Hurst v. State, No. 4-983A311

• Docket Nº: No. 4-983A311
• Citation: 464 N.E.2d 19
• Case Date: June 06, 1984
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

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464 N.E.2d 19 Kenneth Wayne HURST, Appellant (Defendant Below),
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). No. 4-983A311. Court of Appeals of Indiana,
Fourth District. June 6, 1984.

Thomas M. Carusillo, Elkhart, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Louis E. Ransdell, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

MILLER, Judge.

Defendant-appellant Kenneth Wayne Hurst is before us appealing his two consecutive sentences for the delivery of LSD to two undercover police officers. Hurst's plea for the reexamination of this 1982 case rests upon allegations of error in the following:

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1. Did the trial court err in admitting the State's two exhibits of LSD without establishing a complete chain of custody?

2. Was it error for the trial court to overrule Hurst's objection to testimony that Hurst had allegedly been observed selling cocaine to a third party prior to the instant offenses?

3. Under the facts of this case, was Hurst improperly convicted for two deliveries of LSD when both sales took place at the same time?

4. Was the verdict contrary to law?

We affirm the convictions but remand for correction of sentence.

FACTS

During the course of their covert narcotics investigations, two undercover officers of the Elkhart Police Department became acquainted with various subjects involved with drugs. They thereby became familiar with the name "Fish" or "Fishback" as a dealer. The two officers went to the Fishback (later identified as the appellant Hurst) residence, in order to purchase drugs. After negotiating for the sale of LSD, Hurst informed the officers he would have to first get it from his source and would need payment in advance. The male officer handed him $60 for twenty hits; the female officer, $30 for ten hits. Hurst later met the two at the Astrobowl Bowling Alley, and he and a juvenile subject entered their undercover vehicle. The juvenile lent Hurst a pocket knife, and Hurst proceeded to cut the perforated LSD hits from a sheet of white paper. He cut twenty squares, put them in cellophane from a cigarette package and gave them to the male officer. He cut an additional ten, folded them in a piece of paper, and gave them to the female officer. About a half hour later, the two officers met with Detective Sergeant Slayton for the purpose of turning over the evidence. Each placed his or her respective purchase in an individual evidence bag which they then signed, followed by Slayton also signing. Slayton deposited the sealed evidence in a specially designated evidence room to which there exist only two keys, Slayton's and a Lieutenant Thomas's. Thomas was the receiving officer and noted receipt of the evidence in his logbook. He later removed the exhibits from the evidence room for certified mailing to the State Police Laboratory in Lowell. Typically, when such evidence reaches the lab, it is stored in a safe. It was from there that Troy Ballard, the police chemist, removed the two instant exhibits for the laboratory testing which identified each as LSD. Ballard then sealed each exhibit in different bags, the seals of which remained intact at trial. They were then sent back to Elkhart via certified mail where Thomas signed for them and returned them to the evidence room.

On the basis of this evidence, Hurst was convicted of two counts of delivering a controlled substance and was sentenced to two consecutive ten-year terms.

DECISION

Chain of Custody

In the case of fungible items presented as evidence, especially narcotics, all the State is required to do is establish a sufficient chain of custody to "strongly suggest" the whereabouts of the evidence from the moment of seizure until introduction at trial. Holt v. State, (1980) 272 Ind. 544, 400 N.E.2d 130; Lewandoski v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 4, 389 N.E.2d 706. Hurst has provided us with no evidence which would cast any suspicion that these exhibits had been tampered with. See, e.g., Guthrie v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 356, 260 N.E.2d 579; Bonds v. State, (1973) 158 Ind.App. 579, 303 N.E.2d 686. The facts above, as elicited from testimony at trial, strongly suggest that the LSD exhibits remained in police custody throughout the proceedings, without harm to their integrity. There was no error in their admission.

Evidence of Prior Criminal Activity

While testifying, one of the officers mentioned he had observed Hurst prior to the instant offense. When the prosecutor

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asked him to elaborate, he explained that he had observed Hurst deliver a package of what he believed to be cocaine to a third party. Defense counsel objected to this testimony and requested the jury be admonished. The basis of this objection was that because there was no actual evidence cocaine was indeed involved in the observed exchange, the evidence was prejudicial to his client's case. The trial court overruled the objection. On appeal, Hurst elaborates on his allegation of error by claiming that evidence of any prior criminal activity is inadmissible in Indiana and that such evidence here denied him a fair trial. Without having to determine whether this evidence would fit within any of the exceptions to this general rule (see, e.g., Malone v. State, (1982) Ind., 441 N.E.2d 1339) or was erroneously admitted, we find no cause for reversal.

For us to order reversal, we would have to find that the improper evidence had a prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations. Williams v. State, (1981) Ind., 426 N.E.2d 662; Otto v. State, (1980) Ind.App., 398 N.E.2d 716. In light of the overwhelming evidence of Hurst's guilt presented at trial, we cannot say that error in the admission of this evidence was anything but harmless. See Howell...