Hurt v. Exeter Fin.
| Docket Number | 4:23-CV-836 HEA |
| Decision Date | 25 August 2023 |
| Parties | BRENNEN HURT, Plaintiff, v. EXETER FINANCE, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Before the Court is plaintiff's response to the Order to Show Cause why this action should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After reviewing the response and for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3).
Plaintiff Brennen Hurt filed this action on June 29, 2023, by filing a form “Civil Complaint” naming Exeter Finance LLC and Jason Kulas, Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of Exeter, as defendants in this action. [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff claimed that the jurisdictional basis for the present action was “breach of contract.[1]” Although plaintiff did not appear to be bringing this action pursuant to the diversity statute, he asserted that Exeter Finance LLC was incorporated in Texas and had its principal place of business in Texas.[2] He failed to indicate the state of citizenship of defendant Jason Kulas.
Under the section of the complaint titled “Amount in Controversy,” plaintiff stated:
For relief in this action plaintiff requested “performance done by defendant.” He additionally requested all proceeds be returned to him, as well as damages from emotional distress and transportation fees, in total cost of $15,000.
Because plaintiff's complaint appeared to lack a basis for this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, on July 13, 2023 the Court directed plaintiff to show cause why this matter should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. [ECF No 3]. Plaintiff filed a response to the Court's Order on July 24, 2023. [ECF No. 4].
In his response to the Order to Show Cause, plaintiff asserts that this Court's jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or federal question jurisdiction. He claims that Exeter Finance LLC has violated his rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendment by “seizing plaintiff's personal property, without due process.”
Plaintiff also alleges, in a conclusory manner, that “[d]efendant has taken plaintiff['s] security/asset and has not compensated plaintiff. . .” And he asserts that “[d]efendant has failed to correctly disclose the terms and cost of consumer credit as required by the truth in lending act. . .”
Plaintiff's arguments are based on new causes of action and cannot form the basis for jurisdiction. See Morgan Distrib. Co. v. Unidynamic Corp., 868 F.2d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1989) (pointing out that a responsive brief is neither the time nor the place to raise a new claim). Nevertheless, the Court will address his claims.
It appears plaintiff is suing Exeter Finance, LLC and its CFO for repossession of his personal vehicle under Missouri State law breach of contract. Plaintiff does not identify the vehicle, nor does he state when he entered into the contract to purchase the vehicle. Plaintiff also fails to indicate who he purchased the vehicle from.
Exeter is an auto lending company that provides consumers assistance in purchasing personal vehicles. As noted in the Order to Show Cause issued on July 13, 2023, a state law breach of contract claim does not suffice to provide jurisdiction to this Court over this action.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Thomas v Basham, 931 F.2d 521, 522 (8th Cir. 1991). The existence of jurisdiction is a threshold requirement that must be assured in every federal case. Kronholm v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 915 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1987) (). The issue of the existence of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by any party or by the court. Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., 567 F.3d 976, 982 (8th Cir. 2009). The Court must dismiss any action over which it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
The Court has jurisdiction to hear cases involving the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the Court can hear cases where diversity jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Court will first address whether diversity jurisdiction exists in this matter.
Diversity jurisdiction exists when the parties are completely diverse, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Ryan ex rel. Ryan v. Schneider Nat. Carriers, Inc., 263 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 2001). The amount in controversy is to be ascertained from the complaint itself. Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 353 (1961). To satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of $75,000, punitive damages are included but “the existence of the required amount must be supported by competent proof.” OnePoint Sols., LLC v. Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 348 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted). When the Court questions whether the amount alleged is legitimate, “the party invoking federal jurisdiction must prove the requisite amount by a preponderance of the evidence.” State of Mo. ex rel. Pemiscot Cnty., Mo. v. W. Sur. Co., 51 F.3d 170, 173 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)).
Plaintiff, who has the burden here of proving diversity, must plead facts as to the states of citizenship of all of defendant Exeter Finance, LLC's members, and its member's members, at the time of case filing. E3 Biofuels, LLC v. Biothane, LLC, 781 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 2015). He has failed to do so, thus he is unable to prove diversity jurisdiction. Additionally, plaintiff indicates that the amount he has specifically lost in damages is $15,000, which is less than the required amount under the diversity statute.
In Missouri, punitive damages are not ordinarily available in breach of contract actions unless the conduct giving rise to the claim of breach also constitutes an independent, willful tort. Kelly v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 218 S.W.3d 517 (Mo.Ct.App. W.D. 2007). Even if plaintiff were to bring this action under the general tort of “fraud” in Missouri, stricter punitive damages guidelines were added to Missouri Revised Statute § 510.261 in August of 2020. Under those guidelines, punitive damages shall not be awarded unless the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant intentionally harmed the plaintiff without just cause or acted with deliberate and flagrant disregard for the safety of others. Id. Plaintiff has not alleged such actions by defendant Exeter. Thus, there is no indication that plaintiff can sustain a claim for punitive damages in this action.
Although plaintiff additionally claims damages for emotional distress, in Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mo. banc 1983), the Missouri Supreme Court held that a plaintiff in an emotional distress case, where the emotional distress is unaccompanied by physical injury, can only recover so long as: “(1) the defendant should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress; and (2) the emotional distress or mental injury must be medically diagnosable and must be of sufficient severity so as to be medically significant.”
(footnote omitted.) Thereafter, in Fetick v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 38 S.W.3d 415, 419 (Mo. banc 2001), the Missouri Supreme Court held that, to be compensable as damages for willful fraud, emotional distress must meet Bass's requirement of being “medically diagnosable and significant.” Plaintiff has not alleged that he has a medically diagnosable mental injury in this action. Thus, it does not appear that he is eligible for emotional distress damages under Missouri law.
Based on the above, plaintiff has not substantiated that he is able to meet the amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. As a result, this Court lacks diversity jurisdiction.
To continue reading
Request your trial