Hurley v. Kent of Naples, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–10298.,13–10298.
• Citation: 746 F.3d 1161
• Parties: Patrick HURLEY, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. KENT OF NAPLES, INC., a Florida Corporation, Kent Security of Palm Beach, Inc., a Florida Corporation, Kent Security Services, Inc., a Florida Corporation, Gil Neuman, individually, Defendants–Appellants, Orly Alexander, individually, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

746 F.3d 1161

Patrick HURLEY, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v. KENT OF NAPLES, INC., a Florida Corporation, Kent Security of Palm Beach, Inc., a Florida Corporation, Kent Security Services, Inc., a Florida Corporation, Gil Neuman, individually, Defendants–Appellants,Orly Alexander, individually, Defendant.

No. 13–10298.

United States Court of Appeals,Eleventh Circuit.

March 20, 2014.

Richard Celler, Keith R. Mitnik, Angeli Murthy, Morgan & Morgan, PA, Plantation, FL, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Frank H. Henry, Bluerock Legal, PA, Miami, FL, Geralyn Farrell Noonan, Geralyn F. Noonan, PA, Fort Myers, FL, for Defendants–Appellants.

Before CARNES, Chief Judge, HULL and COX, Circuit Judges.

COX, Circuit Judge:

The Plaintiff in this case, Patrick Hurley, sued the Defendants for violating the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). See29 U.S.C. § 2615 (providing a cause of action for interfering with an employee's FMLA rights). Hurley, who suffers from depression, contends that the Defendants wrongfully denied his request for eleven weeks of vacation time and terminated his employment. The Defendants contend: that Hurley's request did not qualify for FMLA protection; and, that he was not terminated because he requested leave. At trial, the jury found that Hurley was not terminated because he requested leave, but nevertheless awarded him $200,000 in damages. On appeal, the Defendants contend that Hurley did not qualify for FMLA leave and that the jury returned a verdict inconsistent with the damage award. Because we conclude that Hurley's requested leave did not qualify for FMLA protection, we need not reach the issue of whether the verdict is inconsistent with the damage award.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Patrick Hurley began working for Kent of Naples, Inc., Kent Security Services Inc., and Kent Security of Palm Beach, Inc. in 2001 as the CEO of Kent of Naples, Inc. Defendant Gil Neuman serves as the Chief Executive Officer of Kent of Naples's parent company, Kent Security Services,Inc.¹ Defendant Kent Security of Palm Beach, Inc. is an affiliate of both companies.

The events at issue in this lawsuit began after Hurley had worked for the Kent companies for almost seven years. One night, Hurley sent Neuman an email with the subject line “Vacation Schedule.” ² In the email Hurley said, “attached is my vacation schedule going forward. The dates are subject to change.” (Ex. 32 at 22.) The attached schedule listed eleven weeks of vacation over the next two years. Neuman responded, “Your request has been denied, please schedule a meeting with me to discuss this further.” ( Id.)

Dissatisfied with Neuman's response, Hurley replied that the “email below, which regards my upcoming vacation schedule, was not a request it was a schedule.” (Ex. 32.) Hurley also claimed that “I have been advised by medical/health professionals that my need to avail myself of vacation time that I have earned is no longer optional.” ( Id.) Although not mentioned in the email, Hurley had been suffering from depression and anxiety which produced panic attacks. Hurley closed the letter by accusing Neuman of failing to pay him an overdue bonus and privately ridiculing his ideas.

Neuman called Hurley the next day to discuss the email. The parties dispute what happened next. Hurley said that during this conversation he explained his medical condition and need for leave. Neuman denies that Hurley mentioned his medical condition. Regardless, both parties agree that Neuman terminated Hurley's employment. Neuman said that he terminated Hurley for insubordinate behavior and poor performance.

A week after his termination, Hurley visited his doctor, Carlos Paisan. Dr. Paisan filled out a FMLA form for Hurley, despite knowing that Hurley had already been terminated. In the form, Dr. Paisan noted that Hurley suffered from depression and had received treatment for his condition. But, Dr. Paisan also noted that he could not determine the duration and frequency of any incapacity.³

As a result of these events, Hurley filed this suit in the district court. The complaint alleged two counts. First, Hurley asserted an interference claim. Hurley alleged that the Defendants “interfered with the exercise of Plaintiff's right to unpaid leave, because Defendants terminated Plaintiff's employment as a result of Plaintiff's exercising his right to FMLA leave.” (R. 1 at ¶ 29.) Second, Hurley also asserted a retaliation claim. Hurley alleged that the “Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff for exercising his right to leave, because Defendants terminated Plaintiff's employment as a result of Plaintiff's exercising his right to FMLA leave.” (R. 1 at ¶ 40.) In relation to both counts, Hurley contended that he suffered from a serious medical condition. But, Hurley never alleged that he was unable to work or incapacitated.

Hurley moved for summary judgment on liability in the case, and the Defendants moved for summary judgment on all issues. The Defendants acknowledged that Hurley suffered from depression, but contended that Hurley's leave request was not protected under the FMLA because it was for vacation and Hurley did not have any period of incapacity. Hurley responded that his leave was protected because he had a “chronic serious health condition.”

The district court determined that there was a material factual dispute in the case and denied both summary judgment motions. The district court decided that some evidence supported a finding that Hurley suffered from a “chronic serious health condition,” but never considered whether the leave Hurley requested was for a “period of incapacity or treatment for such incapacity.”

The case proceeded to trial before a jury on Hurley's interference and retaliation claims. In the Joint Pretrial Statement, Hurley requests damages of $451,859.94 in back pay, $451,859.94 in liquidated damages, and $2,962,399 in front pay. All of the damage calculations were based on Hurley's alleged wrongful termination. Hurley did not contend that he suffered any other damages.

At trial, the bulk of the evidence centered on the nature of the leave Hurley planned to take and whether he would be incapacitated. Even though Dr. Paisan filled out Hurley's FMLA form, he testified that he did not mean to imply that Hurley needed medical leave for the dates in the schedule that Hurley sent to Neuman. Instead, Dr. Paisan testified he had never even seen the schedule Hurley submitted and would not have certified FMLA leave for any future dates.

While Hurley maintains that he requested leave for medical reasons, he testified that he and his wife picked the leave days without any input from a healthcare professional. And, Hurley intentionally selected leave dates to overlap with holiday weekends. According to Hurley, his “leave was not intended to predict” when he would be incapacitated because he “just never knew when [he] was going to have an episode or when the panic attacks would come.” (Tr. 768.)

Hurley acknowledged that he did not have any doctor's appointments for these dates. But, Hurley maintained that he planned to schedule treatment as the dates for leave approached. Hurley testified that, had his leave request been granted, he intended to talk to his medical team about “things [he] could do during these times that would help [him] get better.” (Tr. 762.) According to Hurley, he viewed normal vacation activities, like visiting the Grand Canyon, as things that would help him get better. Finally, despite claiming that the vacation schedule he sent to Neuman was “FAR less aggressive than I have been advised to take,” Hurley admitted that no doctor told him to take a specific amount of vacation time.

Hurley's counselor, Fred Stuart, also testified about Hurley's leave request. In the past, Stuart had told Hurley that he needed to get away from work. But, Stuart also testified that he was not telling Hurley to take medical leave. Rather, Stuart testified there was a difference betweenHurley taking time off work to improve his health and necessary medical leave because he could not work.

At the close of Hurley's case, the Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The Defendants contended that although Hurley had a chronic serious health condition, there was no evidence that the leave he requested was for a period of incapacity. The district court denied the motion for judgment as a matter of law and the trial continued.

At trial, the jury returned a puzzling verdict. The jury found that Hurley suffered from a “serious health condition,” that he was an “eligible employee” for FMLA leave, and that he gave proper “notice” under the FMLA. (R. 135 at 1–2.) Then the jury answered the following three questions:

4. That the Plaintiff was entitled to an FMLA benefit denied by Defendant? Answer Yes or No

Jury: YES

5. That the Plaintiff's request for leave was a substantial or motivating factor that prompted the Defendant to terminate the Plaintiff's employment? Answer Yes or No

Jury: NO

6. That the Plaintiff should be awarded damages for actual monetary losses sustained as a direct result of the Defendant's action? Answer Yes or No

Jury: YES

If your answer is Yes, in what amount

Jury: $200,000.00 (R. 135 at 2.)

Hurley had presented no basis at trial for an award of damages except for his termination. Problematically, the jury's verdict found that Hurley's leave request did not cause his termination, but awarded damages for his termination anyway. So, the jury's verdict on Hurley's termination appeared to be inconsistent with the damage award.

After the verdict, the Defendants renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), on the ground that Hurley's leave request did not qualify for protection under the FMLA. The district court denied the motion. The Defendants also moved for a new trial or remittur based on the jury's inconsistent verdict. The district...