Hurley v. Kijakazi
| Decision Date | 29 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 6:21-CV-166-HAI |
| Parties | JANET KIM HURLEY, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
On April 5, 2016, Plaintiff Janet Kim Hurley filed a Title II application for disability insurance benefits. See D.E. 5-4 at 357.[1] Hurley dates the beginning of her disability period to April 1, 2016. Id.
Hurley summarizes her hearing testimony concerning her medical problems. D.E. 17-1 at 2.[2] Hurley claims she is disabled due to a combination of physical conditions. Id. Hurley's medical conditions include:
difficulty with her hearing; suffers from rheumatoid arthritis and diabetes; has trigger finger issues on her right hand and on the first fourth finer and her left hand on the 3rd and 4th fingers; suffers from Addison's disease; chronic kidney disease, stage 2 diabetic retinopathy; and has had trouble with her lower back. She is still treating with Dr. Chaney in regard to these problems. She also suffers from tachycardia as well as fatigue and flare ups which cause her to be very weak. . . . Her diabetic neuropathy causes her problems with her hands and feet. She testified she takes Gabapentin for these problems, but that she still has shooting and burning pain in her feet and toes and that it causes her problems to use both of her hands. Further, in regard to her vision problems, her right eye is totally blurred and she really can't see anything. She has dizziness, feels weak at times. She testified she has carpal tunnel syndrome as well as arthritis in her hands.
Id. at 2-3. The Kentucky State Agency denied Hurley's claims initially on July 18, 2016, and upon reconsideration on August 17, 2016. D.E. 5-4 at 357. Then, on April 17, 2018, upon Hurley's request, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Davida Isaacs conducted an administrative hearing. Id. The ALJ heard testimony from Hurley and impartial vocational expert (“VE”) Martha R. Goss. Id. She was found to not be disabled during the relevant period, from April 1 2016, to August 9, 2018, the date of the decision. Id. at 366.
Hurley appealed the decision. On December 2, 2019, the Appeals Council vacated the hearing decision and remanded the matter after concluding that (1) “[t]he hearing decision [did] not contain an evaluation of a treating source opinion from George R. Chaney, M.D. (Exhibit 11f),” (2) the decision failed to “consider the claimant's degenerative disc disease at step 2 of the sequential evaluation,” and (3) the ALJ erred by evaluating Hurley's past relevant work “as generally performed in the national economy” when it should have been evaluated “as the claimant actually performed it.” D.E. 5-4 at 374-75. On remand, the ALJ was directed to give further consideration to Hurley's maximum residual functioning capacity by evaluating the treating and non-treating source opinions pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527, give further consideration to whether Hurley has past relevant work and if so, can perform it, and, if warranted by the expanded record, obtain evidence from the vocational expert to clarify the effect of the assessed limitations on Hurley's occupational base. Id. at 375.
On July 7, 2020, the ALJ held a second administrative hearing.[3] D.E. 5-3 at 175. The ALJ heard testimony from Hurley and impartial VE Laura Lykins. Id. The ALJ found Hurley to not be disabled during the relevant period, from April 1, 2016 to September 29, 2020, the date of the subsequent decision. Hurley appealed the ALJ's decision again, but this time the Appeals Council denied her claim. Id. at 16.
Hurley brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial review of the ALJ's decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits. Both parties consented to the referral of this matter to a magistrate judge. D.E. 8, 9. Accordingly, this matter was referred to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of a final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. D.E. 10. The Court, having reviewed the record and for the reasons stated herein, DENIES Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (D.E. 17) and GRANTS the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (D.E. 19).
Under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920, an ALJ conducts a five-step analysis to evaluate a disability claim.[4] The ALJ followed these procedures in this case. See D.E. 5-3 at 177-85.
At the first step, if a claimant is working at a substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). In this case, the ALJ found that Hurley had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 1, 2016, the alleged onset date. D.E. 5-3 at 177.
At the second step, if a claimant does not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limit his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, then he does not have a severe impairment and is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). The ALJ found that Hurley experiences the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; diabetes mellitus with mild nonproliferative diabetic retinopathy; stage 2 kidney disease; bursitis in the right shoulder; cubital tunnel/carpal tunnel; gastroparesis/ulcerative colitis; trigger fingers, bilaterally; osteoarthritis in hands; hearing loss; tachycardia; and obesity. D.E. 5-3 at 177.
At the third step, if a claimant's impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, then he is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). The ALJ found Hurley failed to meet this standard. D.E. 5-3 at 179.
If, as here, a claimant is not found disabled at step three, the ALJ must determine the claimant's Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”), which is his ability to do physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite limitations from her impairments. The ALJ found Hurley had the RFC:
to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except she can never climb ladders/scaffolds and can reach overhead with her dominant (right) arm no more than occasionally; can reach bilaterally in front/handle/finger no more than frequently; should avoid unusually hazardous workplaces, such as those with large moving machinery and unprotected heights; cannot drive commercially; and is limited to no more than moderate noise environments.
At the fourth step, if a claimant's impairments do not prevent her from doing past relevant work (given the ALJ's assessment of his residual functional capacity), she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). Composite jobs “have significant elements of two or more occupations, and, as such, have no counterpart in the DOT.” S.S.R. 82-61, 1982 WL 31387 (Jan. 1, 1982). The Social Security Administration's Program Operations Manual System (“POMS”) indicates that, if a claimant's past relevant work qualifies as a composite job, the ALJ does not consider work “as generally performed in the national economy,” and instead compares “the claimant's RFC to a composite job as the claimant performed it.” Burgess v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:15-CV-00701, 2016 WL 5800467, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2016) (citing POMS DI 25005.020B, 2011 WL 4753471). The ALJ may “find the claimant capable of performing the composite job only if he or she can perform all parts of the job.” Id. Here, the ALJ accepted the VE's testimony that the Hurley's past work is a composite job and she “cannot return to this past relevant work as actually performed, due to [her] driving exclusion.” Id. at 184.
At the fifth step, if a claimant's impairments (considering her RFC, age, education, and past work) do not prevent her from doing other work that exists in the national economy, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). If the claimant has solely nonexertional limitations, the Medical-Vocational Guidelines provide a framework for decision-making, and “do not direct conclusions of disabled or not disabled.” S.S.R. 85-15, 1985 WL 56857 (Jan. 1, 1985). The ALJ found Hurley was not disabled at this step. D.E. 5-3 at 184-85. The ALJ found that Hurley had “acquired work skills from past relevant work.” Id. at 184. The ALJ accepted the VE's testimony that Hurley could find work as, for example, office clerk (adult education) and secretary (education). Id. at 185. The ALJ concluded “although claimant's additional limitations do not allow the claimant to perform the full range of light work, considering the claimant's age, education and transferrable work skills, a finding of ‘not disabled' is appropriate under the framework of Medical-Vocational Rule 202.15.” Id.
Accordingly, on September 29, 2020, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, finding that Hurley was not disabled, and was therefore ineligible for disability insurance benefits. The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's decision on August 27, 2021. Id. at 16.
Hurley argues that the ALJ did not follow the Appeals Council's remand order. D.E. 17-1 at 6.
Under the Social Security Act, a “disability” is defined as “the inability to engage in ‘substantial gainful activity' because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment of at least one year's expected duration.” Cruse v Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 539 (6th Cir. 2007). Judicial review of the denial of a claim for Social Security benefits is limited to determining whether the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla of evidence...
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