Hurlow v. Managing Partners, Inc.

Decision Date02 October 2001
Docket NumberNo. 53A04-0011-CV-479.,53A04-0011-CV-479.
Citation755 N.E.2d 1158
PartiesJohn C. HURLOW, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. MANAGING PARTNERS, INC. d/b/a Mars Nightclub, Appellee-Defendant.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Peter L. Obremskey, Todd J. Meyer, Robert J. Donahue, Parr Richey Obremskey & Morton, Lebanon, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Shannon L. Robinson, Kelley, Belcher & Brown, Bloomington, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

OPINION

BAKER, Judge.

Appellant-plaintiff John C. Hurlow appeals the trial court's grant of judgment on the evidence in favor of appellee-defendant Managing Partners, Inc. d/b/a Mars Nightclub (Mars Nightclub) on Hurlow's respondeat superior claim. Specifically, Hurlow contends that the trial court erred in finding that there was no evidence that a Mars Nightclub employee was acting within the scope of his employment when he injured Hurlow.

FACTS

The facts most favorable to Hurlow show that his friend, Chris Maxwell, worked as a bartender for Mars Nightclub. Some time in the spring or early summer of 1996, Maxwell overheard or participated in a conversation between two Mars Nightclub employees, regarding pigeons in the exhaust vents. Subsequently, on his own initiative, Maxwell brought in an air-powered pellet gun to shoot the pigeons if necessary. Maxwell brought in the pellet gun despite Mars Nightclub's policy prohibiting firearms on business premises. Mars Nightclub's general manager and two other employees were present when Maxwell brought in the gun. Maxwell put the pellet gun in the D.J. booth behind a large rack holding amplifiers. On the day Maxwell brought the gun in, Mars Nightclub's general manager quipped, "I wish you wouldn't have shown this to me.... [S]ome nights I might feel like coming back here and using it on someone." Record at 234-35, 240, 254.

Months later, on August 17, 1996, Hurlow gave Maxwell a ride to work. Hurlow and Maxwell arrived at Mars Nightclub at 8:00 p.m., an hour before it opened for business. Hurlow himself had worked at Mars Nightclub from November 1995 through April 1996. So, while Maxwell was setting up the bar for the evening, Hurlow read a newspaper and talked to other Mars Nightclub employees. In setting up the bar, Maxwell was responsible for stocking liquor, napkins, and cups; getting ice; cutting fruit; making popcorn; and generally cleaning the bar. R. at 203, 425, 555. During business hours, Maxwell's duties included serving drinks and collecting money. Maxwell testified that bartenders were also, to some extent, responsible for entertaining the patrons: "When the Macarena would come up we would have to get up on the bar and do it if we weren't busy or acting like we were busy. We were allowed to play games with the customers, you know, just, and I don't know." R. at 205-06.

After Maxwell had finished setting up the bar, he retrieved the pellet gun from behind the D.J. booth. Maxwell told one Mars Nightclub employee that Hurlow did not like guns and he was going to scare him with it. Maxwell testified that as he walked from the D.J. booth to the bar area, he pulled the trigger on the pellet gun three times and it did not discharge. As he walked past the bar area, Maxwell jokingly asked the assistant manager how much he would pay him to shoot out a nearby lava lamp. The assistant manager responded, "Nothing but you'll owe the bar eighty dollars." R. at 243.

Maxwell then alluded to the fact that Hurlow hated guns and immediately shouted Hurlow's name, pointing the gun in Hurlow's direction to frighten him. R. at 243, 477. Hurlow looked at Maxwell, recognized that Maxwell was pointing a gun at him, and turned away. At that point, the pellet gun fired and a pellet struck Hurlow in the head. As a result of the injury, Hurlow suffers from headaches, dizzy spells, difficulty reading and writing, short-term memory loss, and damage to brain tissue where the pellet is still lodged. R. at 479-89, 494-502.

Subsequently, Hurlow filed a one-count complaint against Mars Nightclub, alleging that the business was liable for his injury through respondeat superior. Hurlow later added a claim against Mars Nightclub for negligent supervision of an employee. A jury began hearing Hurlow's claims on July 18, 2000. At the close of Hurlow's case, Mars Nightclub moved for a judgment on the evidence. The trial court granted Mars Nightclub's motion on the respondeat superior claim but not on the negligent supervision claim. The jury ultimately issued a verdict in favor of Mars Nightclub on the negligent supervision claim. Hurlow now brings one issue for our review: the propriety of the trial court's grant of Mars Nightclub's motion for judgment on the evidence.1

DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review

A party may move for judgment on the evidence after the party carrying the burden of proof on an issue has failed to present sufficient evidence to support his claim. Ind.Trial Rule 50(A). In reviewing the grant of judgment on the evidence, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ross v. Lowe, 619 N.E.2d 911, 914 (Ind.1993). The evidence must support without conflict only one inference that is in favor of the defendant. Id. If there is any probative evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence allowing reasonable people to differ as to the result, judgment on the evidence is improper. Id.

II. Respondeat Superior—Liability Through Jocularity

Hurlow contends that Maxwell's shooting of the pellet gun was within the scope of Maxwell's employment at Mars Nightclub. He maintains that even if Maxwell's act was in Maxwell's self-interest, the act partially served Mars Nightclub's interest:

Joking around was part of Maxwell's job expectations as one of Nightclub's bartenders, as it increased Nightclub's business. The pellet gun was brought to the Nightclub to help with its pigeon problem. Nightclub's general manager, upon seeing the pellet gun, joked around about shooting it. Maxwell, working as a Nightclub bartender, retrieved the pellet gun to joke around with it. After first joking around with the assistant manager who did not stop Maxwell, Maxwell joked around with Hurlow, and Hurlow was permanently injured as a result.
....
Given Nightclub's managerial assent and participation, the jury could have concluded that some—if not all—of Maxwell's actions were authorized. Since at least some of Maxwell's actions were authorized by management, the question of whether any unauthorized acts were within the scope of his employment is a question for the jury.

Appellant's brief at 11-12 (emphases supplied).

The doctrine of respondeat superior imposes liability on an employer for the wrongful acts of his employee committed within the scope of employment. Stropes v. Heritage House Childrens Ctr. of Shelbyville, Inc., 547 N.E.2d 244, 247 (Ind.1989). Our supreme court has recently reaffirmed that the critical inquiry focuses on whether the employee is in the service of his employer when he commits the wrongful act. Warner Trucking, Inc. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 686 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind.1997). In other words, even if an employee "violates the employer's rules, orders, or instructions, or engages in expressly forbidden actions," the employer will still be held accountable as long as the employee was acting within the scope of employment. Id. However, an act does not fall within the scope of employment simply because the act could not have occurred without access to the employer's facilities. Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 457 (Ind.Ct.App.1996).

In some circumstances, an employee may be said to have acted within the scope of employment even when committing a crime, thereby rendering the employer liable under respondeat superior. Gomez v. Adams, 462 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind.Ct.App.1984). In Gomez, a security agency had authorized its security officers to request, receive, and retain personal identification while investigating disturbances or making arrests. One of its officers, pursuant to arrest procedure, requested and retained, among other things, the identification and check-cashing card of an arrestee who had created a disturbance. Later the same day while off duty, the security officer forged the arrestee's name on a stolen blank corporate check and cashed it with the help of the arrestee's check-cashing card. This court held that, as matter of law, the forgery occurred outside the scope of employment because it was so divorced "in time, place, and purpose" from Gomez's employment. Id. However, this court did find that the officer's conversion of the arrestee's check-cashing card was within the security officer's scope of employment because the officer had been temporarily authorized to retain the arrestee's identification and personal effects. Id. at 225. Thus, the employer may be vicariously liable if "`[the employee's] purpose, was to an appreciable extent, to further his employer's business, even if the act was predominantly motivated by an intention to benefit the employee himself.'" Warner Trucking, 686 N.E.2d at 105 (alteration added) (quoting Stropes, 547 N.E.2d at 247).

In addition to determining whether the employee's act furthered the employer's business interest, a court also examines the association between the employee's authorized acts and his unauthorized acts. See id. (holding that an employer may also be liable if an employee's act "`originated in activities so closely associated with the employment relationship as to fall within its scope'") (quoting Stropes, 547 N.E.2d at 247). If there is a sufficient association between the authorized acts and the unauthorized acts, the unauthorized acts may fall within the scope of employment. Stropes, 547 N.E.2d at 250; Konkle, 672 N.E.2d at 457. When a finding is made that some of the employee's acts were authorized, then the question of whether the unauthorized acts were within the scope of the employment goes to the jury. Konkle, 672 N.E.2d at 457....

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