Huron-Clinton Metro. Auth. v. Bds. of Sup'rs of Wayne, Washtenaw, Livingston, Oakland & Macomb Counties

• Decision Date: 05 January 1942
• Docket Number: Motion No. 28.
• Citation: 1 N.W.2d 430,300 Mich. 1
• Parties: HURON-CLINTON METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY v. BOARDS OF SUP'RS OF WAYNE, WASHTENAW, LIVINGSTON, OAKLAND and MACOMB COUNTIES et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

300 Mich. 1

1 N.W.2d 430

HURON-CLINTON METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY

v.BOARDS OF SUP'RS OF WAYNE, WASHTENAW, LIVINGSTON, OAKLAND and MACOMB COUNTIES et al.

Motion No. 28.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Jan. 5, 1942.

Original mandamus proceeding by the Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority, a public corporation, against the Boards of Supervisors of the Counties of Wayne, Washtenaw, Livingston, Oakland and Macomb, and others.

Order in accordance with opinion.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone and Louis H. Fead, all of Detroit (John C. Spaulding, of Detroit, and Edwin C. Goddard, of Ann Arbor, of counsel), for plaintiff.

William E. Dowling, Pros. Atty., Samuel Brezner, Asst. Pros. Atty., Henrietta E. Rosenthal, Asst. Pros. Atty., and Ralph E. Helper, Asst. Pros. Atty., all of Detroit, for Wayne County.

George Meader, Pros. Atty., of Ann Arbor, for Washtenaw County.

Joe P. Gates, Pros. Atty., of Howell, for Livingston County.

Ivan A. Johnston, Pros. Atty., of Mt. Clemens, for Macomb County.

Jay P. Sweeney, Acting Pros. Atty., of Howell, for Livingston County.

Charles L. Wilson, Pros. Atty., and Harry J. Merritt, Corp. Counsel, both of Pontiac, for respondent Oakland County and another.

NORTH, Justice.

This is a mandamus proceedings instituted in this Court. By Act No. 147, Pub.Acts 1939 provision was made for the creation of the Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority, which we herein designate as the Authority. Section 1 of the act provides: ‘As may hereinafter be provided in this act, the counties of Wayne, Washtenaw, Livingston, Oakland, and Macomb, or certain of such counties, may by vote of the electorate thereof, join to form a metropolitandistrict as a body corporate, to be known as the Huron-Clinton metropolitan authority, for the purpose of planning, promoting, and/or for acquiring, constructing, owning, developing, maintaining and operating, either within or without their limits, parks and/or limited access highways, as well as such connecting drives as may be deemed necessary or convenient to provide access to and between the same.’

Section 3 provides that the Authority in accomplishing its purposes may act alone or in cooperation with the department of conservation, the state highway department, any board of county road commissioners, or any federal or other state or local body having authority to construct or maintain parks or highways; and that: ‘Said authority may fix and collect fees and charges for use of facilities under its control, and, for its uses, may sell or purchase lands and may acquire and succeed to any or all the rights, obligations, and property pertaining to parks or highways of the state or of any county, city, village, or township comprising territory within the limits of the said metropolitan district: Provided, That no county, city, village, or township shall surrender any such rights, obligations, or property without the approval thereof by a majority vote of the electors of any such county, city, village or township, voting on such proposition.’

The Authority is directed and governed by a board of commissioners. One commissioner is elected by the board of supervisors from each county comprising the Metropolitan district, and two commissioners are appointed by the Governor. In each of the five counties named in the above quoted section 1 the electors have voted to adopt the statutory plan for the Authority; and subsequently the commissioners were elected or appointed, and they have organized in the manner provided by statute. Section 7 of the act reads:

‘The commissioners may levy for the purposes of the authority a tax of not more than one-quarter mill upon each dollar of the assessed value of the property of the district. The board shall asscertain the total taxes or appropriation required for any year and shall thereupon certify to the board of supervisors of each county comprising the district the necessary tax rate to raise such amount, which shall be uniform in the district, and shall take into consideration the ratio that the total assessed valuation of each respective county bears to the total assessed value of all property, real and personal in said entire district according to he last assessment in each of saic respective counties. All taxes shall be assessed, levied, collected and returned as county taxes under the general property tax law. All moneys collected by any tax collecting officer from the tax levied under the provisions of this section shall be transmitted to the authority to be disbursed as provided in this act.

‘The subjects of taxation for the district purposes shall be the same as for state, county, and school purposes under the general law.’

The Authority acting through its board of commissioners on May 28, 1941, adopted a tentative budget in the amount of $163,235 for carrying out its purposes for the ensuing year and determined a tax should be levied at a maximum rate of 1/20 of one mill upon each dollar of the assessed valuation of the property in the Metropolitan district; and at a later meeting on July 12, 1941, the Authority confirmed the above action but with some modification or revision of the budget. And on September 9, 1941, the Authority adopted a resolution which provided for the levying of this tax and requested the boards of supervisors of the five counties to levy the tax in such counties. A request of the Authority was timely filed with the county clerk of each of the five counties named for an allocation of 1/20 of one mill on each dollar of assessed valuation for the ensuing tax year. In the counties of Washtenaw, Livingston and Macomb the county tax allocation board allocated a maximum rate of 1/20 of one mill for the purposes of the Authority and ordered this 1/20 of one mill to be taken out of the total allocated county tax rate. Similar action seems to have been taken in Wayne county by the tax allocation board on June 2nd, 1941, but was rescinded July 15, 1941, and all of the county tax was allocated to the county purposes. No action was taken by the tax allocation board of Oakland county.

It is alleged in plaintiff's petition that under section 14 of Act No. 62, Pub.Acts 1933, as amended (Stat.Ann. § 7.74), it was the duty of the defendant Edward H. Williams, chairman of the Wayne county tax allocation board, to call a meeting of the chairmen of the tax allocation boards of the five counties comprising the Metropolitan district for their action in passing on and approving the maximum tax rate for the purposes of the Authority; and that Edward H. Williams as chairman of the Wayne county tax allocation board was requested to call a joint board meeting consisting of the chairmen of the tax allocation boards in these five counties for that purpose. Plaintiff in its petition further alleges that notwithstanding a request and a formal demand was made by it upon Edward H. Williams to call a meeting of the joint allocation board of the Metropolitan district for the stated purpose he has refused to call such meeting on the ground that Act No. 147, Pub.Acts 1939 is unconstitutional. It is also alleged that the determination of the Authority as to the levying of this tax was likewise certified to the board of supervisors of each of the five counties; and after such certification the board of supervisors of Oakland county adopted a resolution refusing to spread, approve or levy any tax for the purposes of the Authority for the ensuing year; such action being taken on the ground that the Oakland county board of supervisors had been advised that Act No. 147, Pub.Acts 1939 was unconstitutional. And it is alleged in the petition that, notwithstanding they have been in session, the boards of supervisors of Wayne and Macomb counties have failed to take any action in response to the certification served upon them by the Authority; and that at the time the petition herein was filed the boards of supervisors of Washtenaw and Livingston counties had not yet convened in the 1941 fall session.

On filing of plaintiff's petition an order to show cause issued, and the several respondents have made answer and return thereto. The officials of Washtenaw and Livingston counties concede the constitutionality of Act No. 147. Mandamus is sought to compel such action on the part of defendants as is necessary to secure the levy and collection of the tax for the use of the Authority. But, as hereinbefore indicated, some of respondents deny plaintiff's right to the relief sought mainly on the ground that Act No. 147, Pub.Acts 1939, is unconstitutional. This presents the principal issue.

Subject only to limitations and restrictions imposed by the State or Federal Constitution, the State legislature is the repository of all legislative power. Constitutional provisions are to be regarded as limitations, not grants of such power. Doyle v. Election Commission, 261 Mich. 546, 246 N.W. 220.

‘In passing upon the constitutionality of State legislation, it is necessary to point out in the Constitution of the State the limitation which has been placed by the people through the Constitution upon the power of the legislature to act, before it may be declared unconstitutional.’ In re Brewster St. Housing Site, 291 Mich. 313, 333, 289 N.W. 493, 500.

‘The legislative authority of the state can do anything which it is not prohibited from doing by the people through the Constitution of the state or of the United States.’ Attorney General v. Montgomery, 275 Mich. 504, 538, 267 N.W. 550, 563.

We are not in accord with respondents' contention that Act 147 of the Pub.Acts of 1939 is violative of article 5, § 30, of the State Constitution which provides that the legislature shall not pass a local or special act ‘where a general act can be made applicable, and whether a general act can be made applicable shall be a judicial question.’ This Court might well take judicial notice that there are conditions prevalent in the designated Metropolitan area which...