Hurst v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 09 February 2012
• Docket Number: Civ. Action No. 10-1001-GMS
• Parties: JERRY A. HURST, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

JERRY A. HURST, Plaintiff,

v.STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants.

Civ. Action No. 10-1001-GMS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

Dated: February 9, 2012

MEMORANDUM

I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff, Jerry A. Hurst ("Hurst"), who proceeds pro se, filed this lawsuit on November 22, 2010, alleging violations of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2121 through 2725, that in turn violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Hurst's right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Hurst further alleges conspiracy, retaliation, fraud, abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with a contract, tortious interference with business relations, inadequate hiring, training, supervision and discipline, and breach of contract. He also alleges, generally, constitutional claims and State law claims. (D.I. 2.)

Before the court are motions to dismiss filed by the defendants United National Insurance Company ("UNIC"), the City of Rehoboth Beach ("Rehoboth Beach"), Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company ("HMIC"), Marty Harbin ("Harbin"), Colin Shalk ("Shalk"),¹ KevinConnors ("Connors"), Keith Banks ("Banks"), Walter Speakman ("Speakman"),² Guy Harbert ("Harbert"), Maxwell Wiegard ("Wiegard"), and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm").³ (D.I. 23, 26,28, 29, 32,43,44, 51, 60, 61, 64.) Also before the court are UNIC's motion for leave to file excess pages of its memorandum of law, Hurst's motion to strike the motions to dismiss, Hurst's request for default as to Banks, Hurst's motion to substitute a personal representative for Speakman, and Speakman's motion to substitute a party. (D.I. 25, 36, 38, 66, 70.) For the reasons that follow, the court will grant the motions to dismiss and will direct the Clerk of Court to close the case.

II. BACKGROUND

This action stems from State Farm's denial of an insurance claim made by Hurst for the April 3, 2001 theft of his customized van. The court takes judicial notice that Hurst has filed four other lawsuits regarding the theft of the van, as follows:

1. Hurst v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Civ. No. 04-1350-TSE-BRP (E.D. Va.), a RICO action against State Farm, Harbin, David L. Jones ("Jones"), Marshall Major ("Major"),and John D. McGavin ("McGavin"), dismissed on November 15, 2004. Hurst did not appeal the dismissal.

2. Hurst v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Civ. No. 05-1279-GBL-TRJ (E.D. Va.), filed November 7, 2005, alleging that State Farm breached the terms of an automobile insurance policy when it denied Hurst's claim for the 2001 theft of his van. Hurst attached as an exhibit to the complaint a non-redacted Affidavit of Vehicle Theft ("the Affidavit"). The complaint also alleged fraud, conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The matter was transferred from the Eastern District of Virginia to the Western District of Virginia on December 21, 2005, Hurst v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., Civ. No. 05-776-GEC (W.D. Va.), and summary judgment was granted in favor of State Farm, affirmed on appeal, on April 29, 2009.

3. Hurst v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Civ. No. 08-2907-WMN (D. Md.), a RICO action against State Farm, Harbin, Jones, Major, and McGavin, dismissed on November 19, 2008, as barred by res judicata, affirmed on appeal on April 29, 2009.

4. Hurst v. City of Salisbury, Civ. No. 10-2516-WDG, alleging violations under the federal criminal code, as well as breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, bad faith and intentional infliction of emotional distress, against the City of Salisbury, Chief Webster, Captain Wiley, Officer Smullen, State Farm, Major, Harbin, McGavin, Wiegard, and Harbert, dismissed as barred by res judicata and, in the alternative, as time-barred, affirmed on appeal, on May 31, 2011.

The instant complaint contains fifteen counts: (1) Count I alleges violations of the DPPA; (2) Count II alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by reason of the DPPA violations;(3) Count III alleges violations of privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution by reason of the DPPA violations; (4) Count IV alleges constitutional violations of the right to privacy by publicizing private facts and by false light; (5) Count V alleges conspiracy; (6) Count VI alleges retaliation; (7) Count VII alleges fraud, fraudulent concealment, and fraud on the court; (8) Count VIII alleges abuse of process; (9) Count IX alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress; (10) Count X alleges tortious interference with contractual relations; (11) Count XI alleges tortious interference with business relations; (12) Count XII alleges inadequate hiring, training, supervision, and discipline; (13) Count XIII alleges breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and privacy policy; (14) Count XIV alleges constitutional claims; and (15) Count VX alleges State law claims. Hurst seeks statutory, compensatory, and punitive damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief.

UNIC and HMIC, as insurers, provided a defense for Rehoboth Beach in lawsuits Hurst filed against it. Attorney Shalk was retained to represent Rehoboth Beach and Speakman, the city solicitor for Rehoboth Beach. Connors was retained to represent Banks, chief of police for Rehoboth. Attorneys Wiegard and Harbert were retained to represent State Farm in lawsuits Hurst filed against it. Harbin is a State Farm representative. (D.I. 2, ¶¶ 15,19.)

The instant complaint alleges that Hurst received a November 24, 2008 letter from State Farm, "confessing" that State Farm, through its outside agents and legal counsel, disclosed Hurst's "personal information," including Hurst's social security number, driver identification number, address, and other information that identifies an individual, in violation of the DPPA. The complaint alleges that it was not until Hurst received the November 24,2008 letter that hebecame aware of the disclosure. The November 24, 2008 letter is not attached to the complaint. (D.I. 2, ¶¶ 1,10,11.)

The complaint alleges that, at an earlier time, the information was sent by Harbert, who along with Wiegard, was counsel for State Farm, to Shalk who was retained to defend Rehoboth Beach and Speakman in Hurst v. City of Dover, Civ. No. 04-083-GMS (D. Del.) ("the Dover case")⁴ and in Hurst v. City of Rehoboth Beach, Civ. No. 03-362-SLR (D. Del.) ("the Rehoboth Beach case").⁵ The court takes judicial notice that the Affidavit, the document in question, is on a State Farm form and had been attached as an exhibit to a complaint Hurst filed on November 7, 2005, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against State Farm in Civ. No. 05-1279-GBL-TRJ (E.D. Va.). It contains Hurst's personal information. The court takes further judicial notice that Shalk filed the Affidavit in the Rehoboth Beach case on November 29, 2006 (Rehoboth Beach, Civ. No. 03-362-SLR, D.I. 182, ex. B) and in the Dover case on November 12, 2008, (Dover, Civ. No. 04-083-GMS at D.I. 136, ex. 9B.) Hurst alleges that State Farm approved the "DPPA violations" as a bad faith settlement tool to coerce him to settle his insurance claim. (D.I. 2, at ¶¶ 3, 8.) He further alleges that the use of the information in the Affidavit is ongoing and its continued use violates the DPPA daily. (Id. at ¶ 11.)

In addition, the complaint alleges: (1) that each attorney, in representing his or her client, acted as an agent of the insurers or the insured; (2) that all actions taken were in accordance with, and implemented, the policies, customs and practices of the insurers and employers that have been in place since 2001; (3) that State Farm, and its agents and counsel, violated State Farm's contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing to protect Hurst's personal information; (4) that State Farm used its performance, planning, and review program for the purpose of retaliating against Hurst for his unwillingness to accept an inadequate settlement; (5) a conspiracy between State Farm and Shalk, as well as among all defendants for violations of the DPPA and federal statutes of obstruction of justice, wire fraud, mail fraud and related federal and state laws; and (6) that all defendants conspired against Hurst, not only to settle with State Farm in ongoing Virginia litigation, but also to intimidate, coerce, prevent and dissuade him from continuing in the Dover case.⁶ (D.I. 2 at ¶¶10,12, 13, 14, 17, 23,24.)

All defendants move for dismissal under numerous theories pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Hurst opposes the motions to dismiss and moves to strike the motions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(6) permits a party to move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.89, 93 (2007). Because Hurst proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."⁷ Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).

A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). When determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the court conducts a two-part analysis. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the factual and legal elements of a claim are separated. Id. The court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. at 210-11. Second, the court must determine whether the facts...