Hurst v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., S-17-0082.

• Decision Date: 12 September 2017
• Docket Number: S-17-0082.
• Citation: 401 P.3d 891
• Parties: Sara E. HURST, Individually, and Sara E. Hurst, as the Duly Appointed Wrongful Death Representative of the Estate of Larry G. Hurst, Appellants, (Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs), v. METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee, (Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

401 P.3d 891

Sara E. HURST, Individually, and Sara E. Hurst, as the Duly Appointed Wrongful Death Representative of the Estate of Larry G. Hurst, Appellants, (Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs),

v.METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee, (Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant).

S-17-0082.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

September 12, 2017

Representing Appellants: Autumn Aspen, John Coppede, Quinton Parham, and Richard D. Bush of Hickey & Evans, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Bush.

Representing Appellee: Megan Overmann Goetz of Pence and MacMillan, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, DAVIS, KAUTZ, JJ., and KRICKEN, D.J.

KRICKEN, District Judge.

[¶1] On May 31, 2014, Larry Hurst was killed and Sara Hurst, seriously injured, while riding their bicycles after a vehicle, driven by Hannah Terry (Terry), negligently and consecutively struck each of their bicycles. Terry was not insured at the time. Thereafter, the Hursts filed a claim with their uninsured motorist insurance carrier, Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company (MetLife), who, in turn, filed a Complaint for Interpleader against Sara Hurst; the Estate of Larry Hurst (collectively, the Hursts); and Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wyoming,¹ seeking an order that the defendants interplead and settle their rights to the uninsured motorist (UIM) coverage provided for in the Hursts' MetLife policy (the Policy). The Policy provided UIM coverage/benefits in the amount of "$300,000 each person/$300,000 each accident." MetLife contended that the injuries to the Hursts and caused by Terry were the result of one (1) accident, resulting in a maximum of $300,000 in coverage. The Hursts argued that their injuries were the result of two (2) accidents, warranting $600,000 in coverage. The Hursts and MetLife filed cross-motions for summary judgment, along with a stipulation of the underlying facts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of MetLife, finding there was only one (1) accident for purposes of determining the amount of UIM coverage. The Hursts appealed. We reverse and remand, concluding that, although the district court adopted the correct legal theory upon which to determine the number of accidents for application of UIM coverage and policy limits, the factual record is insufficient for a legal conclusion as to whether Terry maintained or regained control of her vehicle during her collisions with the Hursts. As a result, summary judgment was improperly granted.

ISSUE(S)

[¶2] In their appeal, the Hursts present the following issue(s):

1. Did the district court err in its ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment that there was one (1) rather than two (2) accidents for purposes of determining the amount of uninsured motorist coverage for Joint-Appellants Larry and Sara Hurst who were separately struck by an uninsured motorist while on bicycles?

Stated more specifically:

(a) Did the district court adopt the correct theory, i.e. causation, to determine there was one (1) accident in a case involving uninsured motorist coverage?

(b) Did the district court correctly apply the causation theory to determine there was one (1) accident in light of the stipulated facts?

(c) Did the district court correctly apply the Matty decision, which it relied on, to determine there was only one (1) accident?

(d) Did the district court properly construe/interpret the uninsured motorist coverage to determine that one (1) accident, a term that is undefined in the applicable policy, occurred on May 31, 2014?

MetLife generally agrees, phrasing the issue as:

Whether the district court correctly determined there was "one accident" at issue in this matter.

FACTS

[¶3] The parties stipulated to the following facts before the district court, as follows:

On May 31, 2014, at approximately 12:10 p.m., Larry and Sara were riding separate bicycles and headed south in the 4000 block of Coffeen Avenue/US Highway 87 near the city of Sheridan, state of Wyoming. Sara was riding her bicycle approximately thirty (30) feet in front of Larry. Both bicycles were being ridden on the shoulder of the road, within the emergency lane, and out of the lane of traffic.

At approximately 12:10 p.m. on May 31, 2014, Hannah Terry, driving a 2012 Dodge Caravan (minivan), was also traveling south on Coffeen Avenue at a speed of approximately fifty (50) MPH when her minivan entered the emergency lane (shoulder of the road).

...

After entering the emergency lane, the left front of her minivan struck Larry's bicycle from behind, throwing Larry from his bicycle and over the roof of the minivan. Larry was thrown approximately 166 feet following impact with the minivan....

After striking Larry, the minivan continued to travel in the emergency lane for approximately thirty (30) more feet before it struck Sara's bicycle from behind. After being struck by the left front of the minivan, Sara's bicycle was pushed by the minivan until it came to a stop. Sara remained on the hood of the minivan after it struck her. At some point following the impact, Sara also struck the windshield of the minivan....

There was approximately one-half (1/2) to one (1) second between Hannah Terry first striking Larry Hurst and subsequently striking Sara Hurst with the minivan.

...

Larry succumbed to his injuries shortly after being struck by the minivan, which was a direct result of the negligent driving of Hannah Terry....

Sara sustained multiple serious physical injuries and trauma as a result of the negligent driving of Hannah Terry, including a concussion, collapsed lung(s), pulmonary contusion, internal bleeding, a thoracic fracture, as well as fractures to her leg and ribs.....

The minivan showed no mechanical failure and appeared to be in good condition.

The roadway was in good condition and was not a factor.

The weather was good and was not a factor.

Both bicycles ridden by the Hursts were in good condition and were not factors.

Both bicycles ridden by the Hursts were about 2.5 to 3 feet inside the shoulder of the road and were not an obstacle to traffic.

Hannah Terry had sufficient sight distance before striking the bicycles ridden by the Hursts.

Hannah Terry had driven her vehicle onto the shoulder of the road when she struck the bicycles ridden by the Hursts, even though there were no obstacles in the road.

(Internal paragraph numbers omitted.)

[¶4] On the date of these events, Terry was an uninsured driver. The Hursts were named insureds on an automobile liability insurance policy they purchased from MetLife (the Policy). The Policy provided uninsured motorist (UIM) coverage in the amount of "$300,000 each person/$300,000 each accident."

[¶5] The Policy endorsement for UIM coverage provided, in relevant part:

"Limit of Liability"

A. The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each person" is the most we will pay for all damages, including prejudgment and post-judgment interest, due to BI to any one person as a result of any one accident. This includes all damages sustained by any other person as a result of that BI. Subject to this limit for "each person", the limit shown in the declarations for "each accident" is the most we will pay for all damages, including prejudgment and post-judgment interest, arising out of BI sustained by two or more persons resulting from any one accident.

If a single limit is shown in the Declarations for "each accident" this is the most we will pay for any one accident....

The limit of liability includes damages for care, loss of consortium, emotional distress, and loss of services or death.

This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of:

1. insureds;

2. claims made;

3. vehicles shown in the Declarations;

4. premiums shown in the Declarations; or

5. vehicles involved in the accident.

(Emphasis added.)

[¶6] Based on the Policy language, MetLife deposited $300,000 with the district court in the underlying interpleader action, asserting that amount represented its full policy limits for the one accident that resulted in injuries to the Hursts. The Hursts disagreed and argued, instead, that policy limits were $600,000, in accordance with the Policy, as their injuries were a result of two accidents. The Policy did not define "one accident."

[¶7] After cross-motions for summary judgment were filed, the district court applied a legal doctrine known as the "cause theory" to conclude that only one (1) accident had occurred and, thus, MetLife's policy limit for UIM coverage was $300,000. This appeal by the Hursts followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶8] The parties agree, as does this Court, that a de novo standard of review applies for determining the grant of summary judgment. See Blagrove v. JB Mech . , 934 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Wyo. 1997). This Court affords no deference to the district court's ruling and, instead, reviews a "summary judgment in the same light as the district court, using the same materials and following the same standards." Lindsey v. Harriet , 2011 WY 80, ¶ 18, 255 P.3d 873, 880 (Wyo. 2011). When, as here, the district court resolved the case by the grant and denial of cross-motions for summary judgment, "both the grant and the denial of the motions for a summary judgment are subject to appeal" if the decision completely resolves the case. Lindsey , ¶ 18, 255 P.3d at 880 (quoting Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC , 11 P.3d 353, 356 (Wyo. 2000) ).

ANALYSIS

[¶9] The sole issue in this appeal revolves around the meaning of "any one accident," as contained in the Hursts' UIM coverage language in the Policy. That term is not defined therein.

The Language of the Policy

[¶10] When summary judgment is based upon interpretation of an insurance policy, the rules of contract interpretation apply. See St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Albany County Sch. Dist. No. 1 , 763 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Wyo. 1988). "Interpretation of the contractual language is a matter of law for the court, provided the language is clear and unambiguous. If the language is not clear or there are other material issues of fact,...