Hurlburt v. Klein
| Decision Date | 28 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 20CA011607,20CA011607 |
| Citation | 174 N.E.3d 932 |
| Parties | Deborah HURLBURT, Appellant/Cross-Appellee v. Robert KLEIN, Appellee/Cross-Appellant |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
JONATHAN E. ROSENBAUM, Attorney at Law, Elyria, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
JAMES V. BARILLA, Attorney at Law, Elyria, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
{¶1} Deborah Hurlburt appeals a judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas that awarded her $23,374 against Robert Klein. Mr. Klein has cross-appealed the judgment. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.
{¶2} Ms. Hurlburt and Mr. Klein were in a romantic relationship for several years and decided to move in together. Ms. Hurlburt had been living with her mother and wanted to continue to live with her, but the house Mr. Klein owned was too small for all three of them. Mr. Klein therefore agreed to tear down the house and construct a new one. To finance the construction of the new home, Ms. Hurlburt and Mr. Klein each contributed $15,000, and they obtained a loan together for the balance. Although Ms. Hurlburt co-signed the loan, Mr. Klein remained the only person titled on the deed to the property. After the house was completed, Ms. Hurlburt and Mr. Klein both made contributions to a joint account that was used to make payments on the loan.
{¶3} A little over a year after they all moved into the new house, Ms. Hurlbut determined that she could not live with Mr. Klein any longer and moved her mother and herself out. She also stopped contributing toward the loan. After Mr. Klein refused to reimburse her for the payments she had made toward the construction of the house and the repayment of the loan, Ms. Hurlburt filed a complaint against him, seeking the imposition of a constructive trust and the reformation of the deed to the property. Ms. Hurlburt also sued Mr. Klein for partition and quiet title.
{¶4} The case proceeded to a trial before the bench. The court determined that there was no basis for the imposition of a constructive trust but found that Mr. Klein has been unjustly enriched by Ms. Hurlburt's contributions. It awarded Ms. Hurlburt a judgment for the amounts she had initially paid to the builder as well as for additional charges she had paid during construction for flooring, cabinetry, gravel, and landscaping. Ms. Hurlburt has appealed, assigning three errors. Mr. Klein has cross-appealed, assigning one error.
{¶5} In her first assignment of error, Ms. Hurlburt argues that the trial court should have granted the motion for partial summary judgment that she filed before trial. Under Civil Rule 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate if:
[n]o genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.
Temple v. Wean United, Inc. , 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977). To succeed on a motion for summary judgment, the party moving for summary judgment must first be able to point to evidentiary materials that demonstrate there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dresher v. Burt , 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). If the movant satisfies this burden, the nonmoving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264, quoting Civ.R. 56(E). This Court reviews an award of summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. , 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996).
{¶6} In her motion for partial summary judgment, Ms. Hurlburt argued that there were no legitimate questions of fact and that the law recognizes and protects her unrecorded interest in Mr. Klein's property. Upon review of the record, however, we conclude that this issue is moot. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that "[a]ny error by a trial court in denying a motion for summary judgment is rendered moot or harmless if a subsequent trial on the same issues raised in the motion demonstrates that there were genuine issues of material fact supporting a judgment in favor of the party against whom the motion was made." Continental Ins. Co. v. Whittington , 71 Ohio St.3d 150, 642 N.E.2d 615 (1994), syllabus.
{¶7} At trial there was a dispute of fact about the understanding of the parties at the time that they obtained the loan to begin construction of the new house. According to Ms. Hurlburt, the house was going to be their shared property, even though Mr. Klein was the only one whose name would be on the deed. According to Mr. Klein, he only told Ms. Hurlburt that she would be permitted to live on the property until her death, and that he would then donate it to the county park system. There was also a dispute of fact at trial regarding whether the construction of the new house benefitted Mr. Klein or whether he had actually lost equity in the property. We, therefore, conclude that, under Whittington , the issue of whether the trial court erred when it denied Ms. Hurlburt's motion for partial summary judgment is moot. Id. at 156, 642 N.E.2d 615 (). Ms. Hurlburt's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶8} In her second assignment of error, Ms. Hurlburt argues that the court should have imposed a constructive trust on Mr. Klein's property.
A constructive trust is a
Estate of Cowling v. Estate of Cowling, 109 Ohio St.3d 276, 2006-Ohio-2418, 847 N.E.2d 405, ¶ 19, quoting Ferguson v. Owens , 9 Ohio St.3d 223, 225, 459 N.E.2d 1293 (1984). "A constructive trust is considered a trust because ‘when property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee.’ " Id. , quoting Ferguson at 225, 459 N.E.2d 1293. "The party seeking to have a constructive trust imposed bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence." Id. at ¶ 20.
Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere "preponderance of the evidence," but not to the extent of such certainty as is required "beyond a reasonable doubt" in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.
Cross v. Ledford , 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶9} Ms. Hurlburt argues that it was the parties’ intention to share the house and that the only reason she moved out was because Mr. Klein made it intolerable for her to continue to live there. She argues that, because she remains obligated on the note, she cannot obtain financing to build her own house. She notes that she invested the proceeds of the sale of her old house into the construction costs of the shared house, which has increased in value substantially over the past few years. She also notes that Mr. Klein admitted that the situation was not fair to her. According to Ms. Hurlburt, she trusted Mr. Klein when he said that she could live in the new house forever.
{¶10} According to Mr. Klein, he was clear to Ms. Hurlburt that he wanted to remain the only person on the deed because he had lived on the property for approximately 30 years and wanted to live there until his death. He had intended to give Ms. Hurlburt a life estate but had not reformed the deed yet. Mr. Klein testified that, because Ms. Hurlburt stopped paying her share of the loan payments, he could barely afford the loan. He also testified that, although the overall value of the property increased after the new house was built, his equity had dropped, because he had only owed $30,000 on the old house and now owed over $200,000 on the new one.
{¶11} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that determining what is equitable is somewhat imprecise. Estate of Cowling , 109 Ohio St.3d 276, 2006-Ohio-2418, 847 N.E.2d 405, at ¶ 35. Upon review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it determined that equity did not require the imposition of a constructive trust over Mr. Klein's property. Ms. Hurlburt's second assignment of error is overruled.
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