Hurt v. Horton

• Decision Date: 01 January 1854
• Citation: Hurt v. Horton, 12 Tex. 285 (Tex. 1854)
• Parties: HURT v. HORTON.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

12 Tex. 285

HURT

v.HORTON.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1854.

Where administration has been granted, and after the expiration of the period contemplated by law for the settlement of an estate, the administrator returns a final account and is discharged, the presumption is that the estate is fully administered; the property of the estate remains in the heirs unincumbered by the administrative trust, although liable for any subsisting claims remaining unpaid; and a second administration, under such circumstances, is prima facie (at least) void. (Note 57.)

Where an administrator's sale is invalid, and the administrator has settled his final account and been discharged, the heir, and not an administrator de bonis non, is the proper person to take advantage of the invalidity.

It is not necessary, in this case, to consider the exigencies under which an estate might be partially re-opened or administration granted for limited purposes, as, for instance, for the recovery or control of property not discovered, or which had not fallen in until after the close of administration.

Nor is it necessary to consider the cases in which the acts of an administrator, though under a void grant, if done in the due course of administration, shall not be void. Such, for instance, as the sale of property in payment of funeral expenses, debts, &c. There an administrator or executor being compelled to pay, the sale shall be indefeasible. (Note 58.)

Error from San Augustine. The record shows that John Anderson and Mrs. Shaw were administrator and administratrix of the estate of T. J. Shaw; that Mrs. Shaw having died, and Anderson having failed to make settlement, &c., was dismissed, and that Alexander Horton was appointed administrator de bonis non of the estate of T. J. Shaw, deceased, at the September Term, 1846, of the San Augustine County Court; that Horton, to pay debts, procured an order and sold a certificate for one league and labor, headright of said T. J. Shaw, together with right of location, &c., thereunto attached, and that William M. Hurt bid off the same, and the administrator reported the same to the County Court, and said Court sanctioned the said report, and ordered title to be made to the purchaser. At the May Term, 1848, of said Court, said Horton made a final settlement, and was discharged from said administration. At April Term, 1850, Alexander Horton applied again for administration on the same estate, and it was granted to him; got an order and sold the same certificate, (it being by this time matured into a patent,) sold the same to Reuben D. Woods, and applied to the County Court for confirmation of the sale, August 26th, 1850. On the same day, William M. Hurt, the former purchaser, filed in the County Court his statement of protest and objection to the confirmation of said last sale. At the August Term, these objections were considered and overruled, the last sale confirmed, and administrator ordered to make title to Wood. From all which Hurt gave notice of appeal to the District Court, and filed his bond, &c. The transcript having been sent up, the appeal was tried October Term, 1852, when the District Court affirmed the judgment of the County Court, with costs.

O. M. Roberts, for plaintiff in error. The administration having been closed by final settlement, the second administration was void, and the pretended administrator could confer no title to Wood, the second purchaser.

This case is very different from the case of Davis v. Stewart, Ad'r, 4 Tex. R., 223, which case was not “affirmed,” but dismissed by the District Court.

At the close of the previous administration, the power the Probate Court ceased, but still its confirmation of the last sale is “affirmed” by the District Court, which is contrary to Fisk v. Norvel, 9 Tex. R., 13.

HEMPHILL, CH. J.

The errors assigned are--

1st. In withdrawing the cause from the jury without the consent of parties.

2d. In trying the said cause upon the record without the hearing or consideration of any testimony outside of the record.

3d. In affirming the judgment of the Court below.

4th. In rendering judgment against plaintiff in error for the costs.

There is no foundation for the ground of error first assigned. It was on the plaintiff's own motion that the cause was withdrawn from the jury; and the action of the Court, sustaining his motion, is, as to him, no just cause of complaint.

In relation to the second assignment, it does not appear that there was any attempt to introduce any evidence in support of the issues made by the parties; and there was consequently no error in deciding the cause upon the record alone.

The third assignment presents the main question in the cause, and that is, whether there was error in affirming the judgment of the Probate Court.

This judgment and the proceedings on which it is founded, are judicial anomalies, which, it is presumed, are of rare occurrence on the records of our Courts. The proceedings show a lawful administration, a sale by the administrator, under an order of the Court, of a located league and labor of land, the only property of the estate, the report and confirmation...