannie wrote to the plaintiff a letter in these words: “Uncle was in town yesterday and took the policy [application] you sent out to Mr. Briggs. That worthy objects. Uncle [the defendant's husband] will show you his letter to me, so I have it all made out to aunty [the defendant] but the $100 to C. C. C., but she agrees to make it all right, as agreed upon between you the other night. Have not been as well the last two or three days. Come out on the train and see me. You see by the old policy you would have lost it all. Please let uncle [the defendant's husband] take the old policy, so as to have this finished up.” That November 25, 1891, the said Fannie E. signed a blank application for change of beneficiary, filled out by the secretary of the company, whereby she requested the company to “issue and forward to me a new certificate, payable to my relative C. C. Chittenden, $100, and to my aunt Mrs. Amanda M. Doty the sum of $3,900;” whereupon, and on the same day, the company, by its president and secretary, made a new certificate of insurance for not to exceed $4,000, of which $100 was payable to her “relative C. C. Chittenden,” and $3,900 to “her aunt Mrs. Amanda M. Doty.” That said Fannie E. Nash died December 17, 1891, in Dane county. That thereupon, and May 21, 1892, at Madison, the said company paid said $100 to said Chittenden, and $3,900 thereof to the said defendant. That the plaintiff thereupon duly demanded of the defendant that she should deliver to the plaintiff the said $1,950 so received and held by her in trust for him, but she refused to pay over or deliver to him the same, or any part thereof, and denied said trust. That afterwards, and on October 7, 1892, the plaintiff served and filed this bill in equity to have the defendant declared and adjudged a trustee, holding said sum of $1,950 so received by her in trust for the plaintiff. To that complaint, defendant put in an answer taking issue with the allegations of the complaint, and upon the trial the court found the facts in effect as stated, and also found, as conclusions of law, that the defendant holds said $1,950 in trust for the plaintiff, and that said agreement and trust were valid and binding upon the defendant; that her neglect and refusal to pay over to the plaintiff said sum of $1,950 was wrongful, and in fraud of the plaintiff, and the trust under which the defendant received that fund; that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment herein, and to recover of and from the defendant the sum of $1,950, together with interest since the same was received by her, to wit. May 21, 1892, in the sum of $91, together with costs herein to be taxed, and ordered judgment to be entered accordingly thereon. That from the judgment entered...