Huri v. Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook Cnty.

• Decision Date: 21 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 12–2217.,12–2217.
• Citation: 804 F.3d 826
• Parties: Fozyia HURI, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

804 F.3d 826

Fozyia HURI, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, et al., Defendants–Appellees.

No. 12–2217.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 23, 2015.

Decided Oct. 21, 2015.

Kamran A. Memon, Attorney, Law Offices of Kamran A. Memon, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Mary Ellen Welsh, Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, Patricia M. Fallon, Attorney, Chicago, IL, Susan Ruth Oxford, Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, DC, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before BAUER and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and REAGAN, Chief District Court Judge.^*

Opinion

REAGAN, Chief District Judge.

Fozyia Huri sued her employers at the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, alleging Defendants subjected her to a hostile work environment on the basis of her religion (Islam) and national origin (she hails from Saudi Arabia), and further that they retaliated against her for complaining about that discrimination. Huri brought claims under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16 (“Title VII”), and—claiming her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated—42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The district court disposed of the case at the motion to dismiss stage, concluding Huri failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and, in any event, that her supervisors were entitled to qualified immunity on the constitutional claims. Huri appeals, and for the following reasons we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, construing all well-pleaded facts (and all reasonable inferences from them) in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Doe v. Vill. of Arlington Hts., 782 F.3d 911, 914 (7th Cir.2015) ; Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir.2014). Facts are taken from Huri's Second Amended Complaint.

In 2000, Huri began working at the Circuit Court of Cook County. Her manner of dress marked her as a follower of Islam: she always wore a hijab, an “Islamic head scarf” covering her hair, but not her face. From 2002 through November 2010, she worked as a child care attendant—the only one who was an Arab, and the only one who was a Muslim—under Defendant Sylvia McCullum. McCullum is neither an Arab nor a Muslim; she is a devout (and allegedly vocal) Christian.

According to the Second Amended Complaint, McCullum was unfriendly from the moment the two were introduced. (McCullum, the executive director for all Cook County court system child care attendants, did not even bother to introduce herself to Huri—the only attendant stationed in the same building—for two weeks.) Over the eight years Huri worked for her, McCullum repeatedly told Huri one of her colleagues was a “good Christian” and a “good churchgoing Christian,” that the chief judge was a “good Christian,” and that McCullum herself was a “good Christian.”

In 2009, McCullum ratcheted up the rhetoric, telling a coworker to work with a “good Christian” rather than with Huri, who was “evil.” The same year, McCullum asked several child care attendants to hold hands and, when they did so, McCullum said a prayer “in the name of Jesus Christ.” Further, McCullum falsely criticized Huri, made false misconduct allegations against her, subjected her to different rules than her co-workers, screamed at her, and generally subjected her to greater scrutiny than her co-workers.

Huri filed internal complaints regarding McCullum's behavior. McCullum became aware of those complaints and told Huri that the Chief Judge's Office was uninterested in—and tired of—Huri's complaints. Then, in retaliation for Huri's complaints, McCullum made more false criticisms and allegations of misconduct.

In November 2010, Huri was transferred to the Court Reporters' Office at the Cook County circuit court. Defendants Marilyn Filishio (the Court Reporters' Office Administrator) and James Lawless (Filishio's assistant) generally behaved as badly as McCullum, retaliating against Huri for filing Equal Employment Opportunity complaints (or “charges”) and subjecting her to the same sorts of false allegations, different rules, and greater scrutiny because Huri is a Muslim Arab. Additionally, Filishio and Lawless prohibited Huri from accessing her office early (other employees have 24–hour access), prohibited Huri's daughter from waiting for Huri in the lobby (children of non-Muslim, non-Arab employees are admitted to the lobby and offices), and prohibited Huri (and Huri alone) from having non-work items in the office. They also excluded Huri from a departmental social gathering at the office, and Filishio denied Plaintiff time off for an Islamic religious holiday. Huri repeatedly complained to the Chief Judge's Office, to no effect.

During her travails, Huri filed three complaints (or “charges”) with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). She submitted the first charge pro se in May 2010, and relayed the following regarding her time under McCullum:

I was hired by Respondent on June 5, 2000. My current position is Childcare Attendant. During my employment, I have been subjected to harassment because of my religion and national origin. I filed internal complaints, however, the harassment continued.

I believe I have been discriminated against because of my religion, Muslim, and national origin, Saudi Arabian, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.

I also believe I have been retaliated against for engaging in protected activity, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.

Huri's filed her second charge in April 2011 to correct a technical deficiency in the first.

Huri's third charge, filed in November 2011, relates to her time in the Court Reporters' Office. The detailed third charge lists all the allegations against Filishio and Lawless recounted above. The EEOC issued right-to-sue letters for each charge, and Huri filed suit.

Huri's Second Amended Complaint invoked two statutory provisions: Title VII, which makes it unlawful to discriminate against an employee, retaliate against her, or subject her to a hostile work environment based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which individuals can be held liable for constitutional violations.¹ Huri alleged Defendants subjected her to retaliation for her complaints, and to a hostile work environment because she is Muslim and an Arab.

On Defendants' motions to dismiss, the district court disposed of the entire case. As discussed below, the analysis below is replete with error, so we must remand.

II. Discussion

Huri assigns several errors to the district court. We turn first to whether her Title VII hostile work environment claims—dismissed because the district court determined they were not within the scope of her EEOC charges—should have survived that analysis. Because we answer that question affirmatively, we proceed to examine those claims alongside the Title VII and § 1983 claims, which (with one exception, briefly addressed in Part III, infra. ) fell to the district court's misguided application of the federal pleading standards.

A. Huri's EEOC Charges Support her Title VII Claims

Preliminarily, we agree with Huri that the district court erred in dismissing her Title VII hostile work environment claims for failing to exhaust administrative remedies.

As a precondition to filing claims under Title VII, Huri had to file a charge with the EEOC. See Lavalais v. Vill. of Melrose Park, 734 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir.2013). The primary purpose of the EEOC charge requirement is twofold: it gives the EEOC and the employer a chance to settle the dispute, and it gives the employer notice of the employee's grievances. Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir.1994).

Huri attached three EEOC charges to the Second Amended Complaint. Her first charge (filed pro se ) was submitted in May 2010 and broadly describes “harassment” and discrimination on the basis of her race and national origin, plus retaliation for making internal complaints. Her third charge, filed in November 2011 with the help of counsel, covers her post-transfer period in the Court Reporters' Office and includes very detailed allegations that mirror the Second Amended Complaint.

Courts review the scope of an EEOC charge liberally. Farrell v. Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir.2005). Most EEOC charges are (like Huri's first one) drafted by laypersons rather than lawyers, so a Title VII plaintiff need not include in her charge every fact that, individually or in combination, forms the basis of a subsequent lawsuit's claims. Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500. See also Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 865–66 (7th Cir.1985) (district court “erred by requiring an exact correspondence between the words of the EEOC charge and the judicial complaint”). To be cognizable in federal court, a Title VII claim must simply be “like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such allegations.” Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500. The relevant claim and the EEOC charge must, at a minimum, describe the same conduct and implicate the same individuals. Moore v. Vital Prods., 641 F.3d 253, 257 (7th Cir.2011).

Defendants concede that Huri's November 2011 charge suffices to support her post-transfer allegations, but contend that the May 2010 charge did not describe a hostile work environment (and thus fails to support any Title VII hostile work environment claims pertaining to Huri's time as a child care attendant). The first charge, Defendants claim, mentions discrimination and retaliation, but does not “allege a hostile work environment.”

By highlighting the absence of the phrase “hostile work environment,” Defendants read the first EEOC charge too narrowly. They conveniently overlook simple but important language (emphasis added): “During my employment, I have been subjected to harassment because of my religion and national origin. ...