Hurst v. West

• Decision Date: 11 March 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. TDC-17-2411
• Parties: PAUL MARTIN HURST, Petitioner, v. WALTER WEST, Warden, and BRIAN E. FROSH, The Attorney General of the State of Maryland, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

PAUL MARTIN HURST, Petitioner, v. WALTER WEST, Warden, andBRIAN E. FROSH,The Attorney General of the State of Maryland, Respondents.

Civil Action No. TDC-17-2411

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

March 11, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner Paul Martin Hurst, an inmate at the Eastern Correctional Institution ("ECI") in Westover, Maryland, has filed a self-represented Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the validity of his conviction and sentence after he pleaded guilty to attempted first-degree murder in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, Maryland. Court-appointed counsel has filed a Supplemental Petition, and the matter is now fully briefed. Upon review of the submitted materials, the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts ("Section 2254 Rules"); D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, the Petition will be DISMISSED and DENIED.

BACKGROUND

I. Conviction and Sentence

On August 25, 2014, Hurst was indicted in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County ("the Circuit Court") on charges of attempted first-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, first-degree assault, second-degree assault, reckless endangerment, and two counts of wearing and carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent to injure. The charges arose from an incident on the night of August 3, 2014, and continuing into the early morning hours of August 4, in which Hurst and his co-defendant punched, kicked, and stomped on another individual, and also beat him with a stick and a shovel. The victim suffered a broken nose, broken ribs, internal bleeding, and lacerations of his liver and spleen. Hurst and his co-defendant also attempted to cut off a tattoo from the victim's arm and, after failing, tried to burn it off by pouring lighter fluid on the victim's arm and setting it on fire, causing third-degree burns. After he was taken to a hospital, the victim was treated for life-threatening injuries, underwent surgery, and had his burned arm amputated.

On March 20, 2015, the Circuit Court held a guilty plea hearing for Hurst, during which the following colloquy took place:

THE COURT: Do you understand what the State would have to prove for you to be found guilty of [attempted first-degree murder]?

THE DEFENDANT [HURST]: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Now, I'm told the maximum penalty is life in prison. My understanding from the State and defense is that, in exchange for your plea of guilt[y] to count 1, the remaining charges, second degree murder, first degree assault, second degree assault, reckless endangerment, dangerous weapon wear, carry and with intent to injure, would be dismissed by the State. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Furthermore, the State is not recommending a sentence of life, straight life, what they're recommending is that the Court impose a sentence of life and suspend all but 40 years. Do you understand that sentence?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: So because it is not a life sentence, because there's a suspended aspect to the sentence, it would not require a signature by the Governor in order to be released at the time for mandatory release or parole. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: This is a crime of violence, which means that you are required to serve fifty percent of any sentence before you are eligible for parole. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: So using simple math, if there is a 40-year active sentence, you would be presumably required to serve fifty percent of that sentence before you would be eligible for parole. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Is that how you wish to proceed, by way of that plea agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: This is not a binding plea agreement, which means the Court is not confined to impose the sentence recommended by the State. I can impose a lesser sentence more favorable to the defense. I can impose a greater sentence up to and including the maximum penalty of life. And if I were to do that you would not be free to withdraw your plea based upon the sentence that you receive, because it's within my discretion as part of this agreement. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Do you have any questions about the terms of the plea agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am.

Plea Hrg. Tr. at 9-11, ECF No. 4-2.

Respondents do not dispute that in Maryland, both now and at the time of the plea hearing, "an inmate serving a term of life imprisonment may only be paroled with the approval of the Governor." Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 7-301(d)(4) (LexisNexis 2017). Moreover, "an inmate who has been sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for parole consideration until the inmate has served 15 years or the equivalent of 15 years considering the allowances for diminution of the inmate's term of confinement." Id. § 7-301(d)(1). For purposes of parole eligibility, the statute makes no distinction based on whether any portion of a life sentence is suspended. SeeHanson v. Hughes, 447 A.2d 892, 895-96 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (holding that "where the sentence imposed was life imprisonment, notwithstanding that execution of a part of that sentence has been suspended . . . the inmate 'has been sentenced to life imprisonment' and not merely to the unsuspended part of it which he must serve in confinement" (citations omitted)). Thus, the Circuit Court's statement of the law on this issue was incorrect.

At the conclusion of the plea hearing, Hurst entered a plea of guilty to attempted first-degree murder, and the Circuit Court found that the plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. At the sentencing hearing on April 30, 2015, on the attempted first-degree murder conviction, the Circuit Court imposed the recommended sentence of life imprisonment with all but 40 years suspended, and the State entered nolle prosequi on the remaining counts. Hurst did not file a direct appeal from his conviction or sentence.

II. State Post-Conviction Proceedings

On March 28, 2016, Hurst filed a self-represented Petition for Post-Conviction Relief ("the State Petition") pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. §§ 7-101-7-204 (LexisNexis 2018). In the State Petition, Hurst asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to demand a competency hearing. On September 6, 2016, Hurst, through newly-appointed counsel, filed a Supplemental Petition for Post-Conviction Relief ("the Supplemental State Petition"), claiming that: (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to file a motion for a modification of the sentence after Hurst made a timely request; (2) Hurst's guilty plea was not entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the Circuit Court misadvised him that gubernatorial approval was not required for parole from a suspended life sentence; and (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to correctthe Circuit Court's advisement regarding parole eligibility and the necessity of gubernatorial approval.

At a post-conviction hearing on January 13, 2017, Hurst withdrew the issue relating to a competency hearing that was asserted in the State Petition and expressly stated that he understood that he was "forever waiving the ability to raise" that issue "in any . . . other proceeding." Post-Conviction Hrg. Tr. at 11-12, ECF No. 6-1. The State conceded that Hurst was entitled to file a motion for a modification of the sentence. Hurst then proceeded only on the remaining two claims in the Supplemental State Petition.

At the post-conviction hearing, Hurst testified that his trial counsel never told him that the Circuit Court gave him incorrect advice on the record regarding the requirement of gubernatorial approval for parole. The State presented the testimony of Hurst's trial counsel, which included the following:

Q: And during your discussions with the Petitioner with respect to the plea offer, did you discuss parole eligibility?

A: Yes.

Q: During the context of your discussions, did anything about the Governor come up?

A: The only discussions we would have had about Gubernatorial approval for release would have been if he received a life sentence. I did not have any discussions with him or inform him if Gubernatorial approval was required if he was sentenced to a numerical sentence.

Q: And [were] there any conversations about parole eligibility as to a crime of violence?

A: Yes.

Q: And what was that?

A: That he would be required to serve half of the given time before he would be eligible for parole.

Id. at 23. On cross examination, trial counsel testified that at the time she represented Hurst, it was her understanding that an individual serving "a life sentence with a term of years suspended" would be eligible for parole after serving one-half of that sentence, without gubernatorial approval. Id. at 25-26. On redirect examination, she stated that she advised Hurst that gubernatorial approval for parole was required on a sentence of "straight life." Id. at 26-27.

At the end of the post-conviction hearing, the State noted that "Hurst never testified that the plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary," to which Hurst's counsel asserted that he was not required to "testify to that" because "[i]t's an issue that's from the record." Id. at 36. The judge responded by stating, "He gave me some facts." Id.

On March 13, 2017, the state post-conviction court issued an opinion granting in part and denying in part Hurst's Supplemental State Petition. Specifically, the court granted Hurst leave to file a belated motion for modification of the sentence, as conceded by the State, and denied relief on the claims relating to the guidance he received on parole eligibility. The court did not address the withdrawn claim from the State Petition.

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