Hurd v. U.S. Postal Serv.
| Decision Date | 30 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | 8:20-CV-394 |
| Parties | SUSANNE R. HURD, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, POSTMASTER GENERAL, Louis DeJoy; MARK DIMONDSTEIN, President of the American Postal Workers; and FREDRIC V. ROLANDO, President of the National Association of Letter Carriers; Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
This case concerns a dispute over debts owed to the United States Postal Service ("USPS") by its former employee, plaintiff Susanne R. Hurd1, who is proceeding pro se. Now before the Court are motions to dismiss submitted by defendants USPS and Postmaster General Louis DeJoy (collectively "the government defendants"), Filing 24, and Fredric V. Rolando, President of the National Association of Letter Carriers ("NALC"), Filing 13. Also before the Court are Defendants' Joint Motion to Strike Hurd's Amended Complaint, Filing 32; Hurd's motions to strike Rolando's Motion to Dismiss and his reply brief in support of it, Filing 17 and Filing 22; and Hurd's Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, Filing 44. For the reasons stated below, the motions to dismiss are granted, Hurd's motions are denied, and this case is dismissed with prejudice.
Hurd initially filed the present action in state court in September, 2020, and the government defendants removed the case to federal court in October, 2020. Hurd asks the Court to force the USPS to pay back her "2017 and 2018 Federal Taxes plus damages and interest for illegallydefrauding [her] by issuing [her] a demand letter for money that was paid to [her] in a APWU union agreement." Filing 1-1 at 1 (). She alleges that in 2011 she went from being a mail carrier to a clerk for USPS, and the clerks' union, the American Postal Workers Union ("APWU"), won backpay for its members in arbitration2 with USPS, entitling her to backpay. Filing 1-1 at 1. Hurd received a payout from USPS pursuant to the arbitration agreement in 2016, but in April of 2017, she received a notice from USPS demanding she pay back some of the money, as the agency had overpaid her. Filing 1-1 at 1. In 2018 and 2019, she alleges "USPS had the IRS" took her 2017 and 2018 tax refunds "without due process." Filing 1-1 at 1. She further alleges "the unions" (NALC and APWU) refused her "numerous" requests for help, causing USPS to steal her tax refunds. Filing 1-1 at 1.
Hurd's Complaint does not make clear the precise nature of her claims. She does clearly claim that she was deprived of due process and that she did not receive "representation from the unions to fix this issue." Filing 1-1 at 1. Her statement that USPS was "illegally defrauding" her also suggests she contests whether she was obligated to return the money that USPS claimed it overpaid her. See Filing 1-1 at 1.
As defendants in this matter, Hurd named the Postmaster General; USPS; Fredric Rolando, President of the NALC; and Mark Dimondstein, President of the APWU. Filing 1-1 at 1. She did not name NALC and APWU as defendants. See Filing 1-1 at 1. Hurd has not demonstrated service of process on Dimondstein, and he has not appeared in the present litigation. See Filing 43 (Magistrate's order explaining why Hurd's attempt at providing proof of service was insufficient and extending the service deadline).
A total of six motions are now pending before the Court. The government defendants move to dismiss Hurd's claims alleging a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and a failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Filing 24. Rolando moves to dismiss Hurd's claims against him under Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6), asserting the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him, and Hurd fails to state a claim. Filing 13. Hurd moves to strike Rolando's Motion to Dismiss and a brief in support of his motion. Filing 17; Filing 22. Rolando and the government defendants jointly move to strike Hurd's Amended Complaint as improperly filed. Filing 32. Finally, in order to get the Marshals Service to serve Dimondstein, Hurd moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Filing 44 ("I am submitting this form . . . so that the U.S Marshall [sic] will serve Mark Diamondstein [sic] of the APWU."). The Court addresses each motion in turn.
"Rule 12(b)(1) . . . governs challenges to subject matter jurisdiction." Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir. 1990). "In order to properly dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1),3 the complaint must be successfully challenged on its face or on the factual truthfulness of its averments." Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993). "In a facial challenge to jurisdiction, the court presumes all of the factual allegations concerning jurisdiction to be true and will grant the motion only if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction." Young Am. Corp. v. Affiliated Comput. Servs. (ACS), Inc., 424 F.3d 840, 843-44 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Titus, 4 F.3d at 593). In a factual challenge tojurisdiction, "the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Osborn, 918 F.2d at 730.
When the complaint is factually challenged, "[t]he plaintiff bears 'the burden of proving the existence of subject matter jurisdiction,' and [the court] may look at materials 'outside the pleadings'" when determining whether it has jurisdiction. Buckler v. United States, 919 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Herden v. United States, 726 F.3d 1042, 1046 (8th Cir. 2013) (en banc)). "[N]o presumptive truthfulness attaches to [the plaintiff's] allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude [the court] from evaluating . . . the merits of jurisdictional claims." Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 861 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Osborn, 918 F.2d at 730). "It is the court's duty to 'decide the jurisdictional issue, not simply rule that there is or is not enough evidence to have a trial on the issue.'" Buckler, 919 F.3d at 1044 (quoting Osborn, 918 F.2d 724).
"When personal jurisdiction is challenged by a defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden to show that jurisdiction exists." Fastpath, Inc. v. Arbela Techs. Corp., 760 F.3d 816, 820 (8th Cir. 2014). "To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must state sufficient facts in the complaint to support a reasonable inference that defendants may be subjected to jurisdiction in the forum state." Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580, 585 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 2004)); see also K-V Pharm. Co. v. J. Uriach & CIA, S.A., 648 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2011) (). "A plaintiff's prima facie showing 'must be tested, not by the pleadings alone, but by affidavits and exhibits supporting or opposing the motion.'" Fastpath, 760 F.3d at 820 (quoting K-V Pharm., 648 F.3d at 592). If nohearing is held, district courts view "the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve factual conflicts in the plaintiff's favor." Id. [T]he party seeking to establish the court's personal jurisdiction carries the burden of proof and that burden does not shift to the party challenging jurisdiction." Id. (citing Epps v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 327 F.3d 642, 647 (8th Cir. 2003)).
"Due process requires that a non-resident have minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the lawsuit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980)). "Sufficient minimum contacts requires some act by which the defendant 'purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.'" Id. at 821 (quoting J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011)). A defendant's "conduct and connection with the forum State" must be "such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 287.
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In order to satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Corrado v. Life Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 804 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
In analyzing a motion to dismiss, the Court must "accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, but [is] not bound to accept as true '[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements' or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations." McDonough v. Anoka Cnty., 799 F.3d 931, 945 (8th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). "When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court generally must ignore materials outside the pleadings, but it may consider some materials that are part of the public record or do not contradict the complaint, as well as materials that are necessarily embraced by the...
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